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ABSTRACT 
Why are some countries more effective than others at controlling rhino poaching? 
Rhinos are being poached to extinction throughout much of the world, yet some weak 
and poor countries have successfully controlled rhino poaching. This dissertation presents 
a theory accounting for divergent patterns in the control of rhino poaching, explaining 
why rhino poaching has been controlled in some countries yet increases exponentially in 
others. It does so by examining the relational models predominant in each country with 
wild rhino populations, including institutional analysis of all rhino range states, detailed 
analysis of social constructions used by nearly two hundred conservationists in Nepal, 
Swaziland, and South Africa, and an analytic narrative exploring why Nepal effectively 
controlled poaching. This dissertation shows that when individuals relate to rhinos in a 
non-economic manner, rhino poaching can be controlled despite weak police capacity 
and huge profit incentives to participate in poaching. This dissertation thus demonstrates 
how constructing wildlife with non-economic social dimensions can enable even a weak 
and poor country to successful conserve highly endangered species. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
When Rhino Are Sacred 
In 2007, the future of wild rhinoceros in Nepal looked bleak. In the previous 
seven years, Nepal lost over 30 percent of its rhinos to poaching.1 One of the world’s 
leading experts on rhinos flatly stated, “Nepal probably had the worst rhino poaching of 
any country in the world.”2 In May 2006, the BBC reported that poaching “continues to 
sound alarm bells at the Royal Chitwan National Park,” and in New Delhi, headlines 
announced, “Poaching pushing Asian rhino in Nepal towards extinction.”3 
Yet by 2015, Nepal had essentially halted rhino poaching. In 2007, the Nepalese 
government initiated Operation Unicornis to foster political commitment and strengthen 
counter-poaching across Nepal.4 In 2010, Nepal’s Prime Minister elevated the issue by 
creating a ministerial-level inter-agency task force.5 These efforts succeeded. For three 
                                                 
1  Esmond Martin, Chryssee Martin and Lucy Vigne, "Recent Political Disturbances in Nepal Threaten 
Rhinos: Lessons to be Learned," Pachyderm 45 (2008), p. 99. 
 
2  Esmond Bradley Martin and Chryssee Martin, "Insurgency and Poverty: Recipe for Rhino Poaching in 
Nepal," Pachyderm, no. 41 (2006), p. 61. 
 
3  "Rhino Poaching Up in Nepal National Park." BBC Monitoring International Reports, May 7, 2006.; 
"Poaching Pushing Asian Rhino in Nepal Towards Extinction." The Hindustan Times, January 4, 2007. 
 
4  Kachan Thapa et al., "Past, Present and Future Conservation of the Greater One-Horned Rhinoceros 
Rhinoceros Unicornis in Nepal," Oryx 47, no. 3 (2013), 345-351. 
 
5  "Nepal Orders Investigation into Slaughter of Rhinos." The Telegraph, June 15, 2010. 
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separate 12-month periods since 2011, no rhinos were poached.6 Today, Nepal is the 
world’s leader in successful rhino conservation and the control of rhino poaching. 
Across the Indian Ocean, conservationists in Swaziland had reason to worry as a 
global crisis in rhino poaching erupted in 2007. Swaziland has historically struggled with 
rhino conservation. Rhinos were poached to extinction in Swaziland prior to their 
reintroduction in the 1965.7 A second wave of poaching decimated Swazi rhinos from 
November 1988 to December 1992. Swaziland’s rhinos were nearly poached to 
extinction, at times losing one rhino every two weeks, including up to three per day.8  
Beyond this troubled conservation record, Swaziland is geographically vulnerable 
to poaching. Nestled between South Africa and Mozambique, the entire country lies 
within 200 kilometers of the poaching crisis’ epicenter in Kruger National Park, a 
protected area larger than Swaziland itself. The 2011 poaching of two Swazi rhinos 
demonstrates that poaching remains possible.9 Yet just outside Kruger’s southern 
entrance and South Africa’s Intensive Protection Zone, where two rhinos are killed every 
day, Swaziland has effectively controlled rhino poaching. Beyond the two rhinos lost in 
2011, no rhinos have been poached in Swaziland since the crisis began.10 
                                                 
6  Ishwar Rauniyar, "Nepal's Rhino Numbers Rise Steadily Thanks to Anti-Poaching Measures," The 
Guardian, May 16, 2015. 
 
7  Scott Ramsay, "Swaziland: Showing Africa how to Save Rhinos," African Geographic, April 30, 2014, . 
 
8  Ted Reilly, "Rhinos in Swaziland," Pachyderm, no. 24 (1997), 65. 
 
9  Tom Milliken, Illegal Trade in Ivory and Rhino Horn: An Assessment Report to Improve Law 
Enforcement Under the Wildlife TRAPS Project (Cambridge: TRAFFIC International, 2014). 
 
10  Richard H. Emslie, African Rhinoceros: Latest Trends in Rhino Numbers and Poaching (Geneva, 
Switzerland: CITES Secretariat, 2013), 2. 
3 
Next to Swaziland geographically and comparatively, South Africa’s failure to 
control rhino poaching provides a stark contrast. Less than an hour’s drive from 
Swaziland is the Malelane Gate to South Africa’s Kruger National Park. This protected 
area is the flagship site for South African National Parks, a world leader in wildlife 
conservation, including rhinos. Few species illustrated South Africa’s strength in 
conservation like the white rhino prior to 2007. In the 1960s, white rhinos were poached 
to the brink of extinction; at their nadir, an estimated 20-50 white rhinos remained in the 
world.11 In the four decades following, South African conservationists restored this 
population to over 20,000 animals, exporting rhinos to reestablish populations elsewhere 
and keeping nearly 90 percent of the world’s rhinos within South African borders.12 This 
success in introducing rhinos coincided with effectively controlling their poaching; from 
1990 to 2006, South Africa managed an average of just 15 animals lost to poaching per 
year, with some years as few as five or six and only one year as high as 26.13 Until the 
current poaching crisis, South Africa led rhino conservation worldwide, and many 
considered it the paradigm of successful conservation. 
Yet in the last decade, South Africa reversed its earlier success in controlling 
poaching. After 36 rhinos were poached in South Africa in 2006, the number of rhinos 
poached in South Africa has nearly doubled every year since 2008. By 2014, over 1,200 
                                                 
11  Liana Sun Wyler and Pervaze A. Sheikh, International Illegal Trade in Wildlife: Threats and U.S. 
Policy Congressional Research Service, 2013), 8. 
 
12 Ibid. 
 
13  Tom Milliken and Jo Shaw, The South Africa-Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus (London: TRAFFIC, 
2012)., 69. 
 
4 
rhinos were killed by poachers, with no ready solutions in sight.14 Inside the Malelane 
Gate lies Kruger National Park’s Intensive Protection Zone, where despite South African 
Defense Force patrols, heliborne quick reaction forces with armed rangers and infrared 
detection, and fences resembling a maximum security prison, more than two rhinos per 
day continue to be lost to poachers. One of the world’s leading experts on wildlife 
trafficking concisely summarized South Africa’s present state of rhino poaching: 
“Africa’s rhinos face an ongoing crisis.”15 
 
The Puzzle 
Why do some poor, weak countries control poaching? 
The success of Nepal and Swaziland in controlling rhino poaching is puzzling, 
especially given South Africa’s failure to do so. Both Nepal and Swaziland are relatively 
weak and poor countries, where corruption and trafficking of other illicit products is 
commonplace. Comparatively, South Africa has significantly more government capacity 
and economic activity. Moreover, dominant theoretical paradigms that explain 
conservation outcomes stress both state capacity and economic incentives as drivers of 
successful conservation policies. 
These divergent cases in the control of rhino poaching offer both specific and 
general empirical puzzles. Specifically, I ask why campaigns to counter rhino poaching 
have succeeded in countries with weak police capacity and poor socioeconomic 
                                                 
14  David McKenzie and Brent Swails, "Rhino Wars: Inside South Africa's Losing Battle to End Poaching," 
CNN, September 22, 2015. 
 
15  Milliken, Illegal Trade in Ivory and Rhino Horn: An Assessment Report to Improve Law Enforcement 
Under the Wildlife TRAPS Project, 22. 
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development, including both Nepal and Swaziland. This specific question underlines a 
more general inquiry about conservation and environmental governance: why are some 
communities more effective than others at controlling poaching? 
Wildlife policy is a neglected topic in social science. Aside from brief mentions 
by “most of the early anthropologists, wildlife and its use did not fit well the concepts of 
either the modernization theorists or their dependency critics.”16 Consequently, the study 
of wildlife policy “remained the purview of natural scientists” up until the environmental 
crises of the 1970s,17 and “surprisingly little social science research has been directed 
toward the topic of poaching.”18  
Where social science has considered wildlife use and conservation, two 
theoretical strands dominate the literature: work emphasizing coercive structures of the 
state, and explorations of individual preferences and markets regarding uses of wildlife. 
A common assumption for understanding poaching attributes the practice to 
insufficient government capacity and control. In research, this approach can focus on 
inadequacies in administrative capacity or scientific knowledge, and “generally claims 
that with greater political will, better information, better equipment, better staff, and more 
money, policymakers and their agents would create wildlife policy to improve 
conservation outcomes.”19 Ostrom (1990) traces this approach to a fundamental 
assumption of that a Leviathan or powerful coercive actor is needed to structure wildlife 
                                                 
16  Clark C. Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5. 
 
17  Ibid. 
 
18  Stephen L. Eliason, "The Illegal Taking of Wildlife: Towards a Theoretical Understanding of Poaching," 
Human Dimensions of Wildlife 4, no. 2 (1999), 29. 
 
19  Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa, 6 
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interactions and prevent over-consumption.20 The significance of this embedded 
assumption of conservation as a function of government capacity can be seen in green 
militarization, increasingly militarized state and non-state responses to conservation and 
especially poaching.21 This approach leads one to conclude that state coercive and police 
capacity are key to controlling poaching. 
Parallel to this assumption that government capacity determines the control of 
poaching is a liberal assumption that poaching is a function of actors’ preferences. In 
contrast to the Leviathan, Ostrom identified this paradigm as a fundamental preference 
for market solutions.22 Gibson (1999) described this approach as featuring “the ‘human 
dimensions’ of wildlife policy” while investigating “the incentives that policies generate 
for the individuals who experience the externalities of living with wildlife.”23 Gibson’s 
own path-breaking work in explaining poaching extended this emphasis on actor 
preferences to a new institutional approach, exploring how individuals and groups use 
                                                 
20  Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162, no. 3859 (1968), 1243-1248.; William 
Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity (San Francisco: Freeman, 1973).; Garrett Hardin, Living 
within Limits : Ecology, Economics, and Population Taboos, eBook ed. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
 
21  Elizabeth Lunstrum, "Green Militarization: Anti-Poaching Efforts and the Spatial Contours of Kruger 
National Park," Annals of the Association of American Geographers 104, no. 4 (2014), 816-832. 
 
22  Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," The American Economic Review 57, no. 2 
(1967), 347-359.; Omotunde E. G. Johnson, "Economic Analysis, the Legal Framework and Land Tenure 
Systems," Journal of Law and Economics 15, no. 1 (1972), 259-76.; Robert J. Smith, "Resolving the 
Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife," Cato Journal 1, no. 2 (1981), 
439-468.; W. P. Welch, "The Political Feasibility of Fuller Ownership Property Rights: The Cases of 
Pollution and Fisheries," Policy Sciences 16, no. 2 (1983), 165-180. 
 
23  Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa, 5-6. 
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wildlife to gain private advantage.24 In practice, this paradigm points toward economics 
to explain poaching, particularly through ecotourism.25  
In this context, the contemporary crisis in rhino poaching provides a striking 
puzzle. Countries with the strongest state capacity and economic sectors have 
experienced runaway poaching, demonstrated most strongly in South Africa. Yet some 
countries, particularly those with weak policy capacity and small economic sectors, have 
successfully controlled rhino poaching. 
  
                                                 
24  Ibid. 
 
25  Michael 't Sas-Rolfes, Saving African Rhinos: A Market Success Story (Bozeman: 2011).; Gregory 
Warner, "Can Economics Save the African Rhino? : Planet Money : NPR," Npr Planet Money May 15, 
2013. 
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Table 1.1 Control of Rhino Poaching, By Country, 2005-2015. 
Controlled (n=5) Not Controlled (n=9) 
• Botswana 
• Nepal 
• Swaziland 
• Tanzania 
• Zambia 
• Democratic Republic of Congo 
• India 
• Kenya 
• Malaysia 
• Mozambique 
• Namibia 
• South Africa 
• Vietnam 
• Zimbabwe 
Excluded from analysis: Indonesia, Malawi, and Uganda. 
 
Table 1.2 State Capacity, Measured by Government Revenue in 2005. 
 
  
 Poaching Controlled 
Poaching  
Not Controlled 
High State Capacity (revenue 
> US$ 20 billion) None 
India 
South Africa 
Malaysia (extirpation) 
Vietnam (extirpation) 
Low State Capacity 
(revenue < US US$ 5 billion) 
Botswana 
Tanzania 
Nepal 
Zambia 
Swaziland 
Kenya 
Namibia 
Zimbabwe 
Mozambique (extirpation) 
DR Congo (extirpation) 
9 
 
Table 1.3: Economic Incentives, Measured by Tourism Visitors in 2005. 
 Poaching  Controlled 
Poaching  
Not Controlled 
High Economic 
Incentives 
(Tourism > 1,000,000 
visitors) 
Botswana 
 
India 
South Africa 
Malaysia (extirpation) 
Vietnam (extirpation) 
Kenya 
Low Economic 
Incentives  
(Tourism < 1,000,000 
visitors) 
Tanzania 
Nepal 
Zambia 
Swaziland 
Namibia 
Zimbabwe 
Mozambique (extirpation) 
DR Congo (extirpation) 
 
 
Table 1.4: Economic Incentives, Measured by Tourism Receipts in 2005. 
 Poaching Controlled 
Poaching  
Not Controlled 
High Economic 
Incentives 
(Receipts > US$ 400 
million) 
Botswana 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Malaysia (extirpation) 
South Africa 
India 
Vietnam (extirpation) 
Kenya 
Low Economic 
Incentives 
(Receipts < US$ 400 
million) 
Nepal 
Swaziland 
Namibia 
Mozambique (extirpation) 
Zimbabwe 
DR Congo (extirpation) 
 
Moreover, among the countries that have effectively controlled poaching, 
trafficking of other illicit products such as drugs, human persons, arms, and even rhino 
horn poached from outside the country remains high, as does corruption.  State capacity 
and socioeconomic development are poor predictors of whether a country can effectively 
control poaching. But the success of cases like Nepal and Swaziland in stopping this 
particular type of crime, coupled with the co-existence of other criminal sectors, begs 
10 
systematic investigation.  This dissertation investigates the reasons why, despite 
conventional wisdom to the contrary, anti-rhino poaching campaigns have been effective 
in poor, weak countries.  
 
The Argument 
Constructing rhinos in non-economic ways makes poaching a taboo trade-off, 
facilitating the control of poaching through moral outrage and moral cleansing. 
At the risk of offering a simple explanation, I argue that understanding successful 
rhino conservation today comes down to money. Amid the fantastically lucrative profit 
potential that exists anywhere there is rhino horn, poaching occurs where people see 
rhinos as economic opportunities.  However, social psychology suggests that economic 
perspectives are just one form of social relationship.26 In contrast, when people see rhinos 
as part of their community or important to a common authority, effective control of rhino 
poaching becomes possible. 
 I argue that when people when people construct rhinos in reference to their 
community or an authority, poaching rhinos becomes a taboo-tradeoff and elicits the 
moral outrage and cleansing behaviors that facilitate its effective control.27 Such moral 
                                                 
26  Alan Fiske, Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations (New York: Free 
Press, 1991).; A. P. Fiske, "The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality: Framework for a Unified Theory of 
Social Relations," Psychological Review 99, no. 4 (October, 1992), 689-723. 
 
27  Alan Fiske and Philip Tetlock, "Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions that Transgress the 
Spheres of Justice," Political Pyschology 18, no. 2 (1997), 255-297.; P. E. Tetlock et al., "The Psychology 
of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals." Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 78, no. 5 (May, 2000), 853-70.; Craig MacMillan and Colin Wastell, 
"Taboo Trade-Offs, Moral Outrage and the Moral Limits of Markets," Macquarie Economics Research 
Papers 2 (2008).; A. Peter McGraw, Janet A. Schwartz and Philip E. Tetlock, "From the Commercial to the 
Communal: Reframing Taboo Trade-Offs in Religious and Pharmaceutical Marketing," Journal of 
Consumer Research 39, no. 1 (June, 2012), 157. 
11 
outrage and cleansing behaviors are absent in communities where people construct rhinos 
as economic resources, leaving the control of rhino poaching to the capacity of the police 
and/or market incentives. 
Bridging literature on the governance of socio-ecological systems, psychological 
decision-making, and illicit markets, I explain the effectiveness of anti-rhino poaching in 
the following way: where non-market priced relational schemata predominate in a 
community’s orientation towards rhinos, rhino poaching becomes a taboo-trade off. 
Poachers threaten the social relationships of individuals in that community, who respond 
by symbolically disassociating themselves with the poachers (expressing moral outrage) 
and seeking to punish both poachers (norm violators) and those who tolerate poaching 
(metanorm violators). These behaviors buttress police capacity and dampen profit 
incentives for poaching, thereby facilitating effective policy responses to poaching. 
My approach follows the leading edge of understanding conservation outcomes 
by focusing on institutions within communities. By studying relational models and 
governance rules as institutions, I follow Ostrom (1990)’s path-breaking work showing 
community institutions as decisive for common pool resources (CPRs). Ostrom called for 
“theoretical development that can help identify variables that must be included in any 
effort to explain and predict when appropriates user smaller-scale CPRs are more likely 
to self-organize and govern their own CPRs, and when they are more likely to fail.”28 
This dissertation identifies relational models as critical variables for such analysis. 
My approach also recognizes that such institutions cut both ways, enabling and 
challenging successful conservation outcomes. Gibson (1999) demonstrates institutions 
                                                 
28  Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 183. 
12 
“thwart or augment natural resource conservation,” interacting with “wildlife policies that 
[can] have little relevance or legitimacy in the eyes of those individuals who can make or 
break conservation initiatives.”29 My research demonstrates how non-economic 
constructions of wildlife can enable the control of poaching, and conversely, how 
economic approaches can thwart such control and potentially lead to more poaching. 
By focusing my analysis on norms within communities, my research joins other 
leading contemporary work critically exploring conservation outcomes. Agrawal and 
Gibson (2001) call exploring how community institutions influence outcomes of political 
processes in conservation, particularly in norms that “may not prevent over-exploitation 
of resources” and may even “be a significant part of the problem to a conservationist if a 
norm promotes exploitation.”30 Relational models show why some norms mitigate 
against resource exploitation, while norms contribute to it. Investigating the varying 
modes of thought expressed in relational models, relational models theory can illuminate 
“the appropriate conjunction of theories of bounded rationality and full rationality,” 
identified by Ostrom, Gardiner and Walker as key to theoretically understanding common 
pool resource dilemmas.31 Lastly, this dissertation avoids Ostrom’s “panacea trap” of 
studying resource governance.32 By considering the full universe of cases for rhino range 
states, and particular outcomes of case studies in Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa, 
                                                 
29  Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa, 164. 
 
30  Arun Agrawal and Clark Gibson, eds., Communities and the Environment: Ethnicity, Gender, and the 
State in Community-Based Conservation (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2001), 20 and 11. 
 
31  Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner and James Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 327. 
 
32  Elinor Ostrom and Michael Cox, "Moving Beyond Panaceas: A Multi-Tiered Diagnostic Approach for 
Social-Ecological Analysis," Environmental Conservation 37, no. 04 (2010), 451-463. 
13 
this research demonstrates that relational models are an important consideration in “a 
diagnostic approach in selecting appropriate starting points for governance and 
monitoring” and facilitating “learning from the outcomes of new policies and adapting in 
light of effective feedback.”33 Each case is unique, yet the innate, fundamental, and 
universal role of relational models occurs across this variance.34 This dissertation will 
demonstrate that relational models matter for explaining the effective control of 
poaching.  
 
The Evidence 
Analysis of institutional rules associated with rhino conservation suggests a 
relationship between non-economic relational models and successful control of 
poaching. Case studies of Nepal, South Africa, and Swaziland illustrate how non-
economic approaches facilitate control of poaching through moral outrage and 
cleansing, even where state capacity is weak and profit incentives are high. 
To explore the question of why some countries have effectively controlled rhino 
poaching while others have not, I compare the universe of cases of countries with wild 
rhino populations. I specifically consider institutions involved with protected area 
management, building on work such as Gibson (1999) and Ostrom (1991) highlighting 
the critical role of institutions in understanding wildlife policy and common pool resource 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
 
34  Alan P. Fiske, "Relational Models Theory 2.0," in Relational Models Theory: A Contemporary 
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governance.35 I also consider factors such as state capacity and economic preferences, 
while showing these are insufficient for explaining why some countries have effectively 
controlled rhino poaching while most have not. 
I utilize several types of evidence to support my argument, including analysis of 
all states with wild rhinos (rhino range states) and qualitative data from three case 
studies: South Africa, Swaziland, and Nepal.  
Before proceeding farther in my argument, I will briefly define terms I will refer 
to throughout this book. A rhino is any odd-toed ungulate from the animal family 
Rhinocerotidae.36 There are five extant species of rhino, two in Africa (the white 
rhinoceros, Ceratotherium simum, and the black rhinoceros, Diceros bicornis), and three 
in Asia (the Indian rhinoceros, Rhinoceros unicornis, the Javan rhinoceros (Rhinoceros 
sondaicus, and the Sumatran rhinoceros (Dicerorhinus sumatrensis). In total, 29,000 
rhinos remain in the world, a population decline of 94% in the last century and 60% in 
the last 45 years.37 
In 2008, rhinos existed in the wild in 12 African countries and 5 Asian countries; 
these are collectively known as rhino range states.38  Of the African rhino range states, 
Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe each have 
                                                 
35  Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa; Ostrom, 
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, 280 
 
36 For an excellent history of the rhino as species, see  Kelly Enright, Rhinoceros (London: Reaktion Books, 
Ltd., 2008). 
 
37  Lucy Olivia Smith and Lucas Porsch, The Costs of Illegal Wildlife Trade: Elephant and Rhino. (Berlin: 
Ecologic Institute, 2015), 16. 
 
38  Richard H. Emslie, Tom Milliken and Bibhab Talukdar, "African and Asian Rhinoceroses: Status, 
Conservation, and Trade" 2013. 
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populations greater than 100 rhinos. In Asia, India, Indonesia and Nepal have populations 
greater than 100 rhinos. Since the current crisis began, rhinos have become extinct in 
Vietnam in 2010,39 in Mozambique in 2013,40 and in probably in Malaysia by 2013.41 
Poaching is “any act that intentionally contravenes the laws and regulations 
established to protect wild, renewable resources,” including rhinos.42 This includes illegal 
harvesting of wildlife, but also ancillary activities such as purchasing, transporting, 
possessing, using, and other activities associated with illegal wildlife trafficking. 
Poaching occurs in a variety of forms, including both sustenance hunters and trophy 
hunters.43 However, this dissertation focuses on commercial or market poaching—
poaching to gain economic benefits— as this is the primary driver of the current crisis in 
rhino poaching.44 Poaching is controlled when rhinos are no longer poached in an area, 
aside from sporadic isolated incidents. 
This dissertation will refer extensively to relational models, structures that guide 
social interactions. Fiske (1991) identified four fundamental, innate, and universal 
relational models that structure most, if not all, social action, thought, and motivation.  
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
 
40  Aislinn Laing, "Last Rhinos in Mozambique Killed by Poachers," The TelegraphApril 30, 2013.  
 
41  Rasmus Gren Havmøller et al., "Will Current Conservation Responses Save the Critically Endangered 
Sumatran Rhinoceros Dicerorhinus Sumatrensis?" Oryx (November 27, 2015). 
 
42  Robert M. Muth and Jr Bowe John F., "Illegal Harvest of Renewable Natural Resources in North 
America: Toward a Typology of the Motivations for Poaching," Society and Natural Resources 11 (1998), 
11. 
 
43  Richard A. Brymer, "The Emergence and Maintenance of a Deviant Sub-Culture: The Case of 
Hunting/Poaching Sub-Culture," Anthropologica 33, no. 1 (1991), 177-194. 
 
44  Milliken and Shaw, The South Africa-Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus.  
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The four models structure interactions between individuals based on (1) what they 
have in common, or communal sharing; (2) ordered differences, or authority ranking; (3) 
additive imbalances, or equality matching; or (4) ratios, or market pricing.  These models 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
 
Why Study Rhinos? 
 
Conservation of the world’s most financially valuable animal offers 
important insight for environmental politics, global governance, illicit market 
trafficking, and political economy. 
 
There are compelling theoretical reasons to study varying outcomes in the control 
of rhino poaching. First, rhino poaching provides rich insight into environmental politics. 
Rhinos are simultaneously vulnerable and valuable; their very existence reflects the 
authoritative allocation of value. They are charismatic megafauna, popular animals that 
focus attention on conservation issues and priorities.45 After being hunted to the brink of 
extinction in the 1950s, anywhere a rhino exists in the wild represents some form of 
successful wildlife conservation policy and practice. Yet rhinos demand much from 
ecosystems; conserving the world’s second largest land mammal can entail costs 
approaching $40,000 USD per animal per year. Moreover, rhino horn is presently the 
world’s most valuable commodity by weight, exceeding both licit commodities like gold 
                                                 
45 For a detailed exploration on the concept of charismatic megafauna, see Abigail Entwistle and Nigel 
Dunstone, Priorities for the Conservation of Mammalian Diversity: Has the Panda had its Day? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 53-81. 
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and illicit items such as cocaine.46 As such, policies and outcomes associated with rhinos 
are inherently political.  
Second, rhinos also provide insight into understanding governance, including 
global governance. Rhino conservation involves diverse actors drawing from wide ranges 
of authority, including state conservation and security actors, international conservation 
and development organizations, celebrities, natural and social scientists, international and 
local non-governmental organizations, and transnational criminal networks. Intersecting 
relationships of authority and accountability complicate rhino conservation actions, and 
rhino poaching outcomes can illuminate these dynamics. In this sense, rhinos can be 
considered indicator species not only for their environments, but also for contemporary 
global governance. 
Third, rhino poaching is an important case for understanding trafficking and illicit 
markets. Rhino poaching involves a complex network of trafficking in wildlife, weapons, 
drugs, and human beings.47 These networks cross boundaries of licit and illicit behaviors, 
blurring national boundaries and reaching into everyday lives.48 With ties crossing into 
transnational criminal syndicates and terrorism, wildlife trafficking has recently become 
an official national security concern of the leading powers, including the United States.49 
Yet in many respects, rhino poaching also presents a clearer subject than related cases 
                                                 
46  Gwynn Guilford, "Why does a Rhino Horn Cost $300,000? Because Vietnam Thinks it Cures Cancer 
and Hangovers," The Atlantic, May 15, 2013. 
 
47  Paul Kvinta, "The Madness of Modern-Day Poaching," Outside, April, 2014. 
 
48  Carolyn Nordstrom, Global Outlaws: Crime, Money, and Power in the Contemporary World (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 2007). 
 
49  Executive Order 13648 of July 1, 2013, Establishing an Presidential Task Force on Wildlife Trafficking, 
2013). 
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such as elephant poaching or big cat poaching. Rhino populations exist in relatively 
small, well-documented populations. Poached rhino create large signatures, and 
consequently nearly all rhino poaching events are discovered and documented, enabling 
clear identification of outcomes in the control of rhino poaching. As such, rhino poaching 
may offer visibility into the frequently opaque world of wildlife trafficking. 
Moreover, the small universe of rhino range states feeding the single global 
market for rhino horn facilitates comparative analysis of varying national responses to a 
global price shock. Prior to 2006, rhino poaching rates had remained essentially stable for 
the previous twenty years. The price of rhino horn on global markets was also essentially 
stable, at approximately $1,000 USD per kilogram.50 However, by 2008, surging demand 
from Vietnam coincided with skyrocketing price in rhino horn.51 By 2015, the global 
price for rhino horn was estimated to exceed $100,000 USD per kilogram, making rhino 
horn the most expensive commodity in the world by weight.52 This hundredfold increase 
in price triggered an explosion in rhino poaching around the world, as poaching rates 
grew exponentially each year since 2008. Understanding why some countries have 
controlled rhino poaching, while most have not, can help us understand divergent 
responses to changes in global markets.  
  
                                                 
50 Tom Milliken and Jo Shaw, “The South Africa-Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus: A Deadly 
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Figure 1.1: Price per kilogram of Rhino Horn, 1950-2015 
 
 
 
Policy Implications 
Stop making rhino conservation about money. 
The policy implications for understanding the control of rhino poaching are stark 
and immediate. Wild rhino populations are in crisis, and could face extinction within 10 
years. Officials in South Africa are incrementally legalizing rhino horn exchanges; this 
policy could lead South Africa to restore the international trade in rhino horn or withdraw 
from the Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES), one of 
the world’s most successful international institutions. At the same time, efforts to counter 
rhino poaching increasingly resemble armed conflict. Each year, hundreds of poachers 
and rangers are killed in firefights contesting rhinos and elephants.53 Drastic measures 
                                                 
53  Laurel Neme, "For Rangers on the Front Lines of Anti-Poaching Wars, Daily Trauma," National 
Geographic News, June 27, 2014. 
USD 0
USD 20,000
USD 40,000
USD 60,000
USD 80,000
USD 100,000
USD 120,000
Ye
ar
19
73
19
77
19
81
19
85
19
89
19
93
19
97
20
01
20
05
20
09
20
13
Price per kg of Rhino Horn, 1950-2015
Price per kg of
Rhino Horn
20 
beyond combat include controversial dehorning of live rhinos and airlifting rhinos to 
potential sanctuary locations in Botswana.54 Yet despite the assumption that rhinos will 
be safer in Botswana than elsewhere in Africa, little knowledge exists as to whether or 
why Botswana is more effective at controlling rhino poaching.  
This dissertation will show that social constructions of rhino play a critical 
influence on whether or nor their poaching can be effectively controlled. As such, 
conservation measures that reinforce market-priced social constructions may not only be 
ineffective, they may actually increase the likelihood of rhino poaching.  
 
Plan of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation proceeds as follows. In the next chapter, I identify a social 
theory of the control of poaching, building on Fiske’s relational model approach to 
develop testable hypotheses regarding relational models and the control of rhino 
poaching, plus alternative hypotheses considering state capacity and economic 
conditions. In chapter three, I survey the universe of rhino range states, using formal 
institutional rules as proxy measures for relational models to determinate relationships 
between such models and poaching outcomes. In chapter four, I consider in depth the 
cases of Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa, to illustrate how individuals actually 
manifest these relational models. In chapter five, I use an analytic narrative to examine 
the role of moral mechanisms engendered by non-economic relational models in Nepal’s 
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News, March 30, 2015. 
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effective control of poaching. In chapter six, I conclude by summarizing my findings, 
identifying their limitations, and addressing their theoretical and practical implications. 
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CHAPTER TWO: A SOCIAL THEORY OF CONTROLLING POACHING 
RELATIONAL MODELS AND MORAL MECHANISMS 
This chapter presents a social theory of the control of poaching. After a 
literature review tracing contours in conservation literature emphasizing state 
capacity, individual preference, and mediating communities, this chapter focuses on 
contemporary research into wildlife value orientations and individual decisions 
whether to poach or not poach. Relational models theory offers explanatory 
potential for this decision, particularly through the sacred value protection model 
and moral responses to taboo trade-off reasoning. The chapter synthesizes this 
literature into a social theory for the control of poaching, including alternative 
hypotheses for conventional explanations regarding state capacity and economic 
incentives, before concluding with a research design to investigation observable 
implications in conservation outcomes involving poaching. 
Literature on environmental politics and conservation points to individual 
decision-making as critical to understanding poaching.55 Yet why individuals choose to 
poach or not poach is not understood, nor how communities control poaching behavior. I 
begin this chapter by summarizing the three major themes in understanding wildlife 
                                                 
55 I’m grateful to the following works for influencing the organization and composition of this chapter: 
Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security; Chenoweth and Stephan, Why 
Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict; Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The 
Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa. 
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policy and conservation outcomes, which collectively point to an individual decision in 
the context of structuring community. In the second section, I show how relational 
models can help explain this decision, namely whether individuals choose to poach. In 
the third section, I apply relational models theory to advance a social theory of the control 
of rhino poaching, including general and specific hypotheses for the impact of relational 
models on poaching outcomes. In the fourth section, I introduce my research design and 
justify claims I am making in this investigation. 
 
Major Approaches to Understanding Wildlife Policy and Conservation Outcomes 
Political science literature addressing environmental outcomes like poaching 
developed along three major themes: an original emphasis on structures of state coercive 
capacity, a later focus on the role of market incentives and individual preferences, and 
current work exploring the role of communities in shaping conservation. These themes 
emerged only recently, as political science largely neglected conservation and wildlife 
policy for much of the field’s development. 
In the field of political science, wildlife and conservation are nascent objects of 
interest, particularly in the developing world. Bryant and Bailey (1997) characterized the 
related study of political ecology as “an emerging research field” that before the 1980s, 
“could scarcely be said to have existed at all.”56 This field’s youth results from an 
artificial independence between social and natural sciences, and “the assumption that 
environmental politics can be separated from the principles and laws of environmental 
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science.”57 Gibson (1999) noted that “social scientists have generally ignored African 
wildlife as a topic of research,” leaving such studies to “the purview of natural 
scientists.”58 Gibson attributed this neglect to the ill fit of conservation with dominant 
theoretical approaches within social sciences, particularly modernization.59 As a result, 
Ostrom (1990) observed, “We do not yet have the necessary intellectual tools or models 
to understand the array of problems that are associated with governing and managing 
natural resource systems.”60 As recently as 2003, an editorial in the journal Conservation 
Biology declared that “the social sciences must become central to conservation science 
and practice,” noting the question “is not whether to integrate the social sciences into 
conservation but how to do so.”61 To acquire such tools and integrate social science into 
understanding conservation, political scientists initially turned to the structuring capacity 
of the state.  
This initial focus within conservation literature emphasized the coercive capacity 
of the state to solve the problem of resource use exceeding environmental limits. Hardin 
(1968) called attention to this so-called tragedy of the commons, plainly stately that 
“individuals locked into the logic of the commons are free only to bring on universal 
ruin; once they see the necessity of mutual coercion, they become free to pursue other 
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58 Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa, 5. 
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goals.”62 Ophuls (1977) argued that for effective collective action regarding the 
environment, “the only solution is a sufficient measure of coercion,” and that “we shall 
necessarily move from liberty toward authority, for the community will have to be given 
sufficient means to enforce its demands on individuals.”63 In his survey of conservation 
challenges of the early 1970s, Ehrenfeld (1972) concluded, “If private interests cannot be 
expected to protect the public domain, then external regulation by public agencies, 
governments, or international authorities is needed.”64 This theoretical focus on 
structuring individual decisions through coercive state capacity appears in early 
environmental policy interventions such as the creation of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (1970), the Clean Water (1972) and Endanger Species Protection (1973) Acts, 
and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and 
Fauna (1973). However, this approach emphasizing state coercive structures paid 
insufficient detail to agential interactions and roles of individual preferences. 
A second theme of explanations for environmental outcomes focuses on how 
individuals respond to structuring environments. Assuming that individuals seek to 
maximize benefits and minimize costs, Demsetz (1967) emphasized the function of 
property regimes in internalizing effects of resource allocation, both beneficial and 
harmful. Demsetz specifically argued for private property institutions as a solution to 
poaching, citing the emergence of such rights in some indigenous American communities 
engaged in the fur trade. Based largely on his analysis of Frank G. Speck’s anthropologic 
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research on Montagnais Indians in Quebec and Labrador, Demsetz noted “the fur trade 
made it economic to encourage the husbanding of fur-bearing animals. Husbanding 
requires the ability to prevent poaching and this, in turn, suggests that socioeconomic 
changes in property in hunting land will take place.”65 Demsetz’s conclusion was purely 
functional, failing to consider colonial influences nor any motivation beyond individual 
wealth maximization. Similarly, O. Johnson (1972) argued that a lack of private property 
rights inhibits “rapid growth” in land-using activities, assuming that rapid growth equates 
to increasing value.66 These works explored individual responses to structures, but 
privileged the assumption that individuals seek first to maximize private ends. 
Later scholars extended this focus on privatization to normative dimensions. 
Smith (1981) argues that “the problem of overexploitation or overharvesting is a result of 
the resource’s being under public rather than private ownership.”67 After revisiting 
Speck’s analysis of the Montagnais Indians, Smith goes on to cite “game ranches, 
hunting preserves, safari parks, and animal and bird farms” as “examples of how private 
ownership can successfully preserve wildlife.”68 This leads Smith to flatly conclude:  
the single most important element in wildlife survival was their removal from 
common property ownership. . . . The problems of environmental degradation, 
overexploitation of natural resources, and depletion of wildlife all derive from 
their existence as common property resources. Wherever we find an approach to 
the extension of private property rights in these areas, we find superior results.69 
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According to this approach, if one wishes to prevent the overharvesting of 
wildlife, privatization is the only solution. Other major works that explore environmental 
outcomes from a liberal perspective include Sinn (1984), who studied the effect of 
ownership structures on oil markets, and Welch (1983), who examined the feasibility of 
privatizing ownership structures.70 In exploring consequences of who owns natural 
resources, this literature shifted focus from earlier capacity based explanations to the 
human dimensions of wildlife policy. 
The human dimension of wildlife policy locates conservation outcomes at the 
individual level of analysis. Bell (1987) called for “conservation with a human facing,” 
declaring “any programme that emphasizes long-term communal benefits at the expense 
of short-term individual benefits will be met with resistance.”71 Despite judging 
“utilitarian justification of conservation to be opportunistic, unrealistic, and 
counterproductive,” Bell identifies that “public discussion of costs and benefits is 
couched almost exclusively in terms of . . . the utilitarian and monetary consequences of 
conservation or the lack of it.”72 Bell attributed this to prevailing consensus that non-
monetary conceptions of value are “frivolous and will carry insufficient weight with 
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governments and rural interface populations.”73 This privileging of monetary conceptions 
of value permeates a related concept, community-based conservation. 
Community-based conservation is the idea that delivering benefits to individual 
users of wildlife is a necessary component of successful conservation outcomes. Deeply 
embedded in this concept is the construction of benefits in economic terms. For instance, 
Little (1994) stated the “critical role that economic incentives play in motivating 
community-based conservation is now widely accepted,” even while noting that 
“[e]conomic benefits from community-based conservation are rarely documented 
systematically.”74 Bromley (1994) flatly declared that the “answer, in brief, is to be found 
in the structure of entitlements (often called property rights) and in the constellation of 
incentives and sanctions that emanate from them.”75 Bromley argued incentives 
ultimately reduce to prices, as the “ability of market institutions to resolve conflicting 
human demands on the environment relies [on actors] guided by market prices . . . . 
Prices signal to human actors what actions are right” (emphasis added).76 Bromley 
caveats his argument by referencing a safe minimal standard, acknowledging that when 
“irreversibilities are present, it may be prudent to take steps to avoid the small probability 
that our actions may set in train events leading to the disappearance of certain 
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presumptively valuable biological resources.”77 Not withstanding this potential for small 
probabilities of potential extinctions, the market approach assumes that conservation will 
not occur unless prices make it profitable.  
This market-based approach developed against objections that wildlife cannot or 
should not be thought of in monetary terms. Stoddard (1951) was an early proponent of 
such economic valuations. In an important essay, Stoddard argued that although until 
“now wildlife crops [were] considered to have an intangible economic value, . . . the 
mere fact that society is willing to pay for [conservation] is indicative of the presence of 
tangible, though not marketable, values.”78 Therefore, Stoddard concluded the “time has 
come when our society must make a choice- either to permit the continued depletion of 
wildlife environment in favor of commodity agriculture, or to determine ways and means 
whereby landowners will be provided with incentives, economic and otherwise, for 
producing wildlife crops.”79 Crutchfield (1962) sparked a prominent research program 
aimed at determining these tangible values, arguing that the varied uses of wildlife can be 
captured and modeled in a “logical framework within which these essential comparisons 
can be made and the greatest possible economic product realized from given resource” 
levels.80 This search for ways to quantify the value of wildlife predicated on an assumed 
priority towards maximizing economic growth. 
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Translating wildlife into money was at the center of this economic approach. 
Langford and Cocheba (1978) argued that money can serve as a “cardinal index of 
satisfaction” based on the consumer’s surplus concept.81 While acknowledging “money is 
certainly not a perfect unit of measure,” they argue “some of the persistent arguments 
against using it for this purpose are indefensible” as the “fact remains that money is the 
medium of exchange in our society” and “only the naïve believe that using money to 
measure value implies a materialistic ethic.”82 Cocheba and Langford (1978) explored 
several ways to determine this economic value of wildlife, arguing “it is possible to 
incorporate both a collective and a private good dimension of value into a single 
model.”83 These collective and private goods dimensions hinged on an economic 
measurement expressed in money, sometimes expressed as use and non-use values of 
wildlife. 
The monetization of wildlife was advanced as the best path to conservation. 
Gray’s (1993)  “Picasso and Pachyderm” analogy compared elephant conservation to a 
Picasso painting. Noting that the price commanded by art such as a Picasso painting does 
not detract from the art’s intrinsic aesthetic qualities, Gray argued that “the greatest value 
of elephants is as a tourist attraction.”84 Noting a 1990 study that determined a living 
elephant as generating $14,375 USD per year compared to the $1,880 USD yielded from 
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harvesting that elephant’s ivory, Gray advised this “comparison should be widely 
publicized in Africa.”85 Lewis, Kaweche and Mwenya (1990) studied an ecotourism 
project in Zambia, and concluded that when profits from conservation were made 
available to locals through ecotourism, “poaching dropped dramatically, local economies 
were improved, and village attitudes towards wildlife management and conservation 
became more positive.”86 This study shows the heart of the economic approach: find 
ways to make conservation pay.  
To make conservation profitable for individuals, the market approach focused on 
the functional aspects of institutions. Ostrom (1990) described this as shifting from the 
tragedy of the common’s game of user against user to a individual’s game against nature 
in a smaller, privately held property.87 Gibson summarized this emphasis on markets as 
conservation solutions as:  
the process in which policymakers realize the importance of a new conservation 
policy . . . . and then construct and implement it. That is, because there is a 
realization that humans living in wildlife should participate in gain and participate 
in conservation activities, wildlife policies will follow.88  
 
In addition to its ontological focus on institutions, this approach embedded an assumption 
of utility maximization into conservation, most significantly in the concept of sustainable 
development.  
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Sustainable development assumes that conservation and wildlife policy decisions 
should maximize utility for those who live with wildlife. First proposed in the Brundtland 
Commission’s report Our Common Future, this concept sees suboptimal environmental 
outcomes as consequences of poverty and underdevelopment, which must therefore be 
addressed through poverty reduction and development. This report “brought political 
respectability to the marriage of ecology and economics.”89  The idea that environmental 
outcomes are fundamentally economic has dominated international institutional actions 
towards the environment since the Brundtland report, most notably at the 1992 Earth 
Summit in Rio di Janeiro and at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development.90 
In fact, the first principle declared outright at the 1992 Earth Summit’s Convention on 
Biodiversity was that all states have “a sovereign right to exploit their own resources.”91 
Yet despite the dominance of economic assumptions in understanding conservation, more 
recent work has moved beyond state capacity and rational choice analysis to focus on 
local explanations of conservation. 
Reflecting a broader theoretical turn towards new institutionalism, this third 
theme in conservation literature focuses on communities as a level of analysis that 
integrates both structural factors and individual decisionmaking. Ostrom (1990) heralded 
this turn towards community as she rejected early prescriptions of the coercive state or 
the free market as single solutions to conservation challenges. Rather, Ostrom pointed to 
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a variety of institutional arrangements that can succeed, observing that successful 
conservation outcomes result from “rich mixtures of ‘private-like’ and ‘public-like’ 
institutions defying classification in a sterile dichotomy.”92 Even strong advocates for 
conservation through privatization acknowledge that “[o]ften omitted from policy 
prescriptions is the possibility that a nongovernmental community of users can manage 
common areas and prevent overexploitation.”93 Ostrom would later summarize this 
research as a “diagnostic approach” moving “beyond panaceas,” focusing on social-
ecological systems (SESs) as a means to explain successful conservation and 
environmental governance outcomes.94 SES are “social systems in which some of the 
interdependent relationships among humans are mediated through interactions with 
biophysical and non-human biological units.”95 Principle components of an SES are a 
resource system where actors extract resource units in an action situation, according to 
rules of an overarching governance system.96  
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Figure 2.1: Social-Ecological Systems Model 
 
Source: McGinnis and Ostrom 2014 
Moving beyond state- or market-prescriptions explains conservation successes and 
failures as outcomes of political institutions within communities. 
This community focus appears in key contemporary works within conservation 
literature. Chute (1999) revisited the case behind Demsatz’s seminal argument for private 
property regimes, concluding this is more accurately explained as resilient community 
practices rather than profit-driven private ownership.97 Gibson (1999) examined wildlife 
policy in Africa, and demonstrated that political institutions significantly influence 
conservation outcomes, and are not well explained by typical conservation policy 
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analyses or rational approaches to environmental politics.98 Gibson concluded his study 
by calling for more understanding of the relevance and legitimacy of “those individuals 
who can make or break conservation initiatives . . . . [who] possess different sets of 
preferences about what they consider to be the ‘appropriate’ rules governing wildlife 
resources.”99 From this approach, conservation research looked to where individuals 
interact with wildlife and each other in local communities. 
As scholars have focused on political institutions within communities, important 
critical questions regarding conservation have come to the fore. Agrawal and Gibson 
(2001) note a disconnect between the concept of communities as territorially fixed, small 
and homogeneous groups with the reality of diverse interests and actors, local-level 
processes, and institutional arrangements.100 This underexplored linkage between the 
concept of community and reality is particularly pronounced regarding norms, which can 
both promote and hinder conservation. Agrawal and Gibson observe that norms “in fact, 
may be a significant part of the problem to a conservationist if a norm promotes 
exploitation (posing an enormous obstacle for those interested in community-based 
conservation).”101 To better explain when community accomplish successful collective 
action towards conservation, they call for increased study of social variables within 
community.  
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A particularly promising category of social variables are individual orientations 
towards wildlife. This approach synthesizes insights from both state-centric and private 
market approaches, considering the human dimension of individuals within governing 
structures, and variance in how individuals value wildlife. Manfredo and Dayer (2004) 
surveyed a range of literature pertaining to social aspects of conservation, proposing that 
wildlife value orientations are key to understanding human wildlife conflict.102 Manfredo, 
Teel and Henry (2009) identified contrasting ideologies of domination versus mutualism 
in wildlife value orientations in North America, suggesting this variance may explain 
broader social-ecological outcomes.  As Teel et al (2010) argued: 
Our theory contends that individual behavior toward wildlife is driven by specific 
attitudes (i.e., the association of an evaluation and an object in memory), and 
these attitudes are directed by wildlife value orientations. The latter are beliefs 
reflective of broad cultural ideologies that give personal meaning of right and 
wrong and an ideal life to one’s more basic values in relation to wildlife. They 
play an important role in explaining variation in individuals’ wildlife- related 
actions and their attitudes toward topics related to wildlife treatment. As a result, 
differences in wildlife value orientations can form the foundation for conflict 
among diverse publics on wildlife issues and management strategies.103 
 
This focus on social values towards wildlife as a key explanatory variable has 
been replicated in wolf management studies by Sponarski et al (2014).104 Moreover, the 
concept of wildlife value orientations has been generalized and documented in countries 
outside North America, as shown by Vaske, Jacobs, and Sijtsma’s (2011) study of the 
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Netherlands.105 These studies suggest that a key influence at the communal level of 
analysis lies in how individuals within that community construct wildlife. 
 
Figure 2.2: Major Approaches to Explaining Poaching 
 
 
  
Summarizing this review, social science neglected conservation as a research 
topic for much of its history. Early efforts to explore conservation outcomes initially 
focused on the structuring capacity of the state, and later turned to an emphasis on 
ownership structures and individual incentives regarding wildlife. More recently, scholars 
have focused on the role of communities, particularly in how social factors influence 
individual decision-making amid structured interactions with wildlife.  
In the next section, I identify how social factors identified by Relational Models 
theory can affect conservation outcomes and a community’s control of poaching.  
 
How Relational Models Can Explain the Control of Poaching 
Extant literature explaining conservation outcomes points to individual social 
factors as a key explanatory variable, particularly regarding wildlife value orientations. 
                                                 
105 Vaske, Jerry J., Jacobs, Maarten H., and Sijtsma, “Wildlife Orientations and Demographics in the 
Netherlands.” 
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However, it is not clear what social factors matter, and what dimensions of wildlife value 
orientations matter. This dissertation argues that relational models offer a powerful 
explanation of not only how social factors can vary, but even more so, why such variance 
matters.  
Relational models is a social psychological theory that argues all human 
relationships are structured in one of four ways. Fiske (1991) first proposed that humans 
organize relationships according to what people have in common, ordered differences, 
additive imbalances, or ratios. 106 Labeling these respective approaches as Communal 
Sharing (CS), Authority Ranking (AR), Equality Matching (EM), and Market-Pricing 
(MP), Fiske argued that individuals use these models to generate social relationships. 
Therefore, "[t]hese implicit models are the psychological foundations of social relations 
and society."107 Each model varies in distinct and recognizable ways.  
Communal Sharing is the model built on what people have in common. In this 
model, individual identities blur in contrast to group membership and a common identity, 
marked by boundaries with outsiders. Fiske described the essence of Communal Sharing 
as "a relationship based on duties and sentiments generating kindness and generosity 
among people conceived to be of the same kind."108 An example of a Communal Sharing 
relationship is the ideal of a parent and child and other forms of kinship. People are 
motivated by what they believe they share with others. 
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The Authority Ranking model structures interaction by reference to a common 
authority. As such, this model generates inequality: higher ranked people "control more 
people things, or land than others, and may be thought to possess more knowledge and 
mastery over events."109 While higher ranked individuals have more control and 
prerogative, this model is nevertheless inclusive as the hierarchy encompasses its 
members. Fiske clarifies that this model is distinct from coercive power, as individuals 
accept their subordination as legitimate, rather than something imposed from outside. An 
example of an Authority Ranking relationship is that between a military commander and 
a subordinate. The key aspect of this model is inequality referenced by a common 
authority. 
Equality Matching focuses on additive imbalances. As with Authority Ranking, 
individuals are separate, but in this model they are also equal. As such, this model 
features one-to-one balances of social activities such as shares, contributions and 
influence. The range of this matching includes turn taking, in-kind reciprocity, 
compensating in equal measure, even distribution into equal parts, and matched 
contributions of the same kind and quality. Individuals using the Equality Matching 
model "conceive of each other- or the rights, duties or actions involved in the relationship 
as distinct, but as balancing each other, aligning or matching, so they are 
interchangeable."110 An example of this model is the ideal relationship between spouses 
in a contemporary Western marriage. As with Communal Sharing and Authority 
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Ranking, Equality Matching sees a community as the basis for the relationship and 
individual behavior.  
Market Pricing is unlike the other three models in that individuals exist as 
bounded discrete actors mediated through a market system and market determined values. 
In this model, individuals measure value through a universal metric, usually price or 
utility, enabling the comparison of "any two persons or associated commodities, 
qualitatively alike or unlike."111 This leads to ratios and proportionality, often with 
explicit references to "potential substitutes, complements, and temporal conditions."112 In 
contrast to the previous three model's emphasis on equal membership in the community, 
this model precisely enables unequal relationships among individuals without 
community. An example of Market Pricing is a commercial transaction between a vendor 
and a purchaser. However, Market Pricing models also occur in non-monetized decisions 
such as insurance actuarial tables and military decision-making calculations like fighter 
plane losses to air defenses, infantry kill ratios, and civilian causality acceptability 
rates.113 The essence of this model is the comparison of unlike things mediated by a 
universal metric, typically money. 
Though simple in form, these models are fundamental, general, elementary, and 
universal.114 Individuals employ all four models across a range of contexts, including 
cultures, and the same individual may use multiple models simultaneously to relate to 
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114 Fiske, Alan P., Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations, 25. 
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different things, as well as changing what model that individual uses over time. Building 
from this basic approach, relational models theory makes a bold claim: "the social 
universe may also be based on just four basic relational bonds. The diversity and 
complexity of human societies, institutions, and relationships results from diverse 
manifestations and combinations of the four models.”115 116 
  
                                                 
115 Fiske, Alan P., “Relational Models Theory 2.0,” 8. 
 
116 Fiske has evolved from describing these as models to the term mod, a "cognitively modular but 
modifiable mode of interaction” (Fiske 2004, p. 3). He then argues that people join mods with preos, a 
paradigm, prescript, prescription, proposition, or proscription, that conjoins with a mode to generate a 
specific cultural coordination device. This refinement of models into mods and preos explains both how 
similar things can mean different things in different societies and cultures. For this research, I retain the 
earlier term model for clarity at the cost of ontological precision. 
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Table 2.1: Relational Models 
 
Relational Model Structured According 
To 
Characteristics Examples 
Communal Sharing What people have in common 
- Defined items held in 
common (e.g. blood, 
religion, employer, 
leader) 
- Dyad, group, or 
community 
- Boundaries 
- Undifferentiated 
individuals within group 
- Duties and 
responsibilities 
- Varying intensity 
- Parents and children 
- Kinship 
- Blood rituals 
- Alumni 
- Crop shares 
- Secret societies 
- Misfortune (e.g. AA) 
- Nationality 
Authority Ranking Transitive asymmetrical differences 
- Linear ranking 
- Varied statuses, 
prerogatives, attention, 
and entitlements 
- Rank associated with 
extensions of self 
- Hierarchical inclusion 
- Tendency to assimilate 
- Legitimate rather than 
coercive 
- Bosses and workers 
- Age 
- Caste 
- Seniority 
- Achievement based on 
tests or contests 
- Possession of symbolic 
authority 
- Election or delegation 
Equality Matching 
Additive differences 
referencing an even 
balance 
- Egalitarian peers 
- Distinct but co-equal 
- Differences as additive 
and subtractive 
- Culturally coordinated 
 
 
- Modern Western 
marriages 
- Turn taking 
- Coin-flip 
- Eye for eye 
- Baby-sitting coops 
- Matching contributions 
- Dinner invitations 
Market Pricing Ratios 
- Markets determine value 
- Numbers 
- Cost-benefits 
- Proportionality 
- Relational equity 
- Utilitarian moral 
reasoning 
- Explicit substitution 
-Prices 
-Wages 
-Rents 
-Interests 
-Dividends 
-Efficiency Calculations 
Source: Fiske 1991, Fiske 2004. 
 
In the two decades since Fiske proposed relational models theory, research has  
validated this approach both theoretically and empirically. Haslam (2004) surveyed 
existing literature applying Fiske's model, finding extensive support for "the structural 
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postulates of the theory," in addition to broad resonance in larger literature. Among other 
topics, relational models theory has been applied to families in China (Chuang 2005), 
personal values (Biber, Hupfeld and Meier 2008) and gender dominance (Garcia, 
Posthuma, and Roehling 2009) in cross-national studies, individualism and collectivism 
across cultures (Vodosek 2009), secondary schools in Australia (Bagley 2010), 
knowledge sharing (Boer, Berends, and Baalen 2011), and business to business 
exchanges (Blois and Ryan 2012).117 Such studies lead Haslam to conclude "evidence for 
the structural adequacy of RMs theory is probably stronger than the evidence for any 
other relational taxonomy."118 Moreover, the models "have yet to be clearly outperformed 
in an empirical test and has predicted a variety of phenomena" both across psychological 
categories and across cultures.119 While continuing research in psychology now explores 
the causes of rational models, the significance of relational models to politics lies in their 
role in constructing value.  
How people value an object depends on the relationship(s) one uses the object in. 
This is particularly relevant for relationships involving the transfer of valued objects. 
Individuals "use each of the four fundamental models to organize transfers of material or 
nonmaterial goods and services and to provide obligatory or ideal standards for such 
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transitions."120 With Communal Sharing, objects cannot be transferred since they are 
common property to all. In Authority Ranking, higher persons have first rights and 
prerogative to take first actions towards objects, with less ranked individuals acting 
according to what is left to them. In Equality Matching, objects taken must be balanced 
with objects given to maintain an evenness of exchange, and thus objects taken are 
valued against other like or unlike objects. Finally, in Market Pricing, the value of objects 
is fungible, and socially constructed.121 Value derived from relational models is critical 
for trade-off reasoning.  
 
Table 2.2: Relational Models and Associated Values 
Relational Model Value of Associated 
Object 
Communal Sharing Incomparable / Sacred 
Authority Ranking Incomparable / Sacred 
Equality Matching Incomparable / Sacred 
Market Pricing Fungible / Secular 
Source: Fiske and Tetlock 1997 
 
Tradeoff reasoning occurs when an individual compares one object to a different 
object. Fiske and Tetlock (1997) identified three types of tradeoffs.122 Two types of 
trade-offs involve relational model from a single domain. Comparing two objects using 
the Market Price model is a routine trade-off, involving some ratio of two fungible 
                                                 
120 Fiske, Alan P., Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations, 51. 
 
121 Prus, “Price-Setting as Social Activity.” 
 
122 Fiske, Alan P. and Tetlock, Philip E., “Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions That Transgress the 
Spheres of Justice.” 
 
 45 
values. These routine trade-offs are central to many economic models and rational choice 
theories. However, comparisons involving non-Market Priced models are qualitatively 
distinct from routine trade-offs.  
When individuals construct objects using non-Market Priced relational models, 
such objects attain incomparable value. In the context of relationships with a community, 
a hierarchy, or an equal partner, "people reject certain comparisons because they feel that 
seriously considering the relevant trade-offs would undercut their self-images and social 
identities as moral beings."123 To explain this, Fiske and Tetlock draw on the 
psychological concept of constitutive incommensurability: "two values are constitutively 
incommensurable whenever people believe that entering one value into a trade-off 
calculus with the other subverts or undermines that value."124 Simply put, monetizing 
aspects of some relationships such as one's friends, children, or country "disqualifies 
oneself from certain social roles . . . . to compare is to destroy. Merely making explicit 
the possibility of certain trade-offs weakens, corrupts, and degrades one's moral 
standing.”125 This deeply seated psychological aversion to comparing objects constructed 
with non-Market Priced models (Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, and Equality 
Matching) endows objects in some settings with incomparable value. Echoing 
Durkheim's sacred-profane dialectic, Fiske and Tetlock refer to this incomparable value 
as sacred value, in contrast to fungible values as secular.126  
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When an object attains sacred or incomparable value, two forms of trade-offs are 
possible. First, a tragic trade-off compares two objects, both constructed with a non-
Market Priced model and therefore possessing sacred or incomparable value. Under such 
circumstances, the trade-off is "comprehensible and potentially resolvable, however 
painful the consequences . . . . Ambivalence may remain, and people may experience 
great regret about the relationship they have given up, but the bonds are comparable."127 
An example of a tragic trade-off is a difficult pregnancy where the parents must chose 
between the life of the mother and the life of the child, or a malnourished person 
exchanging a family heirloom for food. The incomparable value of these objects makes 
decision-making associated with them tragic. But when someone proposes comparing an 
incomparable or sacred object to a fungible or secular object, the trade-off becomes 
taboo.  
A taboo trade-off involves the comparison of an object of incomparable, or 
sacred, value to an object of fungible, or secular, value. Tetlock et al (2000) identify such 
comparisons as being qualitatively distinct from other forms of trade-off reasoning.128 
According to Tetlock's Sacred Value Protection Model, an individual who constructs an 
object's value as sacred using a non-Market Priced relational model will respond to a  
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proposed fungible comparison in two distinctive ways. First, that individual will express 
moral outrage: 
a composite psychological state that subsumes cognitive reactions (harsh 
character attributes to those who endorse the proscribed thoughts and even to 
those who do not endorse, but do tolerate this way of thinking in others), affective 
reactions (anger and contempt for those who endorse the proscribed thoughts), 
and behavioral reactions (support for ostracizing and punishing deviant 
thinkers).129  
 
Second, an individual encountering a taboo tradeoff will engage in moral 
cleansing "that reaffirms core values and loyalties by acting in ways that shore up those 
aspects of the moral order that have been undercut by the transgression."130 These two 
responses are the key psychological coping mechanisms of the Sacred Value Protection 
Model (SVPM).  
Relational models theory and the SVPM can potentially explain a range of 
puzzling political behavior. As Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001) argue, the "relational model 
followed by a given institution or community will lead to different kinds of norm-
following logics and thus different implementation rules."131 Noting that variance in 
trade-off reasoning is "psychologically and politically consequential," they conclude that 
if: 
constructivism is to explain how actor's identities are mutually constituted with 
structures, then we need to know which relational scheme structures interaction at 
any given moment in time and how normative logics differ depending on which 
of the three is dominant.132  
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Since its introduction, the SVPM has been used to explain variance in negotiations 
(Robbennolt, Darley and MacCoun 2004, Harinck and de Dreu 2004), responses to the 
9/11 terrorist attacks (Skitka, Bauman and Mullen 2004) and more general acts of 
violence (van Zomeren and Lodewijkx 2005), protest participation (Lodewijkx, Kertsen 
and van Zomeren 2008), democratic rhetoric (Marietta 2008), motivations for collective 
action such as the Tiananmen Square protest (van Zomeran and Spears 2008) and 
marginalization (van Zomeran, Postmes, and Spears 2011), trade in cadavers (Anteby 
2010), intergroup identity (Sachdeva and Medin 2009) and relationships (Tauber and 
Zomeren 2012), religious and pharmaceutical marketing (McGraw, Schwartz and Tetlock 
2012), blame for financial crises (Inbar, Pizarro, and Cushman 2012), and attitudes to 
video games (Rothmund et al 2015).133 The SVPM has even been linked to physical 
cleansing actions in a so-called Lady MacBeth effect. 134 Although it has not yet been 
specifically applied to conservation topics or wildlife policy outcomes, Daw et al (2015) 
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identify taboo-tradeoffs as an overlooked challenge to environmental management.135 
Elsewhere, McCalla, Short and Brantingham (2013) argue that sacred value networks can 
explain variance in criminal behavior.136 These works demonstrate relational models 
theory’s potential in explaining conservation outcomes. 
 
Table 2.3: Forms of Trade-Off Reasoning 
 
Relational Model 
Communal Sharing, 
Authority Ranking, or 
Equality Matching 
Market Pricing 
Communal Sharing, 
Authority Ranking, or 
Equality Matching 
Tragic Trade-Off Taboo Trade-Off 
Market Pricing Taboo Trade-Off Routine Trade-Off 
 
A Social Theory of Poaching 
 
This social theory of poaching explains the control of poaching by focusing on 
individuals and how they construct wildlife. This approach bridges literature from social 
psychology and political economy, utilizing relational insights from the former to explain 
divergent patterns of behavior in the latter. This theory begins by assuming that 
individual preferences are socially constructed and not innate. As social constructions, 
agents and structures mutually constitute such preferences through discursive practices.  
The outcome of interest for this theory is the effective control of poaching in a 
social-ecological system. Poaching is the harvesting of a natural resource that violates a 
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law, and it is effectively controlled when poaching incidents are sporadic and result in the 
punishment of poachers.  
The explanatory variable for this theory is the relational model (mode of 
interaction) pertaining to a resource that predominates among actors in the social-
ecological system. Possible values for this variable are Communal Sharing (CS), 
Authority Ranking (AR), Equality Matching (EM), or Market Pricing (MP). 
The causal mechanism of this theory varies with the predominant relational 
model. If a Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, or Equality Matching relational 
model predominates among actors, then poaching is a taboo trade-off, causing moral 
outrage and moral cleansing behaviors that facilitate effective control of the poaching. 
However, if a Market Pricing relational model predominates among actors, than poaching 
is a routine trade trade-off. Actors will conduct cost-benefit calculations, and if the pay-
off for poaching is sufficiently high, then poaching will not be controlled.  
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Figure 2.3: Causal Relationships 
When Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, or Equality Matching 
Predominates 
 
When Market Pricing Predominates 
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Hypotheses 
General Hypotheses 
Given a social-ecological system with actors, resources, and lucrative price for the 
resource: 
H1. If the dominant relational model is CS, AR, or EM, then poaching will be 
controlled. 
H2. If the dominant relational model is MP, then poaching will not be controlled. 
 
To control for alternative explanations involving state capacity and economic 
incentives, we can add two further hypotheses. 
H3. If there is high coercive capacity, then poaching will be controlled. 
H4. If there are strong economic incentives to not poach, then poaching will be 
controlled. 
 
Specific Hypotheses 
This theory can be applied to the puzzle of rhino poaching. The outcome variable, 
control of poaching, can be operationalized by whether rhino poaching within a country 
is sporadic or recurrent. When rhinos are poached, if the poaching is controlled, poachers 
are caught and punished. If the poaching is not controlled, poachers are either not caught 
or caught and not punished. 
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The explanatory variable, the relational model pertaining to rhinos, is 
operationalized in the discursive practices of individuals who live and work with and near 
rhino populations. If individuals living near rhinos construct rhinos in reference to a 
community, towards a shared authority, or in equality, then rhino poaching will elicit 
moral outrage and moral cleansing behaviors in the populations. Individuals will 
symbolically disassociate themselves from the poaching, and will seek to punish both 
poachers and persons who approve of the poaching. In contrast, if individuals living near 
rhinos construct rhinos according to a fungible ratio such as money, then poaching will 
be a routine trade-off. Individuals will see the poaching in economic terms, and moral 
outrage and cleansing will not be present. Moreover, under such circumstances, the 
lucrative payoffs of rhino poaching in the absence of moral outrage and moral cleansing 
may cause poaching practices to diffuse into the community as a learned behavior, 
contributing to an expansion of poaching activities. 
 
Research Design 
This study investigates the control of rhino poaching through the lens of new 
institutionalism, without privileging this lens’ rational choice, sociological, or historical 
variants. My core hypothesis is when actors living near rhinos construct rhinos use a 
relational model other than Market Pricing, then rhino poaching will be effectively 
controlled due to moral outrage and moral cleansing mechanisms. Conversely, where 
actors construct rhinos using the Market Pricing relational models, then rhino poaching 
may not be controlled due to the absence of moral outrage and moral cleansing. 
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To test this general hypothesis, in the next chapter I survey the universe of all 
countries that had wild rhino populations prior to the start of the current crisis in rhino 
poaching, 2007. In order to assess what relational model predominates in each country, I 
first examine formal institutions pertaining to rhinos, specifically rules, as proxy 
variables for relational models. In doing so, I assume a congruence between rules-in-form 
and rules-in-use.137 Based on this, I identify dominant relational models for each rhino 
range state, coupled with analysis of whether each state has effectively controlled or 
failed to control rhino poaching since 2007. This survey establishes a general pattern of 
relationship between institution configurations and the effective control of rhino 
poaching, enabling deeper analysis of key cases in Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa. 
In Chapter 4, I examine in detail the cases of Nepal, Swaziland and South Africa 
to investigate whether individuals in these countries actually use the relational models 
suggested by their formal institutional rules. Such formal rules suggest these three cases 
offer ideal type variances, with the Communal Sharing relational model in Nepal, the 
Authority Ranking relational model in Swaziland, and Market Pricing in South Africa.  
In Chapter 5, I construct an analytic narrative of how Nepal effectively controlled 
rhino poaching. In the process, I investigate whether moral outrage and cleansing 
mechanisms offer superior explanatory ability for Nepal’s outcome than state capacity or 
economic incentive based explanations.  
In the end, I make no claim about the sufficiency or necessity of any particular 
relational model for effectively controlling poaching. It is theoretically possible that in a 
                                                 
137 Mindful of Ostrom (2005)’s imperative to “dig under surface behavior to obtain a good understanding of 
what rules participants in a situation are following,” this assumption is initially justified by the universal 
scale of this analysis. See Ostrom, Elinor, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 19. 
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system where the Market Price model dominates, some level of poaching control is 
possible if the resource population matches state capacity and economic incentives.138 
My claim is narrower: that in a country with weak police capacity and an immense 
economic incentive to poach, the control of poaching is nevertheless possible under 
certain social conditions. If true, dominant focuses on strengthening state capacity or 
economically incentivizing non-poaching may at best be ineffective. At worst, these may 
actually worsen the problem of poaching, particularly economic approaches.  
Finally, I make no claims about what causes one relational model to dominate 
over another. In the past century, nearly every rhino range state has poached its rhino 
populations to the brink of extinction, including countries like Nepal and Swaziland 
where contemporary rhino poaching has been effectively controlled. This empirically 
suggests that relational models can change, and I welcome further research into this 
aspect of relational models theory. In this vein, I make no claim about the long-term 
resiliency of a system characterized by a non-Market Priced relational model in the 
current environment of fantastic prices for rhino horn. Psychological research suggests 
that moral outrage and cleansing mechanisms mute over time.139 Similarly, governance 
studies suggest that instability, change, and problematic control become more likely 
when economic and sociological domains conflict.140 The success of any one country is 
unlikely to resolve a global crisis driven by fantastically lucrative prices for rhino horn.  
                                                 
138 In the case of Kenya’s northern white rhino population, this level seems to be three rhinos permanently 
accompanied by armed guards. See Gitau, “Northern White Rhino: How Scientists Hope to Save Rare 
Breed from Extinction.” 
 
139 McGraw and Tetlock, “Taboo Trade-Offs, Relational Framing, and the Acceptability of Exchanges.” 
 
140 Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RELATIONAL MODELS AND THE CONTROL OF 
POACHING 
This chapter investigates relationships between relational models and the 
control of poaching, and alternative explanations of state capacity and economic 
incentives. Using the Institutional Analysis and Design approach to explore formal 
institutional rules as proxy measures shows that where Communal Sharing and 
Authority Ranking models predominate, rhino poaching is controlled. Conversely, 
where Market Pricing relational models predominate, rhino poaching is not 
controlled. Furthermore, state capacity and economic incentives show no 
relationship with the control of poaching or its absence.  
What is the relationship between relational models and the control of rhino 
poaching? In this chapter, I survey the universe of states with wild rhino populations to 
identify how relational models relate to the control of rhino poaching. Using institutional 
rules as proxy variables for relational models, I show that states where non-market price 
relational models predominate have successfully controlled rhino poaching. Conversely, 
states where a market-priced model predominates have not controlled poaching. I also 
demonstrate that alternative arguments regarding state capacity and economic incentives 
are insufficient for explaining this variance. I conclude by identifying cases for further 
investigation in order to identify causal mechanisms. 
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Relational models theory holds that individuals construct environments in one of 
four ways: using a market price model based on a ratio between things, or using one of 
three non-market priced models that reference a community, an authority, and an 
equality. From these models, objects attain fungible values in the market-priced model, or 
incomparable values in a non-market priced model. These models therefore lead to two 
distinct patterns of behavior when individuals engage in trade-off reasoning. When an 
individual uses a market priced model, he or she experiences a routine trade-off 
comparing two fungible values. However, when an individual uses a non-market priced 
model, he or she experiences a taboo trade-off, activating the sacred value protection 
model (SVPM) that leads to moral outrage and moral cleansing. 
To assess what relational model most individuals use in a community with rhino, 
this research considers formal institutions as proxy variables. I operationalize these 
institutional measures by considering whether rhino exist on public or privately-held 
land, property rights associated with rhino, and formal penalties for mis-use of rhino as 
wildlife resources. Assuming that these formal rules reflect the rules in use within a 
country with wild rhino, this enables a classification of institutional arrangements within 
countries, and by extension, the predominant relational model. 
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Assumptions 
This analysis makes four assumptions regarding the control of rhino poaching. 
First, I assume that publically reported data regarding incidents of rhino poaching is 
valid. This assumption is justified because of a rhino’s size and significance. As 
endangered megafauna, rhino populations are routinely monitored at the level of 
individual animals. Moreover, a poached rhino results in a carcass weighing between 
4,000 and 8,000 pounds, generating an easily detectable signature. Finally, while it is 
likely that some poaching incidents go unreported or undiscovered, such incidents are 
random and not systematic, unlikely to significantly alter broad assessment and 
inferences. 
Second, I assume that formal rules represent the rules-in-use individuals use to 
make decisions.141 The macro-level analysis of this chapter justifies this simplifying 
assumption, as does my initial purpose of exploring correlation between relational models 
and the control of poaching. However, any causal claims will require closer analysis and 
confirmation of this assumption. 
Third, I assume institutions guiding individual decision-making are static and 
distinguishable from the individuals from actors. I justify this assumption by limiting the 
time frame of this institutional analysis to 2006, just before the outbreak of the current 
rhino crisis. In reality, these institutions are dynamically responding to individual 
decisions, and thus co-constituted and changing over time. However, the short time frame 
of interest to this research justifies treating them as exogenous. 
                                                 
141 Ostrom, Elinor, Understanding Institutional Diversity, 19 and 138. 
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Similarly, I make a fourth assumption that an exogenous shock occurred in the 
global market for rhino horn sometime around 2007, and was responsible for the 
subsequent 100-fold increase in the price of rhino horn. After an initial period of intense 
poaching beginning in the 1960s, rhino “poaching essentially came to a halt in the early 
1990s when concerted international action . . . resulted in decisive political moves to end 
national rhino horn consumption” that left “all major markets dormant.”142 For the next 
two decades, the price of rhino horn remained stable at approximately $800 to 1,500 USD 
per kilogram.143 By 2008, this price rapidly increased to approximately $100,000 USD 
per kilogram.144 Extant research attributes this increase to an economic bubble 
manipulated by criminal syndicates who control the illicit global market, but the cause of 
that lies beyond the scope of this research.145  
These assumptions regarding the validity of public records regarding rhino 
poaching, the similarity of rules-in-form and rules-in-use, the distinguishability of 
structures from agents, and the exogenous shock to the global rhino horn market enable 
an examination of the relationship between the control of poaching and predominate 
relational models in rhino range states. 
                                                 
142 Milliken, “Illegal Trade in Ivory and Rhino Horn: An Assessment to Improve Law Enforcement Under 
the Wildlife Traps Project,” 14. 
 
143 Milliken and Shaw, “The South Africa-Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus: A Deadly Combination of 
Institutional Lapses, Corrupt Wildlife Industry Professionals and Asian Crime Syndicates,” 85; Vigne and 
Martin, “Price for Rhino Horn Increases in Yemen.” 
 
144 Guilford, “Why Does a Rhino Horn Cost $300,000? Because Vietnam Thinks It Cures Cancer and 
Hangovers.” Researchers and authorities are reluctant to publicize data on the price of rhino horn (see 
Milliken and Shaw 2012, p. 85). However, in my 2015 fieldwork, I repeatedly heard experts identify the 
price at $100,000 USD per kilogram. 
 
145 Milliken and Shaw, “The South Africa-Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus: A Deadly Combination of 
Institutional Lapses, Corrupt Wildlife Industry Professionals and Asian Crime Syndicates,” 85. 
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Outcome Variable: The Control of Rhino Poaching 
The outcome variable for this analysis is the control of rhino poaching.  This 
analysis utilizes Muth and Bowe (1998)’s definition of poaching as “any act that 
intentionally contravenes the laws and regulations established to protect wild, renewable 
resources.”146 This includes both illegal harvesting of resources and actions like selling, 
purchasing, transporting, possessing, and using resources that contravenes a law. Thus 
poaching requires intentionality, excluding unintended violations of resource laws like a 
“hunter who mistakenly shoots a hen pheasant in a rooster only area.”147 From this, rhino 
poaching is the illegal harvesting of resources from a rhino, particularly rhino horn, and 
deliberate actions associated with that harvesting such as purchases and sales, 
transportation, possession, and use of rhino horn. 
 Poaching is controlled when incidents of poaching are sporadic, punished, and do 
not threaten the survival of a population. The control of poaching is a form of social 
control, an organized response to deviant acts.148 This approach follows the classical 
conceptualization of control, including both external influences and individual norm 
internalization.149  
This conceptual definition of social control guides operationalizing the control of 
poaching. As a form of criminal activity, some level of poaching will always be possible. 
                                                 
146 Muth and Bowe, “Illegal Harvest of Renewable Natural Resources in North America: Toward a 
Typology of the Motivations for Poaching,” 11. 
 
147 Ibid., 11–12. 
 
148 Cohen, Visions of Social Control; Innes, Understanding Social Control. 
 
149 Janowitz, “Sociological Theory and Social Control”; Moore, Order and Change, 171–219. 
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However, if poaching is controlled, it must only occur in isolated, irregular incidents. If 
poaching occurs routinely, it cannot be considered deviant, and therefore falls outside the 
concept of social control. When poaching does occur, poachers should face some form of 
accountability. Otherwise, the element of social control pertaining to an organized 
response is not present. Finally, such sporadic acts should not threaten the survival of the 
resource population. If any of these elements are missing, the poaching is not controlled. 
 The control of poaching is a categorical dichotomous variable, either controlled or 
not controlled. The unit of analysis is a country during a calendar year. Poaching is 
controlled when during that year, incidents of poaching are sporadic, punished, and do 
not threaten the survival of a population.  As a threshold for measurement, this analysis 
additionally requires that some poaching occur in order for it to be controlled. In order to 
determine when individuals choose not to poach, it is necessary to rule out the possibility 
that poaching simply did not occur, and that individuals never confronted a decision of 
whether to poach or not poach. Put another way, the response aspect of social control 
requires that some action occur necessitating a response. Therefore, the complete absence 
of poaching in a case is not necessarily evidence that poaching has been controlled, and 
cases where no poaching occurred whatsoever will not be considered in this research.  
   
Explanatory Variable: Relational Models 
The explanatory variable for this analysis is the predominate relational model 
used by individuals in resource system with rhino. A relational model is a mode of 
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relationship that structures social action, thought, and motivation.150 From relational 
models theory, there are four potential modes: Communal Sharing (CS), Authority 
Ranking (AR), Equality Matching (EM), and Market Pricing (MP). The absence of a 
relationship can further be considered as a fifth possible null mode. These relational 
models are fundamental, innate, and universal.151  
A relational model predominates when a preponderance of individuals within a 
group utilize the same relational model in a given context. In this research, a relational 
model predominates when a greater number of people living in a community with rhino 
share one relational model than do those who do not.152  
Predominant relational model is a categorical nominal variable with five potential 
values: Communal Sharing (CS), Authority Ranking (AR), Equality Matching (EM), 
Market Pricing (MP), and Null (NR).153154 The unit of analysis is a human population 
living in a state with wild rhino.  
A predominate Communal Sharing model occurs when a preponderance of 
individuals living in a community with wild rhino relate to rhino according to what they 
have in common. This means that individuals treat rhino as common to the community, 
                                                 
150 Fiske, Alan P., “Relational Models Theory 2.0,” 3. 
 
151 Fiske, Alan P., Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations; Fiske, Alan 
P., “Relational Models Theory 2.0.” 
 
152 This research will not identify how much individuals within a group constitutes preponderance. 
 
153 For discussion of the Null or Asocial relationship, see Fiske, Alan P., Structures of Social Life: The Four 
Elementary Forms of Human Relations, 19. 
 
154 Both Fiske (2004) and Haslam (2004) identify a need for further research into the origins and 
interconnections of relational models, suggesting a theoretical potential for this variable to be ordinal and 
not nominal. However, I assume it to be nominal based on current ontology.  
 63 
and identify other community members in part by a shared collective responsibility 
towards rhino.  
A predominate Authority Ranking model occurs when a preponderance of 
individuals living in a community with wild rhino relate to rhino according to a transitive 
asymmetrical differences. This means that individuals associate rhino with a common 
hierarchical authority, where one’s position within the hierarchy determines one’s 
responsibilities, privileges, and choices associated with rhino conservation. 
A predominate Equality Matching model occurs when a preponderance of 
individuals living in a community with wild rhino relate to rhino according to an additive 
imbalance. This means that individuals associate rhino with some relationship of 
balanced equality, involving concepts such as in-kind reciprocity for interacting with 
rhino, or matched contributions of the same kind and quantity. This relational model is 
commonly seen in relationships such as a modern Western marriage or voters in a 
pluralistic democracy. However, it is difficult to operationalize in the context of 
conservation, so this discussion will omit further reference to it. 
A predominate Market Pricing model occurs when a preponderance of individuals 
living in a community with wild rhino relate to rhino according to a ratio. In this 
situation, individuals associate rhino with a single universal utility metric, typically 
money. In essence, rhino become commodities, and people evaluate rhino through ratios 
of comparison to other commodities, including money, time, utility, or substitutes. 
Finally, a predominate Null model occurs when a preponderance of individuals 
living in a community with wild rhino have no relationship to rhino. In these situations, 
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individuals act without regard to any social relationship, and take no account of rhino in 
their lives whatsoever. 
 
General Hypotheses 
 
• If prior to 2006, most people within a country construct rhino using a 
Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking relational model, then poaching will be 
controlled following the shock to global rhino horn markets. 
• If prior to 2006, most people within a country construct rhino using a 
Market Priced relational model, then poaching will not be controlled following the shock 
to global rhino horn markets. 
  
Institutional Rules as Proxy Measures 
To gauge the predominant relational model, this research considers institutional 
rules as proxy variables. Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework established the critical role of institutions in understanding collective action 
regarding resources.155 This use of institutional rules as proxy variables follows Ostrom’s 
approach for classifying institutions that structure individual decision-making.156 
In the context of rhino conservation, variance in relational models appears in three 
forms of institutional rules. First, boundary rules determine the type of land where rhino 
                                                 
155 Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action; Ostrom, Elinor, 
Understanding Institutional Diversity. 
 
156 Ostrom, Elinor and Crawford, “Classifying Rules.” Ostrom and Crawford identify seven institutional 
rules that structure an individual decision in an action situation like poaching: rules regarding boundaries, 
positions, choices, information, aggregation, pay-off, and scope.  For a detailed summary of Ostrom and 
Crawford’s grammar of institutions, see Appendix A. 
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exist. Rhino can exist on land publically owned land or land held by an authority figure, 
suggesting a Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking relational model respectively. 
Alternatively, rhino can exist on privately held land, suggesting a Market Pricing 
relational model. This variable is operationalized by whether rhino live on public or 
private lands. If rules allow rhino to exist on private lands, then the entire system allows 
for private possession of rhino, even if some rhino continue to live on public land. 
Second, choice rules determine property rights regarding rhino, ranging from 
exclusive public ownership to complete private ownership. Property rights held 
exclusively by a public actor indicate a Communal Sharing relational model, while 
property rights that vary with one’s position in a hierarchy suggest an Authority Ranking 
relational model. Private property rights, such as the right of an individual to buy or sell a 
rhino, indicate a Market Pricing relational model. This variable is operationalized by 
whether private ownership of rhino and rhino parts is legally prohibited or authorized. 
Conservatorship rights or landowner privilege, where the state retains theoretical legal 
ownership but private parties are permitted to purchase rights to economically profit from 
rhino (to include hunting them), are a form of private property rights and indicate a 
Market Priced relational model. 
Third, pay-off rules determine the penalties for misconduct involving rhino. 
Severe penalties, such as shoot-to-kill authority conferred on rangers, mandatory 
imprisonment, or asset forfeiture, ostracize offenders in sweeping responses to 
transgressions. These are consistent with Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking 
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relational models.157 Penalties that vary with price, such as fines-in-lieu of imprisonment 
or minor fines, indicate Market Pricing relational models. This variable is operationalized 
by the legal penalty for rhino poaching. 
 
Table 3.1: Proxy Variables for Relational Models 
 
Proxy Variable 
Communal Sharing or 
 Authority Ranking 
Relational Model 
Market Pricing 
Relational Model 
Boundary Rules: 
Where do rhino live? Rhino live on public lands. Rhino live on private lands. 
Choice Rules: 
What property rights 
exist regarding rhino? 
Private ownership of rhino 
prohibited. 
• Private ownership of rhino 
permitted 
• Rhino and/or hunting rights can 
be bought and sold 
• Includes conservatorship and 
landowners privilege 
Payoff Rules: 
What is the penalty 
for misuse of a rhino? 
• Severe penalties 
• No jail in lieu of prison 
• Asset forfeiture 
• Shoot to kill 
 
• Light penalties 
• Fines in lieu of prison 
• Minor fines 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
157 Fiske, Alan P., Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations, 130–32. 
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Causal Mechanisms 
This research argues that moral outrage and moral cleansing mechanisms explain 
the hypothesized relationship between relational models and the control of rhino 
poaching. Moral outrage: 
has cognitive, affective, and behavioral components: lower thresholds for making 
harsh dispositional attributions to norm violators; anger, contempt, and even 
disgust toward violators; and enthusiastic support for both norm enforcement 
(punishing violators) and metanorm enforcement (punishing those who shirk the 
burdensome chore of punishing deviants).158 
 
Moral cleansing holds that every individual deciding whether to poach or not poach “will 
engage in symbolic acts of moral cleansing designed to reaffirm their solidarity with the 
moral community,” even if they merely contemplate the decision of poaching.159  
Applied to rhino poaching decisions, this theory predicts that when individuals 
living with rhino construct the rhino using a non-Market Pricing relational model, they 
will respond to rhino poaching with harsh dispositional attributions to rhino poachers, 
anger and disgust toward rhino poachers, and support for both punishing rhino poachers 
and punishing those who do not punish rhino poachers. Moreover, such individuals will 
engage in symbolic acts to reaffirm their solidarity with the community or authority 
associated with rhino. These moral outrage and cleansing mechanisms will be absent in 
cases where individuals construct rhino using the Market Pricing relational model. 
 This chapter’s focus on formal institutional rules will not identify whether such 
mechanisms are present in the universe of rhino range states. Rather, detailed case studies 
                                                 
158 Tetlock et al., “The Psychology of the Unthinkable,” 855. 
 
159 Ibid. 
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in subsequent chapters will investigate this application of the sacred value protection 
model.  
 
Alternative Arguments: Coercive State Capacity and Economic Incentives 
This chapter also considers the two primary alternative arguments for the control 
of poaching through coercive state capacity and economic incentives. The state capacity 
argument explains that poaching is controlled when a coercive actor, typically the police, 
has sufficient capacity to deter criminal activity such as poaching. Skocpol (1985) argued 
that a state’s deployment of financial resources is the best single measure of state 
capacity.160 While there are many ways to measure state capacity, the state’s total 
financial resources best capture the full potential of the state to act. For instance, a state 
may decide to lower taxes, and thereby diminishing its actual revenue. However, such a 
state could equally decide to raise taxes and increase that revenue. Thus by considering 
the amount of financial resources a state possesses, one gets a fuller measure of what the 
state is capable of.  
I operationalize this state capacity with a continuous variable: the revenue of a 
state in a given year. This value of this variable will expressed in US dollars in 2005. 
This variable will enable the consideration of state capacity as an alternative argument to 
a social theory of the control of poaching. 
 The economic incentive argument explains that poaching is controlled when 
individuals have sufficient economic incentives not to poach. Given that rhino horn 
                                                 
160 Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” 17. 
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currently sells for approximately $100,000 USD per kilogram on illicit markets, it is 
difficult to conceive of a non-poaching use of the rhino that would yield similar 
profits.161 However, one could argue that if non-poaching uses of rhino generates 
sufficient economic income to meet some level of need, then this could explain why 
individuals choose not to poach. To consider this alternative argument, I will consider the 
economic impact of tourism, measured by the number of international tourists per year 
and the amount of money generated by tourism per year. This will enable me to consider 
the alternative argument of economic incentives to control poaching. 
 
Data 
 
This analysis predominately utilizes archival data from the Rhino Resource 
Center, a non-governmental knowledge center that works with the International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) to collect, preserve, and catalogue data on all species 
of rhinoceros.162 I obtained data regarding the control of poaching from reports submitted 
to the Conferences of Parties to the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered 
Species, as well as news articles for more recent poaching events. To analyze institutional 
rules, I utilized archived reports from both governmental, intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations describing rhino conservation programs. To analyze state 
capacity and ecotourism, I utilize data from the World Bank’s World Development 
                                                 
161 Messer (2010)’s economic analysis of poaching makes a similar conclusion that given current 
opportunity costs, most poachers have little to lose relatively to the profit opportunities of commercial 
poaching. Messer, “Protecting Endangered Species.” 
 
162 Rookmaaker, “Rhino Resource Center.” 
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Indicators for 2005.163 In order to gauge conditions prior to the 2007 shock in rhino horn 
price, I utilize data on institutional rules, state capacity, and tourism from 2005.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Institutional structures indicative of non-market priced relational models strongly 
correlate with the successful control of poaching. All five states that controlled rhino 
poaching had institutional structures consistent with a communal sharing or authority 
ranking relational model. Conversely, all nine states that failed to control rhino poaching 
had institutional structures consistent with market pricing. No pattern was observed 
between levels of state capacity and the control of poaching, while states with the 
strongest tourism sectors were the least successful at controlling poaching. 
 
Control of Poaching 
In 2005, seventeen states had confirmed populations of wild rhino.164 In the 
decade since, poaching occurred but has been effectively controlled in five countries: 
Botswana, Nepal, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia. At the same time, rhino have been 
poached to extirpation in four countries (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Malaysia, 
Mozambique, and Vietnam), with uncontrolled poaching in five remaining countries: 
India, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Three countries are excluded from 
this analysis either because no poaching occurred there since the 2007 crisis (Indonesia 
                                                 
163 The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.” 
 
164 Burma, Pakistan, and Rwanda may have individual rhino in the wild, but these are not reliably 
documented and are at best the last survivors of extirpated populations.   
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and Uganda) or because rhino were killed through snares, thus precluding an assessment 
of intentionality (Malawi).165 While it is possible that individuals in these countries 
choose not to poach in this time period, it is also possible that individuals never 
entertained the decision to poach, and therefore these cases are excluded from my 
exploration of why individuals choose not to poach rhino. 
  
                                                 
165 Interestingly, both Indonesia and Uganda may exhibit Null relational models. In Indonesia, rhino only 
exist in remote uninhabited areas and rarely observed even by conservationists, suggesting a geographic 
cause for the complete absence of poaching. Uganda only began reintroducing wild rhino in 2005, 
precluding any assessment of its institutions prior to 2005. 
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Table 3.2: Rhino Poached Per Country, 2006- 2015 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Botswana           
DR Congo           
India  0 1 7  5 6 1 5 0 
Kenya    1 2 5 0 9 5 1 
Malaysia   0 0 0      
Mozambique    5 6 0 2    
Namibia         4 0 
Nepal 0 4  2 1      
South Africa  3 3 22 30 48 68 004 215 175 
Swaziland           
Tanzania           
Vietnam           
Zambia           
Zimbabwe 1 8 64 9 2 5 3  2 0 
Legend: E= White indicates poaching controlled; Red indicates not controlled, E indicates Extirpation. 
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Table 1.1: Control of Poaching 2006-2015 
Poaching Controlled (n=5) Poaching Not Controlled (n=9) 
• Botswana 
• Nepal 
• Swaziland 
• Tanzania 
• Zambia 
• Democratic Republic of Congo (extirpated 2010) 
• India 
• Kenya 
• Malaysia (extirpated 2011) 
• Mozambique (extirpated 2013) 
• Namibia 
• South Africa 
• Vietnam (extirpated 2010) 
• Zimbabwe 
Excluded from analysis: Indonesia, Malawi, and Uganda.  
 
Relational Model 
 
Relational model is highly correlated with the control of poaching. All five states 
that controlled rhino poaching had institutional structures indicative of a non-market 
priced relational model, either communal sharing (Nepal, Tanzania and Zambia) or 
authority ranking (Botswana and Swaziland). Institutions within these states show 
marked similarities in some respects. Each kept rhino populations in publically protected 
areas, often guarded by a strong public actor such as the army. Choice rules regarding 
restricted private property rights, use and consumption, including bans on rhino hunting. 
Payoff rules carried severe penalties for misuse, including mandatory imprisonment for 
poaching. When fines were specified, they often included both forfeiture of resources 
plus sliding penalties such as a fine worth ten times the exchanged value of the poached 
animal. In Botswana and Zimbabwe, a single charismatic actor dominated the 
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conservation program and the broader societal context, indicative of an authority ranking 
structure. 
The nine states that did not control rhino poaching all had institutional structures 
indicative of a market pricing relational model. Boundary and position rules allowed 
significant involvement of private actors, either through outright ownership of rhino (as 
in South Africa) or through conservatorship granted to private landowners (Kenya, 
Namibia, Zimbabwe). In most cases, the majority of the country’s rhino populations 
existed on privately held protected areas. Choice rules afforded significant private 
property rights, either through ownership or through landholder privileges. Pay-off rules 
had light penalties for misuse, often allowing bail and fines in lieu of imprisonment.  
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Table 3.3: Relational Models and the Control of Poaching 
 
 Poaching Controlled Poaching Not Controlled 
Communal Sharing 
Relational Model 
• Nepal 
• Tanzania 
• Zambia 
None 
Authority Ranking 
Relational Model 
• Botswana 
• Swaziland None 
Market Pricing 
Relational Model None 
• DR Congo (extirpation) 
• India 
• Kenya 
• Malaysia (extirpation) 
• Mozambique (extirpation) 
• Namibia 
• South Africa 
• Vietnam (extirpation) 
• Zimbabwe 
 
 
State Capacity and Tourism 
State capacity and ecotourism shows little to no correlation with the control of 
poaching. Some states with low state capacity controlled poaching (Nepal, Swaziland, 
and Zambia), while others did not (DRC, Mozambique, and Namibia). Interestingly, 
states with high coercive capacity such as India, South Africa, Malaysia, and Kenya did 
not control poaching, although Botswana did. Similarly, states with the highest tourism 
rates were the least successful in controlling poaching: of the four states with the highest 
numbers of tourists and highest revenues from tourism, two had the highest numbers of 
rhino poached anywhere and two experienced extirpation. Some states with lower 
amounts of tourists and tourist revenues controlled poaching (Nepal and Swaziland), 
while others did not (DRC and Mozambique).  
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Table 1.2: State Capacity, Measured by Government Revenue and GDP in 2005 
 Poaching Controlled 
Poaching Not 
Controlled 
High State 
Capacity (revenue > US$ 
20 billion) 
None 
• India 
• South Africa 
• Malaysia 
(extirpation) 
• Vietnam 
(extirpation) 
Low State 
Capacity  
(revenue < US$ 5 
billion) 
• Botswana 
• Tanzania 
• Nepal 
• Zambia 
• Swaziland 
• Kenya 
• Namibia 
• Zimbabwe 
• Mozambique 
(extirpation) 
• DR Congo 
(extirpation) 
 
Table 1.3: Economic Incentives, Measured by Tourism Visitors in 2005 
 Poaching Controlled 
Poaching Not 
Controlled 
High Economic 
Incentives 
(Tourism > 
1,000,000 visitors) 
• Botswana 
 
• India 
• South Africa 
• Malaysia 
(extirpation) 
• Vietnam 
(extirpation) 
• Kenya 
Low Economic 
Incentives (Tourism < 
1,000,000 visitors) 
• Tanzania 
• Nepal 
• Zambia 
• Swaziland 
• Namibia 
• Zimbabwe 
• Mozambique 
(extirpation) 
• DR Congo 
(extirpation) 
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Chart 1.4: Economic Incentives, Measured by Tourism Receipts in 2005 
 Poaching Controlled 
Poaching Not 
Controlled 
High Economic 
Incentives 
(Receipts > US$ 
400 mil.) 
• Botswana 
• Tanzania 
• Zambia 
• Malaysia 
(extirpation) 
• South Africa 
• India 
• Vietnam 
(extirpation) 
• Kenya 
Low Economic 
Incentives (Receipts < 
US$ 400 mil.) 
• Nepal 
• Swaziland 
• Namibia 
• Mozambique 
(extirpation) 
• Zimbabwe 
• DR Congo 
(extirpation) 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has surveyed the universe of states with wild rhino populations prior 
to the current crisis in rhino poaching. Of these, five states successfully controlled 
poaching. All five states that successfully controlled poached featured institutional rules 
indicating Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking relational models, including strong 
public sector conservation, bans on private property rights associated with rhino, and 
severe penalties for rhino poaching.  
During the same time period, nine states failed to control rhino poaching, 
including four states whose populations were extirpated. All nine of these states featured 
institutional rules indicative of Market Pricing relational models, operationalized by the 
privatization of rhino conservation and light and/or fungible penalties for rhino poaching. 
Admittedly, this analysis makes a significant assumption that may not be valid: 
formal institutional rules reflect the rules in use by individuals living near rhino. Many of 
the states in question possess weak institutions, which may have questionable influence 
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on actors within them. At the same time, potential confirmation bias during my 
qualitative assessment could affect the reliability of my analysis of relational models at 
the national level. I mitigated this potential bias by operationalizing the models through 
formal rules regarding legal boundaries, choices, and penalties, consistent with Ostrom’s 
well-established methodology for institutional analysis and development. 
I also employed well-established and objective measures to evaluate alternative 
hypotheses. State capacity and tourism provided no clear correlation with the control of 
poaching, except that states with the highest capacity and levels of tourism were the least 
effective in controlling poaching.  
These results provide tentative support for relational models theory and the sacred 
value protection model to explain the control of poaching. They further suggest that state- 
or market-centric theories of conservation are insufficient for explaining the control of 
poaching, and may actually work against achieving such control. 
To look beyond these correlations and investigate causal mechanisms, I next turn 
to detailed case studies of Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa. These cases represent 
ideal types of all three relational models, while also exemplifying variance in state 
capacity and ecotourism. Nepal and Swaziland have institutional structures indicative of 
predominately Communal Sharing and Authority Ranking relational models respectively; 
they also have comparatively weak state capacity and levels of tourism. In contrast, South 
African rhino conservation exemplifies a predominately Market Priced relational model. 
It is also one of the strongest and wealthiest of all rhino range states. These cases will 
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enable a closer look at why poor, weak countries have successfully controlled rhino 
poaching. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: MANIFESTATIONS OF RELATIONAL MODELS 
This chapter explores whether individuals in countries with rhinos actually 
manifest different relational models relative to rhino conservation, as suggested by 
analysis of institutional rules in Chapter Three. After reviewing literature that 
describes how relational models manifest in individual behavior, I present and 
justify a research design to appraise relational models among actors in rhino 
conservation in three countries: Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa. I find that in 
each case, a majority of respondents manifested a similar relational model: 
Communal Sharing in Nepal, Authority Ranking in Swaziland, and Market Pricing 
in South Africa. I detail observations of these manifestations, then conclude by 
addressing this research’s limitations and implications. 
In countries with wild rhinos, do individuals actually think about rhinos in 
different ways? More technically, do individuals use distinct psychological schemata 
when thinking about rhinos, as relational models theory would predict? Does the social 
construction of rhinos vary? 
In Chapter Two, I used relational models theory and the sacred value protection 
model to show how this variance might occur, and how such variance could explain a 
country’s ability to control rhino poaching. In Chapter Three, I used institutional rules as 
proxy measures to show that non-Market Pricing relational models correlate with the 
effective control of rhino poaching, and Market Pricing with a lack of control of 
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poaching. This analysis hinged on an assumption that rules-in-form reflect rules-in-use, 
and that formal rules correspond to the actual behavior in a rhino conservation setting. In 
this chapter, I delve deeper into three cases in order to test these assumptions and 
investigate actual manifestations of relational models.166 Exploring the cases of Nepal, 
Swaziland, and South Africa, I demonstrate that Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, 
and Market Pricing relational models do manifest empirically in each case. Moreover, 
within each case, a vast majority of conservationists employ the same relational model, 
thus validating assumptions made in Chapter Three’s institutional analysis and 
strengthening the argument for a social theory of conservation. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review literature on manifestations of 
relational models to establish observable implications of each model. Next, I present and 
justify my research design, including assumptions, methods, and case selection. I then 
present my findings, demonstrating that each in case, a majority of conservationists 
manifest the same relational model. In Nepal, most actors utilize a Communal Sharing 
model, whereas in Swaziland, most actors utilize an Authority Ranking model and in 
South Africa, a Market Pricing model. I conclude by discussing my findings, their 
limitations, and implications. 
  
                                                 
166 In seeking to test assumptions, I follow Robert H. Bates et al., Analytic Narratives (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), 14. This is contrary to the position argued by Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive 
Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). 
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Manifestations of Relational Models 
Relational models theory posits that people use four fundamental and innate 
relational structures to coordinate social activity.167 The four models are Communal 
Sharing, Authority Ranking, Equality Matching, and Market Pricing. These models are 
psychological schemata that manifest across social domains, appearing in things, choices, 
orientations, and judgments. In the following section, I summarize Fiske (1991)’s catalog 
of key distinguishing features of Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, and Market 
Pricing.168 I first discuss the general manifestation of the relational model, then specify 
observable implications of that model in the specific context of rhino conservation. As in 
Chapter Three, I omit discussion of Equality Matching as this model rarely appears in the 
empirical context of rhino conservation.169 
 
Communal Sharing: Relations Based on What People Share 
The Communal Sharing model occurs when individuals structure interactions by 
what they share. Resources are held in common without individual shares or portions. 
Individuals contribute what they have in fulfillment of collective responsibility. Objects 
hold metonymic significance to other people of shared identity, including natal 
                                                 
167 Fiske, Alan P., Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations (New York: 
The Free Press, 1991); Fiske, Alan P., “Relational Models Theory 2.0,” in Relational Models Theory: A 
Contemporary Overview, ed. Haslam, Nick (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 3–26. 
 
168 Fiske, Alan P., Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations, 41–230. 
 
169 This empirically derived focus on Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, and Market Pricing roughly 
corresponds to Wicks’ three spheres of markets, governments, and communities. See Rick Wicks, “A 
Model of Dynamic Balance Among the Three Spheres of Society – Markets, Governments, and 
Communities: Applied to Understanding the Relative Importance of Social Capital and Social Goods,” 
International Journal of Social Economics 36, no. 5 (April 10, 2009): 535–65, 
doi:10.1108/03068290910954022. 
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orientations towards land. Time is understood in long form, emphasizing tradition, 
eternity, and perpetuity. Decision making features unity and consensus, and social 
influences prize conformity and mutuality. Groups express kinship and common identity, 
privileging close relationships and intimacy. Moral judgments accent altruism and 
protection, including traditional legitimation. Misfortune is interpreted as either 
stigmatizing or as solidarity, and conflict orients against out groups and equivalent others. 
These various manifestations all emphasize the commonality central to the Communal 
Sharing relational model. 
In the context of rhino conservation, a Communal Sharing relational model should 
construct rhinos in reference to a community. Rhinos will be a common resource and a 
collective responsibility of all members of the community. Rhinos will hold metonymic 
significance to community members, with sacred status linking individuals to others in 
the community. Rhino habitat will have natal associations, perpetuating traditions rooted 
in history. Individuals will signal social conformity by outward modeling of support for 
rhino conservation, linked to a common sense of kinship. Individuals will likewise 
motivate action in rhino conservation by associations with close and enduring 
relationships, such as children and parents. Rhinos will have traditional legitimation, and 
conservation actions will feature altruism and generosity. Misfortune associated with 
rhinos will be linked either to outsiders and outgroups, or connected to solidarity with 
fellow community members. 
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Authority Ranking: Relationships Based on Authoritative Hierarchy 
The Authority Ranking relational model manifests in similar ways to Communal 
Sharing, only instead of referencing relationships to a commonality, it is to a shared 
hierarchy. As with Communal Sharing, objects associated with this model have 
incomparable or sacred value. 
In the domain of reciprocal exchange, superiors take first and inferiors second, 
while superiors retain a pastoral responsibility to provide for inferiors and their 
protection. In distributional aspects, those with higher rank get more, and lesser ranks get 
less. Superiors likewise contribute more, often in noblesse oblige. Work allocations 
privilege superiors, who control and direct more demanding work by subordinates. 
Superiors endow objects with prestige and emblems of rank, limiting the ability of 
inferiors to associate with objects. Superiors dominate land orientation. Time is likewise 
structured according to rank, with temporal priority given to superiors. Decision making 
reflects authoritative choices, transmitted through the hierarchy. Social obedience to 
authority is expected and signaled. Groups organize around charismatic leaders, and 
social identity is defined by rank and relationship to the hierarchy. Motivation rests on 
power, but goes beyond mere coercion.170 The moral judgments of superiors are deemed 
legitimate and the source of heteronomy. Misfortunate is construed as a result of breaks 
with a hierarchy, and such breaks elicit aggression and conflict. The Authority Ranking 
                                                 
170 Fiske differentiates between purely coercive power in response to force or the threat of harm, and power 
exercised through Authority Ranking. Subordinates accept the latter as legitimate. See Fiske, Alan P., 
Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations, 14. Gramsci (1971) reconciles 
this distinction through the metaphor of power as a minotaur, see Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison 
Notebooks, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971). 
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model features criteria denoting rank, dimensions marking precedence and demarcated 
domains of authority. 
In the context of rhino conservation, an Authority Ranking relational model 
would manifest by referencing some common hierarchy. Hierarchical superiors within a 
community determine conservation policy, including access to rhinos and utilization of 
resources associated with rhinos. Superiors would bear a responsibility to provide for 
rhino conservation, and make symbolic demonstrations of their fulfillment of that 
responsibility while doing less of the arduous or menial labor associated therein. 
Prestigious associations with rhinos would be reserved for superiors, with restrictions on 
inferior members’ choices regarding rhinos. Land associated with rhinos would be 
dominated by superiors in the hierarchy, potentially through personal dominions, fiefs, or 
special reserves. Rhinos may be temporally associated with superiors, such as marking 
changes in the hierarchy itself like the establishment of a new leader. Decisions regarding 
rhino conservation would be made by fiat or decreed, transmitted through the hierarchy, 
and obeyed by subordinates. Subordinates would socially signal deference and loyalty to 
such decisions, and organize conservation activities hierarchically. Social identities 
identify superiors with prerogative regarding rhino conservation, and inferiors with 
servitude toward such prerogatives. Individuals would be motivated towards rhino 
conservation by power and not merely coercion, morally associating superior’s decisions 
with legitimacy. Challenges to these decisions will be viewed morally, and met with 
aggression and conflict. In short, rhino conservation will be marked by reference to a 
socially legitimate hierarchy. 
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Market Pricing: Relationships Based on Ratios 
A Market Pricing relational model organizes interaction by referencing ratios or 
rates, usually through a utility measurement such as money. This model manifests in 
reciprocal exchange and distribution in the form of proportional payments for 
commodities, often through use of market prices. Contributions are made on the bases of 
fixed ratios like a sales tax, or percentages such as tithing. Work is done for wages that 
vary with time or output. Things have meaning as commodities, produced or purchased 
for profit or maintained as capital or inventory. Products are developed and presented as 
market considerations, and a property’s value is derived from its cost. Land is considered 
as investments or capital, purchased for monetary appreciation, lease, rent, or means of 
production. Time is viewed in terms of productivity and efficiency. Decisions are made 
through markets, featuring considerations of supply, demand, expected utilities, and 
cost/benefit analysis. Social influence is likewise through cost and benefit incentives, 
with focuses on payments, bonuses, penalties, market manipulations, and references to 
scarcity and time limitations. Groups are constituted as corporations, markets, commodity 
associations, and firms. Social identity flows from one’s occupation or economic role, 
and motivation is ascribed to achievement. Moral judgment is based on utilitarian criteria, 
and misfortune explained as unacceptable costs relative to benefits. Aggression and 
conflict are characterized by mercantilism, killing to protect markets or profits, and 
rational strategies such as kill ratios. Key features of the Market Pricing model are what 
entities may be bought and sold, what ratios of exchange are, and what counts as a cost or 
benefit. Relationships are symbolically represented in economic terms, with emphasis on 
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specialization and commodity exchange. These features share the Market Pricing 
relational model’s common reference to ratios or rates. 
In the context of rhino poaching, the Market Pricing relational model chiefly 
manifests in economic terms. Rhinos would be treated as commodities, with conservation 
framed as a function of market prices or utility. Individual participation and contributions 
towards conservation would vary with what one had paid or received, and conservation 
activity would be treated as wage work varying with time or output. The significance of 
rhinos would lie in their ability to produce or be purchased for profit, capital, or 
inventory. Messaging regarding rhinos would be presented in market considerations, and 
the value of rhinos would be associated with their costs. Land for rhino habitats would be 
treated as capital, either for expected appreciation, lease, rent, or as means of production. 
Time associated with rhinos would be framed through efficiency and productivity. 
Decisions regarding rhinos would be made by markets, referencing supply, demand, 
utility, and cost/benefits. Social influence would be through cost/benefit incentives 
associated with rhinos, particularly payments, bonuses, and fines; these will emphasize 
scarcity and time limitations to encourage social action. Groups will constitute as 
corporations, markets, commodity associations, and firms. Individuals will define their 
roles in conservation in terms of occupation or economic role, drawing motivation from 
achievement rhinos. Moral judgements associated with rhino conservation will emphasize 
utilitarian criteria, attributing misfortunate to mismatches between costs and benefits. 
Aggression and conflict involving rhino conservation will be characterized by 
mercantilism, killing to protect markets and profit, and devising strategies based on kill 
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ratios. In total, the Market Pricing relational model will manifest in rhino conservation in 
economic behavior. 
 
Research Design 
To investigate what relational model an individual uses, researchers look at 
individual actions in order to identify manifestations described in the preceding section. 
In the initial presentation of relational models theory, Fiske identified the exploration of 
“who uses which model in what domains, and when” as one of three major directions for 
future research.171 In the following section, I explore this direction. 
I employ a methodological technique common to relational model research: 
analysis of individual statements and behaviors, obtained through interviews and 
observation. In essence, this technique consists of identifying respondents in structured 
settings, either through experimental or field settings, and surveying respondents’ 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses to situations. Variants of this technique are 
used to assess relational models as described by Haslam (2004).172173 Whitehead’s (2000) 
                                                 
171 Fiske, Alan P., Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations, 137. 
 
172 Haslam, Nick, “Research on the Relational Models: An Overview.” 
 
173 For examples of this method, see Fiske, Alan P., Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms 
of Human Relations; Nick Haslam and Alan Page Fiske, “Implicit Relationship Prototypes: Investigating 
Five Theories of the Cognitive Organization of Social Relationships,” Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology 28, no. 5 (September 1992): 441–74, doi:10.1016/0022-1031(92)90041-H; Nick Haslam, 
“Factor Structure of Social Relationships: An Examination of Relational Models and Resource Exchange 
Theories,” Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 12, no. 2 (May 1, 1995): 217–27, 
doi:10.1177/0265407595122004; Nick Haslam and Alan Page Fiske, “Relational Models Theory: A 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis,” Personal Relationships 6, no. 2 (June 1999): 241–50, doi:10.1111/j.1475-
6811.1999.tb00190.x; Nick Haslam, “Taxometric and Related Methods in Relationships Research,” 
Personal Relationships 6, no. 4 (December 1999): 519–34, doi:10.1111/j.1475-6811.1999.tb00207.x; 
Markus Vodosek, “The Relationship Between Relational Models and Individualism and Collectivism: 
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ethnography of the Seltamen of New Guinea features similar methods, as did Goodnow’s 
(1998) study of the organizational of housework work.174 Tetlock, McGraw and Kristel 
(2003) utilized both this method and relational models theory to explore the valuation of 
objects, while Poulson (2000) did likewise to investigation interpersonal conflicts.175 
Haslam, Reichert and Fiske (2002) studied aberrant use of relational models among 
persons with self-identified interpersonal problems.176 This literature establishes the 
credibility and validity of assessing relational models through observation and analysis of 
individual statements and behavior.177  
Applying this method to identify what relational model manifests among users of 
social-ecological systems featuring rhinoceros, I conduct a structured, focus comparison 
of three cases. This approach involves applying standardized general questions to 
multiple cases in order to make systematic comparisons and evaluation of findings. 
George and Bennett (2005) identify three requirements and two characteristics of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Evidence from Culturally Diverse Work Groups,” International Journal of Psychology 44, no. 2 (April 
2009): 120–28, doi:10.1080/00207590701545684. 
 
174 Harriet Whitehead, Food Rules: Hunting, Sharing, and Tabooing Game in Papua New Guinea (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Jacqueline Goodnow, “Beyond the Overall Balance: The 
Significance of Particular Tasks and Procedures for Perceptions of Fairness in Distributions of Household 
Work,” Social Justice Research 11, no. 3 (September 1998): 359–76. 
 
175 A. Peter McGraw, Philip E. Tetlock, and Orie V. Kristel, “The Limits of Fungibility: Relational 
Schemata and the Value of Things,” Journal of Consumer Research 30, no. 2 (September 2003): 219–29; 
Barton Lynn Poulson, “Discord in Relational Models as a Source of Interpersonal Conflict” (City 
University of New York, 1999). 
 
176 Nick Haslam, Therese Reichert, and Alan P. Fiske, “Aberrant Social Relations in the Personality 
Disorders,” Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice 75, no. 1 (March 2002): 19–
31, doi:10.1348/147608302169526. 
 
177 Such research explores validity by comparing relational model analysis with other ontologies and 
methods within social psychology. Haslam (2004) reviews this; see Haslam, “Research on the Relational 
Models: An Overview.” 
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structured, focused comparison.178 First, the universe of cases to be studied must be 
clearly delineated. In this dissertation, the universe is the control of rhino poaching since 
2006, encompassing all 17 rhino range states. Of these states, I focus on three states 
whose formal institutions suggest ideal type variance of relational models. The 
prominence of community actors in Nepal suggests the Communal Sharing relational 
model, while the prominence of the king in Swaziland’s formal rules suggests the 
Authority Ranking model. Lastly, South Africa’s formal rules suggest a Market Pricing 
relational model. 
Second, there should be a well-defined research objective and appropriate 
research strategy. In this chapter, the research objective is to identify if and how 
relational models vary across the universe of cases, utilizing a research strategy common 
to relational model research. Third, case studies should employ variables with 
explanatory potential and policy implications. Relational models meet such criteria. 
George and Bennett additionally note that research should be structured, as in carefully 
developed to reflect the research objective and theoretical focus of the inquiry, and 
focused with a specific research objective in mind and appropriate to that objective. By 
utilizing Fiske’s identified manifestations of relational models in individual behavior, this 
chapter thus meets accepted standards for structure and focus. 
I collected data for this chapter primarily through interviews, complemented by 
observation. I employed semi-structured interviews (also known as non-scheduled 
structured or focused interviews) as this technique’s median positioning on the spectrum 
                                                 
178 This technique is described in Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 67–72. 
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of interview control facilitates deeper exploration and understanding of the interview’s 
topic.179  
I conducted interviews according to a single protocol, locating in an appendix to 
this chapter. This protocol aimed to understand the social construction of a rhino in a 
given locale, the dominant relational model used to construct rhino in a locale, the 
institutional characteristics of communities regarding rhino poaching, how conservation 
organizations manage poaching threats, and what lessons learned conservations have 
discovered in their work with rhino. 
I designed the protocol as an inverted funnel, beginning with an introduction and 
context assessment, before moving into questions gauging the social construction and 
relational model the participant used for rhino, institutions regarding rhino, the 
participant’s experiences with rhino, and finally their assessment of rhino conservation. 
All participants were asked the same questions in the same order, although I followed 
individual answers in a conversational manner to thoroughly understand answers 
provided while using probes to ensure I covered the correct material. 
I utilized cluster sampling to select participants, focusing on the individuals with 
some active role in rhino conservation. Such roles including professional conservationists 
such as wardens, guards, veterinarians, and scientists, but also tangential roles such as 
                                                 
179 Robert K. Merton and Patricia L. Kendall, “The Focused Interview,” American Journal of Sociology 51, 
no. 6 (May 1946): 541–57, doi:10.1086/219886; Margaret C. Harrell and Melissa A. Bradley, “Data 
Collection Methods: Semi-Structured Interviews and Focus Groups” (RAND Corporation, 2009), 27. 
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concessionaires and volunteers. Each of these meets the categorical requirements of actor 
in a social-ecological system.180 
Cluster sampling from actors within the rhino social-ecological system has two 
additional advantages. First, it leverages the benefits of judgement sampling, where the 
opinions of selected participants are important to the research itself. The actors in this 
sample are precisely those identified by extant theory as the critical actors in poaching 
outcomes. Second, cluster sampling actors in rhino conservations mitigates the risk of 
selection bias in deviating from random selection. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) 
highlight the risk of bias towards high status individuals who are generally supportive of 
government policy.181 However, in this case, actors in rhino conservation could likewise 
be assumed to be generally supportive of rhino conservation, viewing rhinos as 
intrinsically worthy of conversation. Actors in rhino conservation all live and work near 
dangerous animals, under pressure from equally dangerous poachers, and most of these 
actors derive their income and living from such work. Given such vested interests in 
rhino conservation, if even this cluster population shows significant relational model 
variance regarding rhinos, then so should broader populations within countries with 
rhinos. 
  
                                                 
180 Pieter W.G. Bots, Maja Schlüter, and Jan Sendzimir, “A Framework for Analyzing, Comparing, and 
Diagnosing Social-Ecological Systems,” Ecology and Society 20, no. 4 (2015): 6. 
 
181 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inquiry in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 125. 
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Results 
In each of the three cases, a clear majority of respondents manifested a single 
relational model. In Nepal and Swaziland, most respondents manifested a non-Market 
Pricing relational model (Nepal, n = 31/35; Swaziland, n = 18/24), primarily Communal 
Sharing in Nepal and Authority Ranking in Swaziland. In South Africa, most respondents 
manifested a Market Pricing model (n = 28/32). This suggests that a single relational 
model does predominate within each social-ecological system, that this predominate 
relational model corresponds to the model suggested by the formal institutional rules, and 
that this variance in relational models may explain why some countries have effectively 
controlled poaching. In the follow section, I will detail participant responses to illustrate 
how each relational model manifests in individual orientations towards rhino 
conservation. 
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Figure 4.1: Manifestations of Relational Models in Rhino Conservationists, by Country 
 
Y axis: Number of Respondents Who Manifest a Particular Relational Model 
 
Nepal: Manifestations of Communal Sharing 
In Nepal, a vast majority of respondents described rhino conservation in terms of 
their community. Most respondents metonymically linked rhinos to their national 
identity, their community, and their family. In response to the question “Why are rhinos 
important to you,” one participant characteristically exclaimed, “Because I’m Nepali!,” 
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before describing rhino conservation of a function of the community’s “self-esteem” and 
“how we see ourselves.”  
Most Nepali respondents (n=31 of 35) manifested the Communal Sharing 
relational model when describing rhino conservation. Four respondents (n= 4 of 35) 
manifested a Market Pricing relational model. 
Nepali respondents frequently linked rhino conservation to their children, thus 
manifesting elements of kinship and unity in group constitution and long-term 
orientations towards time. One participant, after explicitly stating that “rhinos are more 
sacred to me than a cow, and I am a Hindu,” then explained, “rhinos were important to 
my grandfather, and I want them to be important to my son.” Other respondents 
expressed a sense of obligation to children, who are exposed to conservation themes in 
school, and a desire to be seen by their children as fulfilling communal obligations to 
contribute and work rhino conservation. One participant said that if he failed to contribute 
to rhino conservation, he feared what his children would think of him. Other Nepali 
respondents associated work in rhino conservation as a sign of education. One leader of a 
volunteer anti-poaching unit said that after his children learned about rhinos in school, “I 
came to know the importance of the rhino, [and] I joined” the anti-poaching patrol. These 
responses indicate the social influence of conformity, mutual modeling, and imitation, as 
well as intimacy motivation.   
Most Nepali respondents described rhinos as inseparable from a common forest 
landscape, indicating a communal orientation towards land associated with rhinos. One 
participant said that even if tourism stopped, rhino conservation would remain important 
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because he believed rhinos occupied a keystone role in the forest. He also noted that 
rhino bring a sense of safety to the forest, which was striking because his father was 
killed by a rhino in the forest. The participant described that death in language similar to 
a tragic trade-off, indicating that both the lives of his father and the rhino were of 
incomparable or sacred value. He stated that his father had inadvertently trespassed in the 
rhino’s space, and that the rhino had a right to exist in the forest. Several respondents 
described active participation in volunteer anti-poaching patrols, further indicating 
communal orientations to contribution, work, and distribution. One participant described 
his work in rhino conservation as “working for my nation, and for the pride of my 
nation.”  This association of rhinos with community also appeared in moral 
manifestations. 
Most Nepali respondents described transgressions against rhino conservation in 
distinctly moral language. Many respondents expressed a deep sense of altruism and 
selfless generosity towards rhinos, reporting a “duty to protect wildlife” from poachers. 
In the domain of aggression and conflict, poachers were seen as outsiders who threatened 
the community. One participant said that against poachers, conservationists “can’t win 
with guns, [but] only with community. They are our eyes.”  When discussing poaching, 
several respondents displayed moral outrage, stating that “poachers should hang, even 
beyond the law” that prohibits capital punishment. Others expressed a desire for 
mandatory life imprisonment for rhino poachers, or in the words of respondent, the 
punishment should be “as much as more.” Such moral language is consistent with 
manifestations of the Communal Sharing relational model. 
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Nepali respondents often explicitly disavowed the influence of state capacity or 
economic incentives. Rather, both government officials and non-governmental officials 
emphasized the critical role of communities. Several government officials stated that only 
when the government turned to the community did anti-poaching become successful. 
Likewise, a member of a volunteer anti-poaching unit proudly described catching a 
government official who was poaching, and how his community group pressured the 
government to deal with this official. Similarly, many respondents specifically said that 
the value of the rhino lay beyond its impact on tourism. One respondent who worked in 
ecotourism displayed moral outrage when asked to assess the economic value of a rhino, 
flatly stating that “it cannot have a price. It is the source of the community’s wealth.” The 
respondent continued that if ecotourism stopped, his business would likely fail, but he 
believed the rhino would still be important to Nepal, as “this animal has a right to exist.” 
He concluded his interview by emphasizing that “the world in the future must have rhinos 
in it.” Similarly, a community leader expressed disgust for both economic assessments of 
rhinos and efforts to incentivize conservation through tourism revenue. The leader 
distinguished between conservationists “who work for money” versus those “who work 
for the heart,” stating that while money was necessary for community development, “if 
you pay money for conservation, you are forcing people to do what they should already 
do.” This leader emphasized that “ten volunteers are better than 100 workers” when it 
came to protecting the rhino.  
In total, only four Nepali respondents manifested the Market Pricing relational 
model; of these, one was a senior government official, one worked for an Western NGO, 
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one worked in finance for a community NGO, and one led a community that was 
disproportionally affluent compared to neighboring communities. Such responses provide 
exceptions suggestive of a rule, indicating that rather than state capacity or economic 
incentives, a significant majority of Nepali conservationists manifest a Communal 
Sharing relational model in reference to rhino conservation.  
 
Swaziland: Manifestations of Authority Ranking 
In Swaziland, most respondents described rhino in terms of a common 
hierarchical authority. The King of Swaziland, Mswati III, appeared prominently in every 
participant’s response. In answer to the question, “Are rhino important to you,” one 
employee of a Swazi national park replied, “Thumbs up for the King! Because of him, we 
have rhinos in Swaziland.” King Mswati provides the transitive hierarchical authority that 
anchors social constructions of rhino in Swaziland, indicating the Authority Ranking 
relational model.  
A clear majority of Swazi respondents (n=18 of 24) manifested non-Market 
Pricing relational models when describing rhinos. Most respondents manifested the 
Authority Ranking relational model (n=13), while some also manifested the Communal 
Sharing model (n=5). However, even the respondents who manifested Communal 
Sharing still prominently featured discussions of King Mswati. 
Most Swazi respondents described rhino conservation in deference to the King. 
For instance, after stating that it was important to conserve rhino, one government official 
explained, “the monarch has said we must preserve the animals.” Another participant 
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flatly ascribed the importance of rhino conservation to the King’s “decision that we must 
preserve the rhino.” Likewise, another respondent explained that “our king has a lot of 
pride” in rhino, as did a participant who explained that rhinos are important “because we 
are Swazi, and we live in a kingdom.” One participant described rhinos as “the King’s 
children.” These responses indicate the central role of King Mswati as a hierarchical 
authority figure who pastorally directs and controls how Swazis understand rhino 
conservation, a hallmark of Authority Ranking manifestations. 
As most Swazis consider rhinos part of the sovereign realm of their King, 
obedience to and compliance with rhino conservation relies heavily on social influence. 
Respondents often described the importance of setting a good example regarding rhino 
conservation. One participant said “if we do not protect the rhino, our children will see us 
differently,” while another stated that “if you poach, people see you differently” and 
“look on the poacher’s community differently.” Many respondents expressed gratitude to 
the king for Swaziland’s success in rhino conservation. In each of these responses, the 
central concern was maintaining one’s standing in the eyes of the king. This focus on 
social conformity with the hierarchy exemplifies the Authority Ranking relational model.   
Consistent with both Authority Ranking and Communal Sharing relational 
models, many Swazi respondents manifested moral outrage and moral cleansing when 
describing transgressions against rhino conservation. Respondents favored heavily 
punishing both poachers as norm violators and accessories to poaching as metanorm 
violators. One respondent said that “if someone poaches, take away their rights. Even 
someone who offers a helping hand” to poachers.” Another flatly declared that poachers 
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should “rot in jail,” and that maximum punishments should be considered minimums. 
One respondent approvingly noted the legal equivalence between killing a person and 
killing a rhino. Beyond such expressions of moral outrage, respondents also displayed 
moral cleansing in discussion reactions to rhino poaching. One respondent said that in 
order to be released from jail, poachers “must show that you’ve changed” to the Swazi 
community. Another participant said that punishment for poaching should include re-
education, similar to a different respondent’s belief that poachers should be punished by 
being forced to work with rhino conservation in order to better appreciate the animals. 
These responses are characteristic manifestations of non-Market Pricing relational 
models.  
A minority of Swazi respondents (n= 6 of 24) manifested Market Pricing 
relational models while describing rhino conservation. Of these, four respondents were 
elites with significant ties to international actors. This suggests a higher incidence of 
Market Pricing relational models among respondents closer to the international level of 
conservation. Interestingly, several respondents displayed moral outrage while discussing 
Swaziland’s institutionalized outsourcing of rhino conservation and national parks 
administration to a private corporation. One decried turning conservation into “a family 
business” and obtaining private gains from a national resource. Another noted that the 
corporation was straining its relationship with the Swazi people by abusing the 
conservation authority of the King. The respondent attributed this to the killing of alleged 
poachers by rangers employed by the private corporation. The respondent was not 
outraged by the death of the poachers, but rather that they were killed by private 
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employees and not by officers of the king. These reactions are consistent with taboo 
trade-offs described by non-Market Pricing relational models. In total, Authority Ranking 
appeared as the predominant relational model among Swazi rhino conservationists. 
 
South Africa: Manifestations of Market Pricing 
In South Africa, most respondents described rhinos in reference to a market 
system. The universal metric of money dominated South Africa discussions of rhinos, 
particularly its fantastically lucrative illicit price. When asked to explain why he believed 
rhinos were important, one respondent answered, “I’ll be honest, when I see a white 
rhino, I see a [expletive] cow with a million dollars on its forehead.” A clear majority of 
South Africa respondents (n=28 of 32) manifested the Market Pricing relational model 
when discussing rhino conservation.  
South Africa respondents overwhelming related rhino conservation to the price of 
rhino horn. Many respondents explained that rhino were valuable because of their horns, 
stating that “people say its worth a lot of money.” Others attempted to relate the value of 
the horn to income generated by ecotourism, saying “we have to get people to recognize 
the rhino will bring them more money if it is alive than if it is dead.” Another explained 
his calculated cost per year of protecting a rhino from poaching, noting that it was 
economically cheaper for him to minimize anti-poaching outlays, accept a sustainable 
rate of poaching, and replenish his rhino stock through public auctions. Similarly, one 
participant compared the cost of maintaining rhino to that alternative species like kudu, 
and said that other species brought in more tourist revenue. Still another wondered about 
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the effect that a rhino poaching incident would have bed rates in local tourist facilities, or 
on the ability of community members to tithe from disposable income derived from 
tourism. In one telling incident, a police officer at a checkpoint near a protected area 
stated that “rhino horn is very valuable” while he illegally confiscated sundry items I had 
in my luggage.182 These varied responses all share a common employment of calculations 
involving fungible values, efficiencies, costs and benefit incentives, economics decision-
making, and treating rhino conservation as a means to increasing economic ends. 
Consistent with this fundamentally economic outlook, few respondents 
manifested moral outrage or moral cleansing in discussions of rhinos. Some respondents 
rationally legitimized abandonment of rhino conservation by comparing its costs relative 
to that of alternative species. Many called for policy changes to legalize the trade in rhino 
horn on the basis of its lucrative profit potential, stating that it was wrong that only 
criminals could derive financial benefits from conservation given the illicit price for horn. 
Several noted that the price of rhino conservation was simply too high, and that 
“extinction is overrated.” Multiple respondents asked what the actual effect was of losing 
the dodo and quagga, and suggested that if rhinos went extinct, “tourists will still come.” 
Several respondents flatly denied that rhino conservation was important, stating, “I’ll be 
honest, rhinos do not matter to me,” “I do not care about rhinos,” and expressing belief 
that conserving rhinos was more trouble than it was worth. When respondents did state 
                                                 
182 While this incident underscores the challenge of corruption for controlling poaching, this challenge is 
common to all rhino range states, including those that effectively controlled poaching. For instance, in 
Nepal, corruption is comparatively worse than in South Africa, and yet poaching is far worse in South 
Africa. 
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preferences for violent responses to rhino poaching, it was expressed in the language of 
protecting property against thieves.  
A minority of respondents (n=4 of 32) manifested the Communal Sharing 
relational model in contrast to Market Pricing. Of these, all four emphasized obligations 
to their children as driving their participation in conservation, and each displayed moral 
outrage and cleansing that was absent in responses from other participants. One described 
several intensely violent encounters with poaching, and openly discussed psychological 
stresses created by participating in South African rhino conservation. These responses 
provide exceptions that confirm the overwhelming predominance of the Market Pricing 
relational model among South African rhino conservationists. 
 
Discussion 
These findings demonstrate that the social construction of rhinos does vary among 
rhino range states, that how individuals think about rhinos varies in observable ways. 
More significantly, individuals in different countries manifest different relational models 
when discussing rhino conservation within their countries. 
Among conservationists in Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa, a majority of 
respondents in each case manifested a similar relational model. In Nepal, most 
conservationists manifested a Communal Sharing relational model, whereas in 
Swaziland, most conservationists manifested an Authority Ranking model. In South 
Africa, most conservationists manifested a Market Pricing model. 
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This analysis is somewhat limited by the non-random sampling of participants. 
However, the use of cluster-sampling to focus on actively participants in rhino 
conservation mitigates this limitation, as such respondents should logically have a greater 
interest in successful rhino conservation. That this population itself shows variance in the 
social construction of rhinos suggests that such variance continues in broader populations 
beyond the conservationists themselves.  
A more significant limitation lies in the time lag between these observations in 
2015 and the global shock in rhino horn price in 2006. As such, it is possible that the 
identified relational models have endogenously responded to circumstances within each 
case since the global shock, and may not correspond to relational models manifesting 
within these cases prior to the crisis. However, the correlation between relational models 
inferred from formal institutional rules as of 2005 and those identified in respondents in 
2015 suggests that such models have remained stable within each case. 
The respective predominance of Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, and 
Equality Matching within Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa suggests that institutional 
rules are valid proxy measures for relational models in Chapter 3.  Moreover, it lends 
support to the hypothesized relationship between relational models and the effective 
control of poaching, suggesting that moral outrage and cleansing mechanisms have 
facilitated comparatively weak and poor countries like Nepal and Swaziland to succeed 
where stronger, more developed countries like South Africa have failed. To further 
investigate the causal influence of relational models on the control of poaching, I next 
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explore the specific responses of Nepal, Swaziland and South Africa to rhino poaching 
since 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 106 
CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYTIC NARRATIVE OF NEPAL’S CONTROL OF 
POACHING 
Why do Communal Sharing and Authority Ranking relational models facilitate the 
control of rhino poaching? According to the Sacred Value Protection Model, when 
individuals relate to rhino using non-Market Priced relational models, poaching will 
elicit moral outrage and cleansing behaviors. In this chapter, I employ analytic 
narratives to demonstrate that such moral outrage and cleansing provide 
mechanisms for controlling rhino poaching. At critical junctures in Nepal’s 
responses to rhino poaching, moral outrage and cleansing facilitated effective 
responses to rhino poaching. I also demonstrate that at such junctions, state 
capacity and economic incentives were at best irrelevant, and may even encourage 
further poaching. I conclude by summarizing my findings and addressing their 
limitations and implications. 
When individuals think about rhino in different ways, how does it affect the 
control of poaching? Does thinking about rhino in terms of one’s community or a 
common authority help communities control rhino poaching? Does predominant usage of 
Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking relational models facilitate the effective control 
of rhino poaching? According to relational models theory and the sacred value protection 
model, when individuals use non-Market Pricing relational models to relate to rhino, then 
poaching rhino becomes a taboo trade-off and elicits moral outrage and cleansing. These 
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moral reactions to poaching provide critical mechanisms that weak and poor communities 
can leverage to control poaching of fantastically lucrative wildlife.  
To understand these mechanisms connecting structural factors like relational 
models and outcomes like the control of poaching, I employ analytic narratives to 
understand how Nepal has effectively controlled rhino poaching. In tracing Nepal’s 
response to rhino poaching since 2006, I demonstrate that moral outrage and moral 
cleansing existed at critical junctures in this country’s effective control of rhino poaching. 
I also establish that at such critical junctures, the role of state capacity and economic 
incentives were at best irrelevant and at worst, worked against the control of poaching.  
This chapter proceeds as follows.183 First, I present and justify the methodology 
of analytic narratives to evaluate the sacred value protection model, and the case selection 
of Nepal for evaluating this model. Second, I identify a model of the control rhino 
poaching based on sacred value protection, including general observable implications. 
Third, I examine an analytic narrative of Nepal’s response to rhino poaching since 2006, 
moving from the country’s history of rhino conservation to their attempts to control the 
current epidemic, followed by analysis of the model’s explanatory ability for the case. I 
conclude by discussing my findings, their limitations, and implications. 
  
  
                                                 
183 I organized this chapter along the argument presented by Margaret Levi’s “Conscription: The Price of 
Citizenship” in Analytic Narratives, eds. Robert Bates et al (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 
109-147. Levi explores social explanations for failures in a rational choice model through three cases; this 
was similar to my own analysis, especially in its tangential connection to relational models theory through 
the concept of blocked exchanges. Levi references Philip E. Tetlock, Randall Peterson and Jennifer 
Lerner’s “Revising the Pluralism Model: Incorporating Social Content and Context Postulates,” in The 
Psychology of Values, ed. Clive Seligman, James D. Olson, and Mark P. Zanna (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1996), 25-51. 
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Modeling Rhino Poaching 
Rhino conservation programs chiefly vary on a dimension of public versus private 
authority. In public programs, rhino conservation is oriented to and anchored in a public 
interest, either a communal identity or a common hierarchy. In contrast, private interests 
motivate private conservation programs, and conservation is seen as good business. 
Conceptually, these programs can be modeled as social-ecological systems 
(SES).184 SES analysis seeks to explain institutional interactions and outcomes in 
resource systems. Interactions are activities and processes such as harvesting, poaching 
(illegal harvesting), information sharing, conflicts, and monitoring and evaluation 
activities. Outcomes occur in three forms: social performance measures such as 
efficiency, equity, and accountability, ecological performance measures such as 
overharvesting, resiliency, biodiversity, and sustainability, and externalities to other SES. 
  
                                                 
184 John M. Anderies, Marco A. Janssen, and Elinor Ostrom, “A Framework to Analyze the Robustness of 
Social-Ecological Systems from an Institutional Perspective,” Ecology and Society 9, no. 1 (2004): 18. 
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Figure 2.1: A Social-Ecological System 
 
Source: McGinnais and Ostrom 2014185 
The SES framework explains these interactions and outcomes as functions of the 
interaction of four subsystems of variables: Resource Systems, Resource Units, 
Governance Systems, and Actors. Resource Systems variables describe ecological 
attributes relevant to rhino conservation, such as physical boundaries around rhino 
populations, human constructed facilities associated with rhino conservation, and forage 
available to rhinos. Resource Units variables describe the rhino themselves, including 
both their number of units (population), replacement rate (births and natural deaths), and 
economic value (both licit and illicit). Governance Systems variables comprise the social 
institutions associated with rhino conservation, from government organizations to 
property-rights systems to monitoring and sanctioning rules. Actors variables describe the 
                                                 
185 Michael McGinnis and Elinor Ostrom, “Social-Ecological System Framework: Initial Changes and 
Continuing Challenges,” Ecology and Society 19, no. 2 (2014): 30. 
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agents who live in rhino conservation settings, including socioeconomic attributes, 
location, norms and social capital, and technology available.  
The SES approach was developed to enable systematic analysis of complex and 
diverse resource management situations. While this framework enables detailed 
examination of individual situations, its explanatory power derives from leveraging 
generalization about such diversity, thereby enabling cross-case comparison, analysis, 
and the typological theorizing advocated by George and Bennett (2005) and identified by 
Ostrom and Cox (2010) as “consonant with the paradigm of adaptive natural resource 
management.”186 As Ostrom said in her 2009 Nobel laureate lecture, “We need to ask 
how diverse polycentric institutions help or hinder the innovativeness, learning, adapting, 
trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of participants, and the achievement of more 
effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales.”187 The SES framework 
enables exploration of such outcomes through generalization amid complex diversity. 
To model rhino poaching using the SES framework, the focal action situation 
(outcome of interest) is the control of poaching, an ecological performance measure. 
Rhino poaching is controlled when it is rare, punished when it does occur, and does not 
threaten the survival of a given rhino population.  
Dominant literature examining conservation outcomes offers two explanations for 
why the control of poaching should occur. First, the economic value of rhino harvesting 
                                                 
186 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 235; Elinor Ostrom and Michael Cox, “Moving beyond Panaceas: A 
Multi-Tiered Diagnostic Approach for Social-Ecological Analysis,” Environmental Conservation 37, no. 4 
(December 2010): 10. 
 
187 Ostrom, Elinor, “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems” 
(Stockholm, Sweden, December 8, 2009), 436. 
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can fall, reducing the benefits available to actors from illegal harvesting.188 The reduction 
could occur in two ways. First, the market price for poached rhino horn could diminish, 
thereby reducing the incentive to poach. Alternatively, the economic value of not 
harvesting could increase, such as through ecotourism revenue sharing. This latter 
approach anchors many contemporary prescriptions for conservation through ecotourism. 
The second explanation for the control of poaching is increasing the capacity of 
guards and monitors, either through alteration to governance systems like government 
organizations or through increasing technologies available to guards.189 According to this 
explanation, individuals choose not to poach when the costs of poaching become 
sufficiently high. This approach is at the heart of green militarization, and accompanies 
calls for shoot to kill policies to combat rhino poaching. 
Both of these approaches are theoretically and empirically problematic. 
Theoretically, it is difficult to resolve collective action problems associated with 
distributing costs and benefits inherent in both explanations. At an individual level, an 
individual always stands to exclusively gain the benefits from poaching, while poaching's 
costs will likely be distributed amongst the individual's community. Moreover, the 
empirical reality of today's fantastically lucrative price for rhino horn makes it difficult 
for any cost benefit calculation to yield a situation in which it is profitable not to poach. 
                                                 
188 See David W. Bromley, “Economic Dimensions of Community-Based Conservation,” in Natural 
Connections: Perspectives in Community Based Conservation, ed. Western, David and R. Michael Wright 
(Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1994), 428–47. 
 
189 While fewer scholars argued for this approach today, this outlook was classically argued in William 
Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1977);  and David W. 
Ehrenfeld, Conserving Life on Earth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972). 
 112 
A social explanation leverages psychology to encompass these explanations while 
moving beyond them to more accurately explain micro-foundations found in reality. The 
control of poaching is an interaction of three key actors: poachers, community members 
who live near rhino populations, and authorities who sanction activities associated with 
rhino conservation. Whether poaching is controlled— that is, whether it is rare, punished, 
and does not threaten the survival of a given rhino population— is a function these 
interactions. Poachers seek to illegally harvest rhino horn. To do so, poachers must travel 
from and through a community to access rhino habitat, and return to populated areas 
afterwards in order to traffick the poached horn. To control this, authorities must either 
closely guard the rhinos themselves, or intercept poachers moving through communities 
to rhinos. Continuous guarding is difficult with wild rhinos, although this is precisely 
what Kenyan authorities have done with the world's last three northern white rhinos. 
Otherwise, authorities must intercept poachers moving within, from, and to populated 
areas. Their ability to do so hinges on the residents of those populated areas. 
This chapter's analysis considers the critical juncture for determining whether 
poaching occurs as individual decisions to participate in poaching, to acquiesce to such 
poaching, or to stop it. This focus employs the concept of a critical juncture of a brief 
phase of "institutional flux," when individual choices have lasting impacts that close off 
alternative options and generate self-reinforcing path-dependent processes that are 
difficult to alter.190 Moreover, this focus grounds an analysis of poaching in the micro-
foundations of the individual level.191   
                                                 
190 Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and 
Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59 (April 2007): 341–42; Paul Pierson, 
 113 
At this critical juncture is the decision to poach rhinos. In its narrowest sense, this 
is the decision to wound or kill a rhino in order to harvest its horn. However, in reality, to 
poach is to engage in the illegal harvesting of a natural resource.192 As such, this critical 
juncture is actually the decision to participate in the illegal harvesting of rhinos.  
The term poacher encompasses any actor engaged in the illegal harvesting of 
rhino horn. Milliken and Shaw (2012) typologize poachers into five levels, based on 
analysis by South Africa’s National Wildlife Crime Reaction Unit. Level 5 poachers are 
international buyers and consumers of rhino horn, typically in China and Vietnam. Level 
4 poachers are the international couriers, buyers, and exporters who acquire rhino horn 
from countries with rhinos, then traffick and sell it in demand markets. Level 3 poachers 
are the national couriers, buyers and exporters who transport rhino horn from local 
sources to international poachers. Level 2 poachers at the local level organize the illegal 
harvesting of rhino horn, which is actually collected by Level 1 poachers who physically 
hunt and harvest the horn.  
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 
135. 
 
191 Robert H. Bates et al., Analytic Narratives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 13–15. 
 
192 Robert M. Muth and John F. Bowe, “Illegal Harvest of Renewable Natural Resources in North America: 
Toward a Typology of the Motivations for Poaching,” Society & Natural Resources 11, no. 1 (January 
1998): 11–12., doi:10.1080/08941929809381058. 
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Figure 5.1. Levels of Organized Crime in Rhino Poaching 
 
Source: Milliken and Shaw 2012, p. 78.193  
Benefits accrued from poaching vary with each level of the poaching syndicate, 
ranging from approximately USD 10,000 per rhino for a level 1 poacher to nearly USD 1 
million per rhino at its final sale. These actors’ interests are primarily commercial: 
maximize profits while minimizing costs.194 They also seek to avoid legal authorities to 
avoid sanction, and if caught, will seek first to pay bribes, then fines to evade 
punishment. While Level 1 poachers gain the least from poaching, they are paradoxically 
the critical actor in determining whether a rhino is poached.  
                                                 
193 Tom Milliken and Jo Shaw, “The South Africa-Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus: A Deadly 
Combination of Institutional Lapses, Corrupt Wildlife Industry Professionals and Asian Crime Syndicates” 
(TRAFFIC, 2012), 78. 
 
194 Muth and Bowe (1998) identify other potential motivations for poaching, which could also be accounted 
for by this model. However, an absence of commercial motivations may not trigger the moral mechanisms 
of the savred value protection model activated by taboo trade-off reasoning. In any case, contemporary 
rhino poaching empirically appears to be commercially motivated. Muth and Bowe, “Illegal Harvest of 
Renewable Natural Resources in North America: Toward a Typology of the Motivations for Poaching.” 
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The strategy employed by a Level 1 poacher is to travel to a location with rhinos, 
whose small ranges make them relatively easy to find.195 Once there, the poacher can 
approach a rhino, whose notoriously poor vision enables poachers to approach closely. 
The poacher shoots the rhino to disable it, and then utilizes tools as crude as a hacksaw to 
remove the rhino's horn. This process takes approximately 10 minutes, after which the 
poacher returns to a populated area with easily concealable rhino horn weighing 
approximately 4 kilograms per horn.196 During the poacher’s movements, he must evade 
guards monitoring the protected area. Once returned to the protected area, the Level 1 
poacher must now meet with a Level 2 poacher to exchange the poached horn for money. 
The Level 1 poacher now returns home flush with cash he or she must launder into licit 
income.  
Meanwhile, the Level 2 poacher consolidates horn locally and arranges to transfer 
it to a Level 3 poacher, typically located near air or sea ports. The Level 2 poacher must 
evade monitoring by police near the protected area, and the Level 3 poacher must evade 
monitoring by customs and border control personnel. The Level 3 poacher trafficks the 
horn to a Level 4 poacher, who exports the horn across national boundaries to finally 
connect with the Level 5 poacher, who purchases the horn in its demand market.  While 
                                                 
195 This account of rhino poaching is based on the author’s observation of anti-poaching activities, 
interviews with rhino conservationists, and published accounts of rhino poaching including Kamal Jung 
Kunwar, Four Years for the Rhino: An Experience of Anti-Poaching Operations (Kathmandu: Save the 
Rhino Foundation Nepal, 2009); Ronald Orenstein, Ivory, Horn and Blood: Behind the Elephant and 
Rhinoceros Poaching Crisis (Richmond Hill, Ontario: Firefly Books Ltd., 2013); Lawrence Anthony and 
Graham Spence, The Last Rhinos: The Powerful Story of One Man’s Battle to Save a Species (London: 
Sidgwick & Jackson, 2012); and Clive Walker and Anton Walker, The Rhino Keepers: Struggle for 
Survival (Auckland Park, South Africa: Jacana Media, 2012). See also Esmond Bradley Martin and Lucy 
Vigne, “Nepal’s Rhinos: One of the Greatest Conservation Success Stories,” Pachyderm 21 (1996): 10–26. 
 
196 Esmond Bradley Martin, “Rhino Horn Weights,” Traffic Bulletin 5, no. 2 (1983): 23. Martin catalogues 
average weights for the five rhino species. While Asian rhino have smaller horns than African rhino, 
historically, Asian horns command higher prices, and their smaller size makes them more trafficable. 
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individuals vary in their specific illegal activity within the transnational criminal 
syndicate, each individual chooses to intentionally contravene laws regarding rhino. 
Poachers' preferences are straightforwardly economic: they prefer to maximize 
their profit and minimize costs.197 At most basic level, these individuals choose to poach. 
In reality, these decisions are made in an institutional context in the presence of other 
actors. As such, to understand the critical juncture of whether an individual chooses to 
poach a rhino, two other key actors are relevant: authorities who guard and monitor rhino 
populations and activities associated with them, and community members who live near 
both rhino populations and poachers. One could simplistically argue the final decision to 
poach a rhino is simple a matter of the poacher faced with a rhino. In reality, poachers 
depart from and return to communities after engaging in poaching. During that time 
period, poachers may encounter authorities, and almost certainly will encounter 
community members who are aware of the poaching. The poacher seeks to illegally 
harvest rhino, authorities guard and monitor rhino populations and associated activities, 
and community members watch. The interaction of these three groups determines 
whether poaching will be controlled or uncontrolled. 
Authorities who monitor activities associated with rhinos consist of security 
forces at the protected areas where rhinos live, police forces in surrounding areas and in 
areas where individuals live, including poachers, customs and border security personnel 
                                                 
197 If a potential poacher’s utility function includes social variables such as community reputation, this 
would further diminish the likelihood that the poacher would choose to poach if the community’s 
predominant relational model is Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking. Assuming that the poacher’s 
motivations are purely economic makes for a harder test for a social explanation, adding to this model’s 
robustness. 
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at ports of embarkation in and out of a country, and permit authorities for activities such 
as entering protected areas, hunting, and legal exportation.  
Ceteris paribus, these authorities generally prefer to enforce existing rules, 
especially those associated with their formal authority. Assuming that such authorities 
chiefly desire to retain their authority, the very act of illegally harvesting a rhino 
undermines that authority. However, under standard rational choice assumptions, these 
authorities will also engage in cost benefit reasoning regarding how they guard and 
monitor interactions with rhinos. The benefits of sanctioning illegal activities regarding 
rhinos are constant, in the form of salaries. However, direct costs vary, and likely 
increase as poachers increase activities. Park security forces must provide for fuel for 
park vehicles and equipment, and rations for park employees and livestock. Police 
likewise incur operating expenses, plus costs associated with cultivating and maintaining 
intelligence networks like informants. Regulators have administrative overhead, often in 
challenging field conditions. For governments with limited state capacity in the 
development countries home to wild rhino, the direct costs of enforcement are expensive. 
Authorities may not prefer to enforce rules if such enforcement comes at 
significant costs. Direct costs associated with rule enforcement include those associated 
with monitoring rhino populations and boundaries of protected areas, cultivating and 
maintaining intelligence and informant networks, and screening individuals moving 
through and near protected areas. Indirect costs include opportunity costs of rejected 
bribes and side payments, and social censure from policing members of one's own 
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community. Exponential increases in the illicit price of rhino horn particularly increase 
the opportunity cost of rejecting bribes and corruption. 
As public authorities, these actors also have indirect costs to their community 
relations. To varying degrees, public authorities may be accountable to the communities 
poachers come from and return to. Enforcing anti-poaching laws may cost authorities 
popular support; in some countries, park rangers are not even commissioned as law 
enforcement, and therefore not legally permitted to shoot a would-be poacher without 
committing manslaughter or even murder. Moreover, enforcing conservation laws against 
poachers may trigger backlash from communities with poachers, particularly if poachers 
enjoy community support. This Robin Hood effect can further increase the indirect costs 
to public authorities for sanctioning poachers. Finally, corruption is endemic in every 
rhino range state. Public authorities that sanction rhino poaching incur opportunity costs 
of forgone bribes and side payments associated with poaching. Adding this factors to the 
potential for shirking in all principle-agent relations yields a situation where authorities 
may or may not choose to sanction rhino poaching. This ambiguous role of authorities 
points to the critical actors in determining whether rhino poaching is controlled or 
unchecked: members of communities adjacent to protected areas and home to poachers 
themselves. 
Community members have tangential interests to rhino conservation. Some may 
derive income from conservation activities, either directly through employment in 
ecotourism or indirectly through revenue sharing associated with rhino conservation. 
Others may simply live near rhino, which creates vulnerability to human-wildlife conflict 
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and potential damage to human life and property.198 Finally, community members may 
have social relationships with other actors, both poachers and public authorities. 
Maintaining such relationships is a potential interest. Finally, community members may 
face direct and indirect costs associated with poaching. For direct costs, community 
members may provide taxes and public revenues to finance anti-poaching enforcement. 
For indirect costs, community members may face losses in revenue from ecotourism due 
to poaching, as well as potentially bodily harm to poachers and public authorities with 
whom community members have relationships. 
When a community member encounters a poacher, the community member faces 
a choice. He or she can ignore the poaching, and do nothing. Second, the community 
member can inform public authorities. Third, the community member can pressure public 
authorities to sanction the poacher, or sanction the poacher him/herself. 199   
 
Equilibrium Outcome 1: When a Market Pricing Relational Model Predominates 
If all three actors approach this action situation from an economic perspective, as 
when a market pricing relational model predominates in reference to rhinos, and given 
the fantastically lucrative contemporary price of rhino horn, we should expect an 
equilibrium outcome of increasing poaching and the absence of poaching control. 
Poachers will weigh costs and benefits, and determine that the profit opportunity of 
                                                 
198 Human-wildlife conflict frequently ends tragically for humans. For instance, see Nabin Paudel, “3-Year-
Old Girl Dies, Gran Injured in Rhino Attack,” Kathmandu Post, December 26, 2016, 
http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2016-12-26/3-year-old-girl-dies-gran-injured-in-rhino-
attack.html. 
 
199 If the community member accepts a bribe or facilitates the poacher’s criminal activity, that community 
member crosses the threshold of participation and becomes a poacher him or herself. 
 120 
approximately $10,000 USD for ten minutes of relatively easy work is worthwhile.200 
Moreover, such profit margins provide plenty of money available to bribe any 
sanctioning authorities encountered. 
Such sanctioning authorities may also deem it profitable to not sanction poaching 
activity, or to not expend excessive public resources to protect them. In order to protect 
every rhino all the time, authorities would need to significantly increase the direct costs 
of enforcement action. Meanwhile, such work could risk alienating community members, 
upon whose support and resources authorities depend. 
If these community members view the action situation through economic lenses, 
those who derive economic benefits from not poaching (e.g. ecotourism) and from public 
authorities such as revenue sharing may prefer that poachers do not poach, or that 
authorities sanction poaching. However, this would only occur if such benefits exceed the 
windfall profits to be gained through poaching a product valued at prices approaching 
USD 100,000 per kilogram. For such an outcome to occur, the economic benefits accrued 
from sustainable uses like ecotourism would have to pay extraordinarily well. 
However, if community members do not economically gain from not-poaching, or 
if such gains do not outweigh fantastic potential gains from poaching, then community 
members will likely do nothing in relation to poachers. This produces the policy 
equilibrium of uncontrolled poaching. 
 
                                                 
200 The extraordinary price commanded by rhino horn on global markets bears stressing here. If the price 
were lower, say at USD 1,000 per kilogram range where it remained stable for approximately twenty years 
before the current crisis, it is possible that even where Market Pricing relational models predominate, an 
equilibrium outcome controlling poaching would be possible. However, the high illicit price of rhino horn 
is central to this analysis. 
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Equilibrium Outcome 2: When a Non-Market Pricing Relational Model Predominates 
Incorporating relational models theory into the model illuminates a different 
potential policy outcome. According to relational models theory, individuals who 
confront the action situation through strictly economic decision-making are employing 
the market priced relational model, and engaging in routine trade-off reasoning. The costs 
and benefits of poaching and not poaching, sanctioning and not sanctioning, ignoring or 
informing will be weighed as fungible options, which tend to lead poachers to poach 
while authorities and the community looks away. 
However, when individuals construct rhinos using a non-market pricing schemata, 
either communal sharing or authority ranking, the policy equilibrium becomes the control 
of poaching. Poachers will still choose to poach, as some individuals will always engage 
in taboo behavior. However, public authorities employing the non-market pricing 
schemata will view poaching as a taboo-trade off, and are more likely to expend 
resources towards guarding and monitoring regardless of costs. Still, while such attitudes 
may make for more effective anti-poaching activities, the basic challenge of constantly 
protecting such vulnerable animals means that committed authorities may not be 
sufficient to control rhino poaching. 
However, if community members employ a non-market pricing relational 
schemata to construct rhinos, then rhino poaching becomes a taboo tradeoff. Economic 
incentivizes and cost-benefit calculations will not only fail to incentivize community 
members to ignore poaching, such measures will paradoxically incentivize community 
members to instead report poaching activities to public authorities (moral outrage) and 
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pressure such authorities to sanction rhino poachers (moral cleansing). The act of 
sanctioning poachers will become legitimizing; authorities who do so will enjoy public 
support, and those who fail to do so will face public pressure against them. In effect, the 
community itself becomes an extension of the guard and monitor functions formally 
assigned to public authorities. When poachers poach, they trigger moral outrage and 
cleansing in the community. Community members report poachers to authorities, and 
pressure authorities to sanction poachers. Ultimately, the control of poaching— or even 
zero poaching— becomes the new policy equilibrium. 
 
Observable Implications of Equilibrium Outcomes 
These two scenarios produce two general scenarios. In the first, where the 
predominate relational model among community member Market Pricing, the following 
interactions occurs: 
1. Poachers engage in the illegal harvest of rhino horn. 
2. Most community members who encounter poachers ignore the poaching. 
3. Authorities either: 
a. Lack sufficient capacity to protect rhinos always and everywhere. 
b. Ineffectively guard and monitor rhino, or ignore what poaching activity 
they do monitor. 
c. Do not sanction poachers. 
 
As a result, poaching is not controlled. 
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Conversely, when community members predominately employ a non-Market 
Pricing relational model, the following interactions occur: 
1. Poachers engage in the illegal harvest of rhino horn. 
2. Community members witness poaching, triggering a taboo-tradeoff. As a result, 
they: 
a. Express moral outrage, thus inform public authorities of poaching and 
strengthening the monitoring capacity of such. 
b. Seek moral cleansing, thus pressuring public authorities to sanction 
rhino poachers. 
3. Authorities: 
a. Augment capacity with information gained from moral cleansing from 
community members. 
b. Respond to pressure generated by moral outrage from community 
members. 
c. Sanction poachers. 
 
As a result, poaching incidents decline and the poaching is eventually controlled. 
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From these scenarios, this model yields the following observable implications: 
1. As the price of rhino horn increases, poaching will increase. 
 
Where a Market Pricing relational model predominates,  
2. As poaching increases, community members will ignore increased poaching 
levels rather than report poachers or pressure authorities. 
3. As poaching increases, public authorities may increase guard and monitor 
capabilities, but will not significantly increase sanction activities. 
 
Conversely, in countries where a non-Market Pricing (Communal Sharing or Authority 
Ranking) relational model predominates: 
4. As the price of rhino horn increases, community members experience poaching 
as a taboo trade-off. 
5. As poaching occurs, community members will express moral outrage at the 
poaching activity, and report it to authorities. 
6. Community members will pressure authorities to sanction rhino poaching as a 
form of moral cleansing.  
 
Both to distinguish moral mechanisms in this model from economic incentives, and 
because theoretically, moral mechanisms should be most active when persons do not 
construct rhino through Market Pricing relational models: 
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4. The community members who express moral outrage and cleansing will not 
economically benefit from rhino conservation.   
5. Conversely, community members who economically benefit from rhino 
conservation may ignore poaching, or seek economic alternatives like rhino horn 
legalization rather than moral responses. 
 
Finally, in order to distinguish moral mechanisms from mere coercion from authorities: 
6. Sanction by public authorities should be temporally preceded by pressure from 
community members with no economic incentive for doing so. 
 
The following analytic narrative explores how Nepal successfully controlled rhino 
poaching. In Nepal, a Communal Sharing relational model predominates and most people 
associate rhino with their community. Using archival data and contemporary accounts, 
this narrative describes how Nepal responded to the 2006 shock in the price of rhino 
horn, focusing on the interactions of the model's key groups and the role of moral 
mechanisms, before concluding with analysis of the model's utility. This analysis 
explores how the moral mechanisms of outrage and cleansing have led to a policy 
equilibrium of controlled rhino poaching. 
 
Analytic Narrative of Nepal’s Control of Poaching 
Historically, Nepal has struggled to control rhino poaching. From an initial 
population in the early 1950s of approximately 800 rhino, within twenty years, Nepal’s 
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rhino population fell to between 60 and 80 animals. In 1973, the government of Nepal 
began deliberate efforts to conserve rhino through the creation of Nepal’s first national 
park, Chitwan. However, this program has consistently struggled to control poaching. 
Given Nepal's weak system of government and endemic problems with both trafficking 
and corruption, poaching remained an ongoing threat to Nepali rhino, and was increasing 
in the years leading up to the current global crisis. Yet just a few years into the poaching 
pandemic, Nepal has become the most effective country in the world at controlling rhino 
poaching.  
 
History 
Nepal has a checkered history of rhino conservation. Public authorities across 
various regimes have sought to protect rhinos, beginning with the Rana kings and 
continuing to today's post-conflict unity government. A series of institutional adaptions 
sought to balance public authority with community consent and support. However, the 
effectiveness of these arrangements has ebbed and flowed, and some level of rhino 
poaching persisted until well into the current global crisis. 
Nepal is home to the greater one-horned rhinoceros Rhinoceros unicornis, 
sometimes known as the Indian rhinoceros. The third largest land mammal, this species is 
the second largest of the five rhino species.201 Its horn is comparatively smaller than 
African varieties due to the absence of a posterior horn, although it has historically 
                                                 
201 Eric Dinerstein, The Return of the Unicorns: The Natural History and Conservation of the Greater One-
Horned Rhinoceros (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 64. 
 
 127 
commanded a higher price.202 Possessing folds of hardened skin resembling armored 
plates, this species was the first to be successfully imported live into Europe, and 
dominates visual constructions of rhino in many Western cultures. 203 Behaviorally, the 
Indian rhino is generally docile, inhabiting surprisingly small-ranges relative to other 
megafauna.204 In Nepal, rhinos live in a low-lying jungle forest known as the Terai, with 
ready access to vegetation needed for rhinos’ prodigious appetites.205 Rhinos also 
frequent wallowing sites, making them relatively easy to locate for poachers.206 These 
animals historically inhabited the floodplains throughout south Asia, but since the 20th 
century have been essentially reduced to populations in two countries, India and 
Nepal.207208 
The commercial hunting of Indian rhino is a similarly historic practice. While 
rhino horn is often associated with traditional Chinese medicine, Nepal itself has a long 
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cultural history of consuming rhino products (horn, hide, hooves, organs, even urine).209 
Perhaps due to the cultural significance of rhino products, in 1846, the first ruler from 
Nepal’s Rana dynasty declared the rhino a Royal Animal, thus reserving the right to hunt 
rhinos to members of Nepal’s royal family.210 At the time, poaching was punishable by 
death.211 Moreover, mosquito-borne malaria discouraged human settlements near rhino 
habitats.212 The twin protections of royal prerogative and malaria kept Nepalese rhino 
populations stable until the 1950s. 
However, as the 1951 fall of the Rana dynasty removed royal protections from the 
Terai landscape, malarial eradication enabled human settlement of rhino habitat. 
Financed by foreign aid, the human population in the Terai increased from 36,000 in 
1950 to 100,000 in 1960.213 Within increased human contact came increased poaching. In 
this same time period, rhino populations plummeted from approximately 1,000 animals to 
less than 300.214 Despite a government-compelled relocation of nearly all human 
settlements north the Rapti River, human and rhino populations continued to boom and 
bust respectively. By 1968, rhino population fell to between 81 and 108 animals, while 
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by 1971, human population reached 185,000.215 As rhino populations neared extinction, 
the government acted. 
Initial efforts to protect Nepal’s rhino created physical boundaries and established 
guard and monitor roles for public actors. Spurred in part by a World Wildlife Fund 
project initiated in 1967 to protect rhinos near Chitwan, in 1973 Nepal’s government 
gazetted the habitat of the last remaining rhino as Chitwan National Park, commissioning 
a Gainda Gasti or rhino patrol from the Forest Department to guard rhino populations.216 
This created a physical barrier around Nepal’s rhinos, and charged a public authority with 
guarding them. In 1976, the Royal Nepal Army assumed guard responsibilities from the 
rhino patrol, solidifying the exercise of public authority in protecting rhinos. These 
actions effectively halted rhino poaching, as from 1975 until 1983, only three rhinos were 
poached in Nepal.   
In the 1980s, Nepal expanded position rules by institutionalizing monitors for its 
rhino population, and increased security forces stationed in the park. A partnership 
between the Nepalese government and the American Smithsonian Institution’s National 
Zoological Park led to the 1982 creation of Nepal’s first conservation nongovernmental 
organization, the King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation (KMTNC, now known 
as the National Trust for Nature Conservation or NTNC).217 In conjuncture with a newly 
created Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation within the Forest 
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Ministry, KMTNC’s monitors generated scientific data about rhinos and the park, leading 
to the formation of an epistemic community within the government’s public authority. 
However, this increase in information about Nepal’s rhinos accompanied a return of 
rhino poaching. By 1988, an Army battalion deployed to protect Chitwan National Park, 
yet poaching continued to rise uncontrolled.218 As human populations outside the park 
also grew, Nepalese rhino conservationists shifted focus from governance within the park 
to communities that lay beyond it. 
In the 1990s, coincident to a democratic transition ending Nepal’s absolute 
monarchy, Nepal expanded the role of community members in rhino conservation. This 
effort centered on the pioneering creation of buffer zones adjacent to Chitwan National 
Park, creating a multiple layers of protected areas around the core of the park. The 
concept of buffer zones originated in UNESCO’s Man and the Biosphere Programme in 
1971, and community forest development accelerated since the Panchayat Forest Rules of 
1978 and the Community Forestry program of 1980.219 220 In 1988, USAID funded a 
native tree nursery created on private land owned by a KMTNC employee, creating an 
environment for community members to harvest valuable thatch grass.221 Coincidently, 
this same environment expanded habitat for wildlife like rhinos. The next year, this effort 
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expanded onto government-owned land managed by user group committees. By 1993, 
national legislation officially sanctioned these community-managed buffer-zone forests, 
and in 1998, responsibility for these zones transferred from Nepal’s Department of 
Forestry to the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC).222 
These institutions were replicated in additional protected areas created for rhinos in 1986 
at Bardia National Park and in 2000 at the Royal Sukla Phanta wildlife reserve.223  
Buffer zones created positions for community members to involve themselves in 
governance of rhino conservation. However, they aimed to do more, explicitly anchored 
in the logic of sustainable development and accomplishing conservation outcomes 
through generating benefits to local communities.224 In the 1990s, Nepal’s buffer zones 
did generate indirect benefits from rhino conservation, namely by protecting cropland and 
flood control.225 However, direct economic benefits from such zones were small, slow to 
materialize, and narrowly distributed.226  Throughout this period of expanding 
community involvement in rhino conservation, rhino poaching increased. As benefits 
from conservation failed to materialize, Maoist insurgents ignited a civil war in 1996.  
For the next ten years, Nepal experienced escalating violent conflict. As the 
government struggled to maintain control, Army security forces withdrew from guard 
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roles in protected areas, and public authorities diverted resources away from rhino 
conservation. For instance, after the government declared a state of emergency in 
November 2001, the Army shuttered 24 guard posts at Chitwan National Park while it 
withdrew soldiers for assignment elsewhere.227 As the insurgency progressed, rhino 
poaching increased. For over a decade prior to 1996, Nepal lost approximately five rhinos 
per year to poaching. This doubled for the next two years, and by 2002, close to 40 rhino 
per year were lost to poaching. By 2005, over a hundred rhinos were lost, leading experts 
to conclude that “Nepal probably had the worst rhino poaching of any country in the 
world” due to the insurgency’s effect on security.228  
 At the same time, conservationists continued to bemoan the lack of 
economic development associated with rhino conservation. Several studies documented 
the lack of direct economic benefits reaching community members from rhino 
conservations.229 Economists and conservationists continued to call for the “creation of 
alternative economic opportunities locally, so as to deter poachers from poaching.”230 By 
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2006, Nepal’s rhino conservation was characterized by weak security measures, high 
poverty, and the worst poaching rates in the world.  
Thus Nepal’s conservation history at the start of the current crisis was mixed. 
Rhino poaching was an established pattern of interaction. For the previous five decades, 
public authorities had consistently but ineffectively sought to control rhino poaching, 
including innovative institutional adaptations like assigning the Army guard and monitor 
roles, enacting strict choice and pay-off laws into legislation, and the pioneering practice 
of buffer zone communities. Yet by 2006, these authorities were distracted by an 
insurgency and constrained by limited resources, and ultimately ineffective at controlling 
poaching amid the insurgency.  
Community members faced physical and economic insecurity, even while 
increasing participation in rhino conservation. According to capacity- or economic-based 
expectations about conservation, Nepal should have been hard hit by the global shock in 
the price of rhino horn. However, few community members had ever associated rhino 
conservation with economic development. Rather, rhinos became coincident to healthy 
forests and community life, and associated with community empowerment and 
governance.  
 
Nepal's Response to the Epidemic 
Like many countries, Nepal initially experienced an increase in rhino poaching in 
the first years after the price of rhino horn increased. However, vigilante action by 
community members precipitated a wave of policy reforms targeting rhino poachers, 
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including crackdowns against complicit government officials. By 2010, rhino poaching in 
Nepal had effectively stopped, and since then, Nepal has gone from the world’s worst 
country for controlling rhino poaching to the world’s best. 
During the first four years of the poaching epidemic, rhino poaching continued in 
Nepal. From 2006 until 2010, Nepal lost over 13 rhinos on average per year.231 232 This 
demonstrates that as with other range states, Nepalese poachers responded to global price 
shock and continued to poach. Contemporary reports on rhino conservation from that 
time period underscore that in the first years of the global crisis, many conservationists 
assumed that because of Nepal’s demonstrated inability to control rhino poaching when 
the price of rhino horn was low, Nepalese rhino were in great danger as the global price 
skyrocketed and transnational criminal activity intensified.233 
The start of the crisis coincided with the resolution of Nepal’s civil war. In April 
2006, Nepal’s king abdicated and reinstated Parliament, prompting Maoist rebels to 
declare a three-month truce. Yet instead of reaping a conservation-dividend from the end 
of fighting, initial government actions instead exposed deep corruption and complicity 
with rhino poaching. In May 2006, after security forces killed a rhino poacher in Chitwan 
National Park, the government arrested park officials for homicide, including the park’s 
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chief warden and chief of anti-poaching. A newly appointed replacement warden soon 
issued Nepal’s lightest possible sentence for poaching to a major rhino horn trader. 
Nepal’s cabinet ordered 13 poachers released from jail that August, and two additional 
poachers released in September.234 These actions demonstrate at best ineffective 
government responses to rhino poaching, if not outright collaboration with poachers. 
Tragically, in September 24, 2006, a helicopter chartered by WWF-Nepal crashed 
in northeast Nepal, killing 24 people. Among those killed were leading conservationists, 
including Nepal’s Forest Minister, several World Wildlife Fund (WWF) employees 
including nearly its entire Nepali leadership and its country director for Britain, the 
Finnish charge d’affairs, and two USAID staff.235 Since 1967, WWF had been the major 
international NGO supporting wildlife conservation in Nepal. Beyond the organizational 
impact of losing these key personnel, this event garnered significant public attention in 
Nepal and the global conservation epistemic community. 
Nepal’s civil war ended in November 2006 with the signing of a Comprehensive 
Peace Accord.236 Soon after, community members began mobilizing through public 
demonstrations about rhino poaching, and calling for the government to control rhino 
poaching. In December 2006, a student movement in Kathmandu delivered a petition 
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with more than 100,000 signatures to the Forest Ministry, urging the government to stem 
poaching.237 This action is consistent with the public disassociation described as moral 
cleansing. By early 2007, civil society groups from the buffer zone regions around 
Chitwan National Park were pressuring the government to dismiss homicide charges 
against the jailed officials from the previous May, and media reports criticized the light 
sentencing of the rhino horn trader that followed.238 These actions demonstrate the desire 
for punishment described by moral outrage. 
Throughout 2007, public authorities began taking steps to improve rhino 
protection as pressure from community members mounted. In March 2007, the 
government withdrew its homicide case against the Chitwan park leadership, and arrested 
a trading ring of Level 2 poachers in Kathmandu, including a Nepali soldier who was 
supplying ammunition.239 By mid-2007, the government reestablished 22 security posts 
in Chitwan National Park, and allocated a special budget of USD 57,423 for Army 
operations within national parks.240  
While public authorities scaled up guard activities, community members also 
increased interactions mobilizing public engagement aimed at controlling rhino poaching. 
A public-private partnership between the Nepali government’s DNPWC and WWF-
Nepal launched Operational Unicornis, a nationwide program to increase political 
commitment for rhino conservation. A similar partnership between the DNPWC, WWF-
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Nepal, the formerly-named KMNTC now known as the National Trust for Nature 
Conservation (NTNC), the Zoological Society of London, and the UK Darwin Initiative 
began a law-enforcement monitoring system developed by the Wildlife Conservation 
Society (WCS), known as MIST.241 In August 2007, international and Nepali NGOs 
launched the Empowering People for Rhino Conservation (EPRC) project in five buffer 
zone communities adjacent to Chitwan National Park, including Conservation Watch-
Nepal, a news service publishing information about rhino and other wildlife 
conservation.242 By September 2007, this newsletter was publicizing information about a 
recently butchered rhino, which it characterized as “cruel,” “brutal,” and “pathetic,” and 
describing the complicity of government authorities in condoning this practice.243 Later 
that month, Conservation-Watch Nepal reported that 67 rhinos had gone missing from 
Bardia National Park’s official counts, presumably lost to poaching.244 Student activism 
among community members also increased. The EPRC project began organizing rhino 
clubs in high schools near areas with high poaching, and an October 2007 student rally 
near Chitwan centered on the slogan, “Save rhino, it saves us.”245 Students even began 
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organizing volunteer anti-poaching patrols in communities adjacent to protected areas.246 
Beyond schools, the EPRC also began hosting conservation summits between park 
leaders and buffer zone village development councils.247 These actions demonstrate 
increasing involvement and activism from community members to counter rhino 
poaching. 
As public authorities slowly increased guarding and monitoring activities 
throughout 2007, rhino poaching continued. In September 2007, two Level 2 poachers 
were arrested outside Chitwan National Park, and in October 2007, a Level 3 poacher 
was arrested near Kathmandu.248 Community members appeared at public forums to 
denounce both poaching and the government’s ineffective responses to it, including those 
who had reported their own relatives for poaching. Despite these arrests, government 
efforts to address poaching remained sluggish and focused on repairing and reoccupying 
previously abandoned posts within parks.249 Security positions would not be fully 
occupied until 2009.250 As the government acted slowly, Level 1 poachers continued to 
kill rhinos, including a rhino calf in Bardia National Park in December 2007.251 
                                                 
246 Martin, Martin, and Vigne, “Recent Political Disturbances in Nepal Threaten Rhinos: Lessons to Be 
Learned,” 101. 
 
247 Deepak Acharya, “Rhino Poaching Is a Serious Conservation Threat,” Conservation Watch-Nepal 1, no. 
6 (n.d.). 
 
248 Acharya, “Rhino Numbers Severely Depleted in Bardia”; Acharya, “Three Megafauna Died Between 
Nine Days.” 
 
249 Richard Kock, Rajan Amin, and Naresh Subedi, “Rogue Army Staff Involved in Poaching in Bardia 
National Park, Nepal, 2007-2008,” Pachyderm 45 (July 2008): 116. 
 
250 Martin and Martin, “Enhanced Community Support Reduces Rhino Poaching in Nepal,” 50–51. 
 
251 Deepak Acharya, “Infant Rhino Poached Heinously,” Conservation Watch-Nepal 1, no. 7 (January 1, 
2008). 
 139 
Throughout 2008, twelve rhinos would eventually be lost to poaching.252 In this 
environment of sluggish public authorities and continued poaching, community members 
continued to act decisively. 
Near Bardia National Park, community members finally confronted poachers 
directly. In the first three months of 2008, a volunteer group of community members 
formed essentially a vigilante raid on poachers operating in collusion with Army 
personnel. Building intelligence for two months, this group seized Level 1 and 3 poachers 
along with four Army soldiers, along with weapons and rhino horn, and delivered them to 
government officials in Kathmandu.253 Subsequently, this same group arrested 17 
additional Army soldiers, eventually leading to the relief of the Army commander in 
Bardia.254 Poachers conducted a final operation at Bardia in May 2008, but were 
challenged by security forces, killing two guards in the process.255 After these raids, rhino 
poaching in Bardia effectively stopped.256 
Following the community raids in Bardia, Nepalese government officials in 
Kathmandu began aggressively pursuing poachers. While rhino poaching continued in 
Chitwan National Park, government leaders began signaling that corruption and 
complicity with rhino poaching would no longer be tolerated. The Army commander at 
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Bardia was relieved, and in April 2008, the government announced embezzlement 
charges against the deposed king and senior leaders of the NTNC NGO for using 
conservation programs to launder bribes.257 In May 2008, the leader of Nepal’s Maoist 
party declared that Nepal’s rhinos had been liberated “from the clutches of the royal 
family,” and pledged to increase government security measures at parks throughout 
Nepal.258 In June 2008, an Army spokesperson admitted that over 30 Army personnel had 
been caught participating in poaching, and pledged to cooperate and not interfere with the 
DNPWC investigations into rhino poaching.259 At the same time, DNPWC officials 
called for shoot to kill policies to be enacted to protect rhinos, and arrested a National 
Geographic journalist for alleged complicity in wildlife trafficking.260 In November 
2008, the government publicized a seizure of the royal treasury of rhino parts, include 81 
rhino horns, emphasizing the Nepal government’s assumption of responsibility for the 
parts.261 This actions show public authorities beginning to respond to moral outrage and 
cleansing in response to rhino poaching. 
As rhino poaching continued in Chitwan National Park in 2009 and 2010, public 
authorities began a series of institutional adaptions to tackle multiple levels of criminal 
activity involved in rhino poaching. In June 2009, Chitwan’s chief warden declared that 
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in-park security measures were insufficient to tackle the problem, and called for 
expanded joint patrols and community involvement.262 The following month, DNPWC 
unveiled a plan to create District Conservation Coordination Committees comprising 
leaders from park staff, the police, Army, and district forestry offices. This plan aimed to 
identify poachers accessing protected areas from surrounding communities.263  
However, responses at the national level continued to lag. In May 2010, the 
government released more than 100 rhino poachers only halfway through ten year terms 
for poaching.264 Throughout 2010, poaching continue at Chitwan. Anti-poaching efforts 
were largely limited by jurisdiction to national parks themselves and adjacent buffer-
zones, frustrating efforts to tackle broader syndicates. However, by late 2010, public 
authorities enacted an institutional adaption to counter the network of transnational 
trafficking. 
 In November 2010, the Nepal government established a series of joint 
interagency tasks forces to counter transnational trafficking networks. A National 
Wildlife Crime Control Coordination Committee (NWCCCC) involved members from 
DNPWC, the Forest Department, Customs, the Nepal Army, Nepal Police, and other 
ministerial level actors, charged with establishing policy control for wildlife trafficking. 
A Wildlife Crime Control Bureau (WCCB), consisting of representatives from the 
aforementioned ministries plus the National Investigation Department and the Crime 
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Investigation Bureau (CIB), enacted policies at the national level. Reporting to the 
WCCB were 19 WCCB District Levels, involving officials from the same agencies 
excluding the CIB. These district level bureaus coordinated interagency collaboration 
countering wildlife crime including rhino poaching.265 As a result of these changes, 
public authorities began to counter wildlife-trafficking operations throughout Nepal 
beyond the parks. 
In 2011, the pocket of effective control that began in Bardia spread throughout 
Nepal. Throughout 2011, over 250 rhino poachers were arrested across Nepal, including 
50 with warrants over 10 years old.266 More significantly, poaching effectively stopped in 
Nepal in 2011. Two rhinos were poached that year; for at least one of the poached rhino, 
the Level 1 and Level 2 poachers were arrested shortly thereafter.267  
This effective control of poaching continued in 2012 and beyond. During April 
that year, only a single rhino was lost to poachers, who were subsequently tracked to and 
extradited from India.268 By year’s end, five of the seven trafficking syndicates known to 
operate in Nepal during the crisis had been shut down.269 Anti-poaching activities by 
community members continued to grow. In January 2013, community members with a 
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volunteer anti-poaching patrol arrested a Level 2 poacher near Bardia, and by 2014, over 
400 community anti-poaching units were operating in Nepal.270  
Since 2011, Nepal has achieved four one-year periods of zero rhino poaching. A 
gilded sign in the Nepal Army Officer’s Mess at the Chitwan National Park Headquarters 
says it all: Zero-Poaching Bar. Army battalions now rotate through the park, as duty 
conveys national prestige. Yet even as elite units take turns protecting rhino, community 
members remain the linchpin and focus of counter-poaching operations. For instance, 
family members of poachers appear in public to condemn poaching, including some who 
turned in relatives to authorities.271 The Chief Warden of Chitwan National Park 
expressed his focus concisely: “anti-poaching means protecting the youth of our 
community” as much as it means protecting rhinos. 
Poachers remain a threat, as demonstrated by a rhino shot in August 2016. 
However, even in that case, community members secured the wounded rhino before its 
horn was removed, alerting public authorities in the process.272 This failed attempt at 
poaching demonstrates that rhino poaching in Nepal is now effectively controlled. 
 
Analysis 
This narrative presents evidence suggesting that social factors, particularly 
pressure generated by moral outrage and cleansing, temporally preceded and led to 
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Nepal’s effective control of poaching. As rhino poachers engaged in wildlife trafficking, 
public authorities initially preferred to do little to interfere with poachers, and in some 
cases collaborated with them. Only when community members began pressuring public 
authorities did the trajectory of Nepal’s control of rhino poaching change. This pressure 
from community members was consistent with the moral outrage and cleansing 
hypothesized by the sacred value protection model. 
Rhino poachers consistently poached rhinos in Nepal since the late 1980s. As 
Nepal’s civil war intensified from 1995 onward, public authorities diminished protection 
efforts for rhinos, demonstrating that they rationally sought to minimize expenditures for 
rhino conservation, particularly given opportunity costs of security operations against 
rebels. In some cases, public authorities even became complicit in poaching themselves, 
underscoring their aversion to incurring costs by countering rhino poaching. Community 
members in areas adjacent to protected areas engaged in governance activities and 
community resource management tangentially related to rhinos.  
After the global price in rhino horn began increasing in 2006, community 
members began displaying moral outrage and cleansing regarding rhino poaching. In late 
2006 and throughout 2007, community members began publically demonstrating against 
rhino poaching, and pressuring the government to increase enforcement actions. A 
pivotal moment occurred in 2008 when community members raided a poaching camp in 
Bardia National Park, catching Army personnel collaborating with poachers. This action 
effectively ended rhino poaching at Bardia, and triggered a cascade of government 
actions nationally. Over the next two years, Army officers were relieved, security forces 
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increased at parks, and anti-poaching efforts and interagency collaborations expanded 
nation-wide. By 2011, rhino poaching in Nepal was effectively controlled. 
This change in outcomes was consistently driven by pressure from community 
members exhibiting moral outrage. Beginning with student petitions and culminating in 
interagency reforms, moral outrage facilitated costly enforcement actions and 
institutional adaption. As predicted by the model, community members pressured public 
authorities with anger and enthusiastic support for punishing poachers as norm violators, 
even going so far as to raid poacher camps and conduct volunteer anti-poaching patrols. 
Community members also targeted ineffective public authorities as metanorm violators, 
such as the embezzlement action against the king’s conservation NGO and the seizure of 
rhino parts from the royal treasury. Throughout this period, community members 
displayed moral cleansing through public statements, protests, workshops, and their 
participation in rhino clubs and volunteer anti-poaching patrols. 
Important shifts also occurred in state capacity and in the strategies and 
preferences of public authorities. Public authorities increased the number of security 
forces guarding and monitoring Nepal’s park throughout 2008 and 2009, and the 2010 
interagency committees led to nation-wide enforcement efforts. This latter policy shift 
was the final significant institutional change preceding the halt in poaching, 
demonstrating the necessary role for public authorities in controlling poaching. However, 
these changes occurred only after community members acted, and is best explained by 
accounting for preferences of community members expressed through moral outrage and 
cleansing. Moreover, the ongoing complicity of public authorities in poaching throughout 
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2008 and 2009 demonstrates that state capacity in itself is insufficient to explain why 
Nepal controlled poaching. 
Likewise, the incorporation of rhino poaching into the policy agendas of the 
Maoist leader and later of the Prime Minister likely influenced changes in national policy 
and resource allocation. However, the exposure of the disposed king’s complicity in 
conservation corruption between the Maoist party’s embrace of anti-poaching and the 
shifts in national policy suggest that these changes were more than mere elite preference. 
Rather, controlling rhino poaching has become a legitimizing activity for Nepal 
authorities, and a relatively uncontroversial issue around which to build national unity. In 
this sense, the present government’s strong commitment to continuing Nepal’s zero-
poaching success demonstrates a legitimizing tradition of protecting Nepal’s rhino 
extending back to the first Rana king. 
The source of this legitimizing pressure was the constructed sacred value of rhino, 
and not just public pressure to strengthen governance, reduce corruption, or otherwise 
improve government accountability. For one, community members explicitly mobilized 
on the issue of rhino conservation, whether through community anti-poaching patrols, 
student rhino clubs, or lobbying for the release of jailed rhino conservation actors. 
Moreover, Nepal’s improved effectiveness at controlling rhino poaching has not 
coincided with broader improvements in combatting corruption or improving governance. 
Throughout the crisis, Transparency International has consistently rated Nepal as one of 
the world’s most corrupt countries; at the same time that Nepal effectively halted rhino 
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poaching, corruption across Nepal actually worsened.273 Similarly, Nepal’s public sector 
capacity and law enforcement remain extremely weak.274 This underscores the puzzle of 
why a weak and poor country like Nepal has nevertheless effectively controlled 
poaching, and speaks to the legitimizing potential of wildlife for fragile developing states. 
At no point in this narrative were economic arguments for conservation 
evidenced. Despite the economic logic central to the establishment of buffer zones near 
Nepal’s national parks, hypothesized economic benefits from conservation never 
significantly materialized for these communities. If anything, the decade-plus of civil war 
preceding the mobilization of community members should have made this group less 
likely to agitate for control of rhino poaching. In fact, at the start of the crisis, several 
leading conservationists, including WWF-Nepal’s country representative at the time, 
believed the biggest challenge facing Nepal’s rhinos was a lack of economic benefits 
accruing to Nepalis from conservation.275 Paradoxically, just as community members 
raided the poachers camp near Bardia and captured complicit Army personnel, 
conservationists were decrying the lack of tourist access and complete lack of funding for 
buffer zones in that same area.276 Community members proved most decisive where 
economic incentives to counter poaching were most absent.   
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Two further points underscore the lack of economic motivations in this narrative. 
First, the government only increased park entry fees in 2012, the principle source of 
conservation revenue sharing, after poaching was controlled.277 Second, in 2009, the 
government ordered all ecotourist resorts within its national parks closed, including Tiger 
Tops, an iconic lodge closely associated with the creation of Chitwan National Park.278 
These lodges were the most luxurious options in Nepal’s moribund ecotourism sector, 
catering almost exclusively to foreign tourists. The government’s rationale for this 
decision was concessions within the park were unsound for both anti-poaching and for 
ecology, though some operators claimed victimization by protectionist policies favoring 
Nepali businesses over foreigner-operated and oriented hotels like Tiger Tops. In any 
event, these decisions underscore the absence of material economic incentives spurring 
community members in the critical actions leading to Nepal’s effective control of 
poaching. 
 
Conclusion 
At a time when rhino poaching increased exponentially around the globe, and 
countries with more state capacity and developed ecotourism sectors have failed to 
control poaching, Nepal has emerged as an unlikely leader in successful rhino 
conservation. Despite a checkered history of poaching, pronounced poverty and civil 
conflict, conservation in Nepal developed deep support throughout communities living 
near rhino populations, particularly in buffer zones surrounding protected areas. Shortly 
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after the global price in rhino horn increased in 2006, and incidents of poaching began 
rising across rhino range states, community members throughout Nepal began pressuring 
public authorities to control the decades-long problem of poaching. As Nepal’s 
government recovered from its civil war, moral outrage and cleansing behaviors 
exhibited by community members regarding poaching were followed with a series of 
institutional adaptions by public authorities. Ultimately, these measures led to near total 
cessation in poaching by 2011. 
The sacred value protection model best explains this shift in pressure from 
community members. Amid a backdrop of civil war, as public authorities diverted 
resources away from conservation and even collaborated with poachers, community 
members acted. Pressuring the government to arrest poachers, dismiss charges against 
guards who interdicted poachers, forming volunteer anti-poaching patrols, and even 
raiding poachers camps, these community members manifested the moral outrage 
predicted by the model, particularly in seeking to punish both poachers as norm violators 
and the metanorm violators who support them. Moreover, community members 
organized public actions through demonstrations, petitions, student groups, and 
workshops—all forms of the moral cleansing that “reaffirms core values and loyalties by 
acting in ways that shore up those aspects of the moral order that have been undercut by 
the transgression” of poaching.279 The embrace of this cleansing by the national 
government and its security forces underscores the depth of this social influence. 
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This narrative makes clear that state capacity-based explanations are insufficient 
to explain Nepal’s success. Public authorities in Nepal responded to social pressure, not 
vice-versa. Moreover, the complicity of such authorities in poaching during the first years 
of the crisis shows that even when state capacity is lacking, conservation progress 
remains possible. At the same time, both security forces to guard and monitor protected 
areas and interagency cooperation to counter trafficking networks ultimately proved 
necessary to control poaching.  
However, economic explanations of how Nepal controlled poaching fail. The only 
actors in Nepal who seemed motivated by economic incentives were poachers themselves 
and public authorities who collaborated with them. Nepal’s buffer zones had never 
realized the neoliberal dream of ecotourism generating economic growth, and when the 
crisis began, nearly all tourist revenue streams had stopped due to the civil war. Even 
now that Nepal has effectively controlled poaching, existing ecotourism capacity caters 
towards accommodating Nepali visitors rather than foreigners and luxury tour operators.  
This analysis is limited by scope and focus. In seeking to understand whether 
social constructions of wildlife can influence conservation outcomes, I treated how 
Nepalis construct rhinos as exogenous. I did not consider why most Nepalis relate to 
rhinos in terms of their community rather than in economic terms, i.e. using a Communal 
Sharing instead of a Market Pricing relational model. The exclusion of such questions is 
justified by the limited time horizon under investigation; I assume that the predominate 
social construction did not significantly change during the half-dozen years it took Nepal 
to effectively control their poaching after the present crisis started. Moreover, the 
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misguided yet deeply embedded bias for explaining conservation outcomes using 
economic approaches justifies excluding exploration of why relational models vary. For 
now, it is enough to demonstrate that they do, and that such variance matters. 
 My level of analysis creates a more significant limitation to my findings. In 
seeking to explore national level outcomes like the control of poaching across Nepal, I 
made generalizations regarding both actors and structural factors. In reality, these 
categories are significantly more complex than categories like poacher, public authority, 
and community member suggest. Pleading eclecticism, I sought to minimize bias in my 
generalizations by anchoring my analysis in the social-ecological systems framework 
developed by the Ostrom Workshop at Indiana University and the analytic narrative 
methodology.280 Still, it is possible that greater detail at the expense of generalizations 
may enrich understanding of how Nepal controlled poaching. For instance, even though 
few community members materially benefited directly from rhino conservation, prospect 
theory would hold that individuals may have believed in future earnings potential 
associated with successfully controlling poaching. Similarly, some public authorities 
likely embraced institutional reforms more for political gain than for improving 
conservation outcomes. Further exploration of individual motivations anchored in 
historical contexts would illuminate the validity of generalizations made here.  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
HOW SACRED VALUE FACILITATES THE CONTROL OF POACHING 
In the present global epidemic of rhino poaching, why have only weak and poor 
countries controlled rhino poaching? In the preceding chapters, I explored this puzzle to 
understand why some countries are more effective than others at controlling poaching. 
Rhinos are effectively controlled when individuals construct them using Communal 
Sharing or Authority Ranking relational models, thus protecting them through moral 
mechanisms even when state capacity and economic alternatives are lacking. This 
research is both significant–– in that rhinos are critically endangered throughout the 
globe— and puzzling, given dominant assumptions throughout conservation literature 
and practice that privilege state capacity and economic incentives. 
 
Literature Explaining Conservation Outcomes 
Mainstream conservation literature inadequate explains the success at controlling 
poaching demonstrated by countries like Nepal and Swaziland. Social scientific 
explorations of conservation outcomes are a nascent field, originating only four decades 
ago with the advent of the modern environmental movement.281 The 1970s saw work in 
                                                 
281 Raymond L. Bryant and Sinéad Bailey, Third World Political Ecology (London ; New York: Routledge, 
1997), 10; Clark Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5; Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution 
of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 2. 
                               
 
 
153 
this field emphasized public structures to constrain individual decisions regarding 
common pool resources, while the second decade emphasized varied preferences from 
private interests within those structures. By the 2000s, both approaches were insufficient, 
and scholars increasingly looked to communities as the focal level of analysis.282 Recent 
critical scholarship points to wildlife value orientations and social factors as potentially 
significant; yet within this dimension, it is unclear what social factors matter and why.283 
Relational models theory illuminates such factors. Identifying four fundamental, 
universal, and innate modes structuring interaction between individuals, this theory 
postulates that individuals construct value for objects depending on the relational mode 
with which they associate that object.284 When individuals associate an object with a 
Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, or Equality Matching relationship, the object 
attains incomparable or sacred value. Conversely, when individuals associate an object 
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with a Market Pricing relationship, the object possesses fungible or secular value. The 
type of value an individual associates with an object determines how that individual 
responds to proposed trade-offs regarding that object. 
The Sacred Value Protection Model identifies three forms of trade-off 
reasoning.285 In routine trade-offs, individuals compare two objects of fungible or secular 
value. In essence, this assigns a price to an object. In tragic trade-offs, individuals 
compare two incomparable or sacred objects, such as weighing the life of a mother 
against that of a child during a difficult pregnancy. Such situations where significant loss 
is unavoidable define tragedies. 
Taboo trade-offs are the third form of trade-off reasoning, where an individual 
compares an object with fungible or secular value to an object with incomparable or 
sacred value. Such situations threaten the social relationship associated with the sacred 
object, eliciting cognitive, emotional, and affective behaviors from individuals who 
contemplate the taboo trade-off, specifically moral outrage and moral cleansing. 
Moral outrage refers to actions by an individual seeking to punish both the norm 
violator who proposes the taboo trade-off and a metanorm violator who approves of the 
taboo trade-off. An example of moral outrage is pressuring an authority to harshly punish 
a poacher, or seeking to inform on or punish a poacher oneself. 
Moral cleansing refers to symbolic actions by an individual to outwardly 
disassociate oneself with the taboo trade-off. An example of moral cleansing is joining a 
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protest or advocacy group, making public statements against poaching, or disavowing 
previous participation in poaching. Out, damned spot! Out, I say!286 
If individuals living near endangered wildlife construct such species with non-
Market Priced relational models, then poaching of those species becomes a taboo trade-
off, eliciting moral outrage and cleansing that can facilitate effective control of poaching. 
To assess this hypothesis, this research first sought to understand where rhino 
poaching has been effectively controlled by cataloging rhino poaching events around the 
world by country. Next, to assess whether relational models correlate with the effective 
control of poaching, I utilized formal institutional rules as proxy measures for 
predominate relational models. After establishing that such a correlation exists, I then 
sought to understand whether the relational models manifested by individuals correspond 
with that suggested by formal institutional rules in three cases. I selected three cases 
whose formal institutional rules suggested ideal type variance of relational models, 
namely Communal Sharing in Nepal, Authority Ranking in Swaziland, and Market 
Pricing in South Africa. After finding that individuals within these cases employed 
relational models consistent with the relational model suggested by formal institutional 
rules, I then investigated the case of Nepal to understand how moral outrage and 
cleansing mechanisms facilitated the effective control of poaching. I did so by assessing 
an analytic narrative of Nepal’s successful control of poaching after the 2006 crisis. 
 
  
                                                 
286 William Shakespeare, MacBeth, V.1.25. 
                               
 
 
156 
Findings 
The Control of Rhino Poaching 
In Chapter 3, I explored the relationship between the control of poaching and 
formal institutional rules associated with certain relational models. Drawing from 
literature on social control, criminology, and common pool resource management, I 
operationally define poaching as controlled when the illegal harvesting of rhino is rare, 
punished, and does not threaten a population with extirpation.287  
Since 2006, rhino poaching has been effectively controlled in five rhino range 
states: Botswana, Nepal, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia.  
Poaching has not been controlled in the Democratic Republic of Congo, India, 
Kenya, Malaysia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe; rhino 
have been extirpated in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2010, in Malaysia in 2011, 
in Mozambique in 2013, and in Vietnam in 2010.  
In Indonesia, Malawi, and Uganda, poaching may have been controlled; however, 
I exclude these from my analysis because it is unclear whether poaching is controlled 
there or simple absent. While the absence of poaching is beneficial for conservation, it is 
not the same as effectively controlling poaching. It is hypothetically possible that 
transnational criminal organizations engaged in rhino poaching have simply not 
attempted to operate within these countries. While such an agential decision merits 
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further inquiry, it lies beyond the scope of this research into whether social constructions 
of rhino significantly vary. 
 
Relational Models and the Control of Poaching 
Of the universe of countries with wild rhino populations, all five countries with 
formal institutional rules for rhino conservation consistent with Communal Sharing or 
Authority Ranking relational models effectively controlled poaching.  
Conversely, nine countries with formal institutional rules for rhino conservation 
associated with the Market Pricing relational model did not effectively control poaching; 
in four of these, rhino were extirpated. 
 There was no relationship between state capacity indicators or economic 
incentives and the control or lack of control of poaching, except that states with the 
largest capacity and ecotourism sectors also experienced the most intense poaching. 
 
Manifestations of Relational Models in Individual 
In Chapter 4, I explored whether formal institutional rules accurately reflect actual 
relational models used by individuals within a country.  
Focusing on three countries whose institutional rules suggested ideal type 
variance among relational models, I found that a significant majority of rhino 
conservationists in Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa employed a single relational 
model, and that model was consistent with the formal institutional rules in that country 
for rhino conservation. In Nepal, this predominant model was Communal Sharing (n= 31 
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of 35). In Swaziland, the predominant model was Authority Ranking (n=18 of 24). In 
South Africa, the predominant model was Market Pricing (n=28 of 32).  
 
Moral Mechanisms in Nepal’s Control of Poaching 
 
In Chapter 5, I investigated whether the moral outrage and moral cleansing 
mechanisms predicted by the Sacred Value Protection Model facilitated Nepal's effective 
control of poaching.  
Through an analytic narrative, I established that moral outrage and cleansing were 
the key mechanisms generating community pressure on public authorities to control 
poaching. This community pressure occurred despite a lack of material economic 
incentives, and countered state capacity that was at best ambivalent to and occasionally 
even complicit in rhino poaching. This moral outrage and cleansing was critical in 
facilitating Nepal's effective response to poaching and emergence as the world's most 
successful country in controlling rhino poaching. 
 
Summary 
These findings collectively establish that relational models are a critical variable 
in explaining the effective control of rhino poaching. Since the 2006 global epidemic in 
rhino poaching began, only countries where non-Market Priced relational models 
predominate have effectively controlled poaching. In these countries, most individuals 
construct rhinos either as something they hold in common or in relation to a hierarchical 
authority. Rhino poaching then becomes a taboo trade-off, eliciting moral outrage and 
cleansing that pressures public authorities to adapt to poaching operations and effectively 
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control poaching. This moral outrage and cleansing can occur despite weak state capacity 
and in the absence of economic incentives to control poaching. Paradoxically, such 
economic incentives might be incompatible with these moral mechanisms, and mute any 
outrage or cleansing poaching might otherwise elicit. 
 
Limitations 
This research is chiefly limited in its scope and level of analysis. First, this 
research has examined whether social constructions of rhino vary, and if any such 
variance matters. This focus is significant, as conventional discourses on conservation 
uncritically embed assumptions about state capacity and especially economic incentives. 
For example, during a recent contested debate over legalization of rhino horn trade at the 
Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species’ 17th Conference of Parties, 
one legalization advocate exclaimed "conservation that doesn't generate profits is merely 
conversation!" This research has critically examined such perspectives, demonstrating 
that constructing wildlife as a commodity (i.e. relating to it with a Market Pricing 
relational schemata) is a choice some actors make while other actors do not. Those who 
do not construct rhino as commodities are more effective at controlling rhino poaching in 
the current crisis. 
Yet in seeking to demonstrate that social constructions of rhino can vary in a 
significant way, I have not explored why such constructions vary. What causes 
individuals to use one relational model versus another? Under the pressures of a taboo 
trade-off, what is the durability of a non-Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking 
relational model? In other words, how long will moral outrage and cleansing last? 
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Experimental research in trade-off reasoning suggests that these effects mute in the 
presence of confusing framing, and potentially with time.288 What is the instrumental 
purpose of ascribing incomparable value to an object?289 How do relational models 
change and evolve?290 Having established that sacred values matter, future research 
should explore the causes and dynamics of changes of such values and relational models. 
Moreover, I do not claim that the institutional trajectory of Nepal nor relational 
models themselves offer panaceas to the contemporary challenge of poaching, rhino or 
otherwise. Mindful of Ostrom and Cox's injunction to avoid such panaceas while moving 
towards a diagnostic approach in understanding social-ecological systems, this bears 
underscoring.291 Just as rhino present unique conservation challenges distinct from those 
posed by other endangered species, each country and indeed each community engaging in 
resource management is distinct from others. Rhino are not elephants, and Nepal is not 
South Africa.  
However, even as we should not conflate distinct cases into one universal 
template for conservation, neither should we assume no parallel generalities exist 
between cases. My analysis of institutional rules and relational models research conforms 
to Levin’s call for searching for patterns across cases, and my analytic narrative to 
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George and Bennett’s for typological theorizing.292 An essential task for scientific 
research is to explore what is distinguishable from what is common across varied cases. 
This research suggests that relational models are one such distinguishable commonality. 
A second limitation lies in this project's level of analysis and generalizability. I 
have focused on outcomes at the national level, moving through explanatory variables 
from the national level through the community to the individual. In doing so, I have 
conflated action situations while assuming holons, nested subassemblies of part-whole 
units in complex adaptive systems.293  
In reality, there may be systematic effects and connections between these levels 
that this research did not consider. For instance, my analysis of state capacity privileged 
instrumental uses of that capacity. Given the inescapable politics of wildlife policy 
outcomes, it is both possible and likely that public authorities responded to public 
pressure to control poaching for political purposes beyond the efficacy of addressing 
poaching.294 From this, it is likely that the politics of rhino poaching policy contributed to 
successful adaptions to the contemporary crisis, such as the embrace of anti-poaching by 
Nepal's Maoist leader. While this research’s focus on varying social constructions has 
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identified a source of political pressure for that political decision, I have not fully 
explored the politics of that decision itself. This question bears further research. 
Similarly, I operationalized actors for rhino social-ecological systems as 
belonging to three categories: poachers, public authorities, and community members. 
This generalization is consistent with the framework approached advocated by Ostrom 
and others.295 However, such generalization may miss important variation among actors 
within these groups, such as that between a national park official and an Army soldier 
within the broad category of public authority, or among different levels of poachers. This 
potential variation could also be explored in further detail to assess its significance. 
Against such limitations, I plead theoretical eclecticism in pursuit of 
understanding why weak and poor states have controlled poaching, and investigating 
whether social constructions can matter. This type of “methodological ‘bet’ about which 
unit of aggregation will produce tractable and empirically powerful explanations” is 
justified both by its attention to micro-foundations of actors, and I hope by its findings.296 
However, future research should explore variance among levels of analysis and within 
categories of actors.  
A deeper challenge to these findings lies in my privileging material interests in 
appraising economic incentives. For instance, following prospect theory, it is possible 
that individuals who did not materially benefit from ecotourism nonetheless believed that 
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if rhino poaching were controlled, such benefits would materialize in the future. Against 
that critique, I note that such benefits have still not yet materialized in countries like 
Nepal, and that individual statements and behaviors I observed did not suggest that 
individuals are motivated by economic gains. Nevertheless, given the centrality of utility 
maximization in conservation discourses and the challenge my research poses to that 
economic approach, this potential critique should be further explored through prospect 
theory. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
This research has implications for the theoretical employment of relational models 
and the diagnostic approach to explaining conservation outcomes, and suggests an 
institutional sequence of endangered species protection. 
 
Relational Models Theory and Sacred Value Protection 
First, this research has demonstrated the utility of relational models theory and the 
sacred value protection model in explaining conservation outcomes. Contemporary 
research in wildlife policy points towards psychological variance in wildlife value 
orientations,297 social capital,298 and institutionalized norms299 as key explanatory factors 
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in understanding outcomes regarding wildlife policy and common pool resource 
management. This research suggests that the relational schemata identified in relational 
models theory are important variables previous studies pointed towards. 
 
Social-Ecological Systems Framework 
Similarly, these findings lend credence to the utility of Ostrom's diagnostic 
framework for understanding social-ecological systems. This approach enabled cross-
case comparison and analysis of a variety of cases involving rhino conservation. Ostrom 
and McGinnis (2014) argued that this approach could enable scholars and practitioners to 
compare diverse cases by focusing on a key level of analysis, identifying which variables 
at that level can be observed and measured, and communicating the results of such 
variables across research communities.300 My research fruitfully followed that approach, 
focusing on the interactions between poachers, public authorities, and community 
members, particularly the relational models employed in those interactions. These 
findings are relevant not only to political and social scientists, but also to scholars and 
practitioners from the wide range of disciplines engaged in conservation. As such, this 
demonstrates the value of the social-ecological system framework approach and its 
potential for further illuminating wildlife policy and conservation outcomes.  
An Institutional Sequence for Endangered Species Protection? 
From that perspective of institutional analysis, it appears that successful 
conservation of endangered species may follow an institutional sequence. In Nepal, 
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effective control of poaching began with a critical juncture, at the point where 
populations of the endangered species fell to an alarming level. This occurred around 
1973, after the lifting of royal protections from rhino habitat joined with increased human 
population pressure on rhino populations following DEET-induced malarial eradication.  
At this critical juncture, a public authority established a physical boundary 
separating the endangered species from human populations, and assigned guards and 
monitors to enforce that boundary and generate information about the species. In Nepal, 
this occurred when the government established the Chitwan National Park as a protected 
area, and assigned the Nepalese Army to guard the park. Meanwhile, Forestry 
Department officials monitored populations in conjunction with both international NGOs 
(WWF-Nepal) and domestic NGOs (the KMTNC). 
Next, community members were re-socialized to interact with the endangered 
species in a non-exploitative way. In Nepal, this occurred through the creation of the 
national park buffer zone community forests. Significantly, these community members 
were allowed to harvest grass and other forest products from rhino habitats, but not to 
profit from rhinos themselves. Ecotourism drawing foreign tourist receipts and revenue 
was pitched by international conservationists but never materialized in reality; even 
today, Nepal’s ecotourism sector today remains a world apart from thriving ecotourism 
sectors across sub-Saharan Africa and even neighboring India. In this manner, 
community members became socialized to construct the endangered species with their 
community, forming Communal Sharing relational models.  
Echoing Marx’s concept of a metabolic rift, it may be that when unsustainable 
extraction of a resource threatens a species with extirpation or extinction, the key to 
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averting that outcome is restoration of a species' social and ecological ties to the 
community members who live near it, and the public authorities who guard and monitor 
it. This metabolic restoration socially restores the exploited wildlife from alienation to an 
ecological metabolism.301 Social welfare studies identify that de-commodification occurs 
when a service formerly constructed as a commodity becomes a matter of right, severing 
its existence from a market.302 Nepal’s rhinos may demonstrate the potential of species 
de-commodification as a means of protection against surging illicit demand in wildlife 
trafficking. 
These moral mechanisms proved critical to Nepal's effective control of rhino 
poaching despite the fantastically lucrative price commanded by rhino horn after 2006 
and the absence of effective state capacity after Nepal's civil war. Further research into 
protection of endangered species should compare this institutional sequence to path 
trajectories in other cases where communities have attempted to conserve endangered 
flora and fauna. 
 
The Price of Rhino Horn and the Evolution of Relational Models 
Finally, more research is needed into understanding two factors outside the scope 
of these findings. First, further study should be conducted into why the global price of 
rhino horn increased as it did in 2006. Based on extent literature on the crisis, this study 
assumed that this price shift occurred exogenously due to a market manipulation by 
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syndicates trafficking rhino horn to emerging markets in East Asia, namely Vietnam and 
China. However, this event is prone to facile explanations and inferences derived thereof.  
Many assume that rhino horn is a normal good, and that demand pressures driving 
current poaching can be reduced by simple measures such as creating a legal trade for 
horn, farmed or otherwise,303 or synthetically creating a substitute good.304 However, 
rhino horn is in fact more properly considered a Veblen good, whose demand is 
proportional to and a function of its high price. This concept was first identified in the 
late 19th century as part of the conspicuous consumption of industrialization's nouveau 
riche.305 In today's demand for rhino horn, it appears this phenomenon now occurs in 
contemporary East Asia. Further economic research should explore market dynamics of 
such Veblen goods, particularly as they involve illicit markets and transnational criminal 
organizations. 
Similarly, having established what relational models can cause in relation to 
conservation outcomes, further research should explore what causes relational models. 
Why do relational models vary? How do relational models change? When engaged in 
taboo trade-off reasoning, how long a non-Market Priced relational model endure? 
Relational model theorists have identified relational model evolution as a future direction 
for research, exploring why and how some objects attain incomparable value while others 
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do not.306 Synthesizing these questions with political science research into varying social 
constructions of wildlife and privatization in governance could generate novel insights 
into why relational models change.307 
 
Policy Implications 
This research demonstrates that how we think about endangered wildlife matters. 
This holds practical implications for the immediate challenge of rhino conservation and 
the protection of other endangered species, and for broader issues of state-building, 
ecotourism, and countering illicit trafficking. 
For rhino conservation, these findings suggest that the path toward successful 
conservation and the control of rhino poaching lies in socializing community members to 
value rhinos as communal responsibilities, rather than in a militarized focus on increasing 
state coercive capacity or through economic incentives like ecotourism. While state 
capacity remains a necessary element of effective control of poaching, it is no substitute 
for price-shock resistant moral mechanisms built on de-commodified community 
relationships. The recent success of community-centered anti-poaching efforts in South 
Africa such as the Black Mambas underscores the external validity of such 
mechanisms.308  
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Similarly, these findings suggest that efforts to protect rhinos and endangered 
species through economic incentives like ecotourism are problematic. Given the 
fantastically lucrative profit potential for a single act of poaching, promoting sustainable 
alternative uses of rhino and similar endangered species are at best ineffective. At worst, 
such measures may exacerbate the very poaching they seek to address by legitimizing the 
economic exploitation and commodification of wildlife like rhino, and socializing 
community members and public authorities alike to see such wildlife through Market 
Pricing relational schemata, thereby suppressing moral mechanisms that could contribute 
to endangered species protection. 
Similarly, current public discourses about economic solutions to rhino poaching 
are likewise at best ineffective, and may in fact contribute to increased poaching. 
Legalizing trade in rhino horn, promoting the agricultural farming of rhino for ecotourism 
game parks, and auctioning hunting permits for rhino to the highest tourist bidder likely 
legitimizes the construction of rhinos as commodities and encourages individuals to 
reference rhinos using the Market Priced relational model. Regardless of any short term 
gains in revenue generated for endangered species protection and conservation, such 
economic solutions may ultimately prove counterproductive by dampening the only 
demonstrated mechanism for effectively controlling rhino poaching in the current crisis. 
In the end, it matters how we think about endangered species like rhino. When we 
construct rhino as commodities, we relate to them through a Market Pricing relational 
model. Under such circumstances and discourse, whether a poacher successfully kills a 
rhino becomes a function of the profit potential for that poacher and the capacity of 
public authorities. To effectively control poaching under this Market Priced 
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circumstance, either the price of rhino horn must decrease or the socioeconomic status of 
that poacher must increase until such poaching becomes irrational.  
Alternatively, increasing the capacity of the public authorities relative to rhinos 
could increase to the point where guards could guarantee the rhino’s security. However, 
Kenya's example regarding state capacity is instructive. There, the last three northern 
white rhino in existence are continuously guarded by rangers at arms’ distance, 
suggesting that while a concentration of public authorities around rhino is possible, it can 
only exist with populations teetering on the brink of extinction. At the same time, the 
intensely militarized intensive protection zone of South Africa’s Kruger National Park 
continues to lose rhino to poachers at an alarming rate. During 2015, this area was losing 
approximately three rhinos per day, demonstrating that not even green militarization is 
enough to controlling poaching. 
Yet countries like Nepal show that an alternative outcome is possible. When we 
think about endangered species like rhino in reference to our community or to a common 
hierarchical authority— when we use Communal Sharing or Authority Ranking relational 
models to construct rhino— poaching becomes a threat not only to wildlife but to our 
relationships with a community. This elicits moral responses— outrage and cleansing— 
that block cost-benefit calculations of profit potential and pressure public authorities to 
guard, monitor, and sanction poachers.  
The essence of these moral mechanisms is for a community member to see in the 
rhino him or herself, and to associate rhino with his or her relationship to the community. 
During fieldwork for this dissertation, Nepali respondents repeatedly responded to the 
question, "Are rhinos important to you?" by exclaiming, "I am Nepali!" Many continued 
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speaking of personal encounters with rhino. One flatly told me, "rhinos are safe here," 
while another teenager took me into his community forest to proudly show me his 
community’s resident rhino, living openly without a guard or a fence in sight. These 
respondents overwhelming described Nepal’s rhino as fellow members of their 
community, for whom they felt moral responsibility. 
Ultimately, the responsibility one feels for wildlife protection is a function of how 
one values it. In his essay “Money Versus Goods,” the poet and conservationist Wendell 
Berry observed that: 
A proper economy, moreover, would designate certain things as priceless. This 
would not be, as now, the “priceless” of things that are extremely rare or expensive, but 
would refer to things of absolute value, beyond and above any price that could be set 
upon them by any market. The things of absolute value would be fertile land, clean water 
and air, ecological health, and the capacity of nature to renew herself in the economic 
landscape. . . . there are precedents in all societies and traditions that have understood the 
land or the world as sacred—or, speaking practically, as possessing a suprahuman value. 
The rule of pricelessness clearly imposes certain limits upon the idea of land ownership. 
Owners would enjoy certain customary privileges, necessarily, as the land would be 
entrusted to their intelligence and responsibility. But they would be expected to use the 
land as its servants and on behalf of all the living.309 
 
From this perspective, if we designate certain wildlife like rhino beyond and 
above any price set upon them by a market, we simultaneously constrain our choices of 
actions regarding such wildlife and create positive moral obligations to act toward that 
wildlife in a public trust.  
This research supports that view. In today's crisis of rhino poaching, the only 
effective control of poaching occurs where community members construct rhino as 
elements of that community, to be defended against profit seeking poachers and despite 
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resource constrained authorities. In a globalized market where rhino horn costs more than 
cocaine and gold, and rhino exist only in remote environments guarded by authorities of 
limited capacity, de-commodification and the morality of community members may be 
wild rhino's only hope. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Interview Questionnaire 
Project Synopsis 
This project explores how various communities manage rhino conservation and rhino poaching, 
and assesses factors that impact the control of poaching.  In particular, field research is being 
conducted to assess rules, norms, and shared strategies vary in different locales, and how factors 
affect responses to poaching.  
 
Research Questions 
 
1) What is the social construction of a rhino in a given locale?  
2) What is the dominant relational model used to construct rhinos in a locale? 
3) What are the institutional characteristics of communities that control rhino poaching?  
4) How do conservation organizations manage the threat of poaching?   
5) What lessons have been learned from the various ways in conservationists have sought to 
protect rhinos?  
 
Research Participants: Government officials involved in rhino conservation, professional 
conservation practitioners; local scholars and analysts; international conservation specialists, local 
conservation leaders and participants.  
 
Assessment: In order to assess and compare various episodes of rhino poaching, I will interview 
government officials, conservation actors, and local participants and experts regarding their roles, 
insights, and perceptions of rhinos and efforts to conserve rhinos and counter rhino poaching.  
 
Interview Questions 
 
Introduction and Context Assessment 
 
1. Tell me a bit about your own professional pathway, and in particular what drew you 
personally to become involved in rhino conservation?  (e.g., How did you come to work in your 
current occupation? Or, what is your relationship to the conflict episode under consideration?) 
 
2. What do you do in relation to rhino conservation? 
 
3. What are the present opportunities for, and challenges, to rhino conservation in [location]?
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Social Construction and Relational Model to Rhinos 
 
4. What do you think should happen to rhinos? 
 
5. Is it important to conserve rhinos? If so, why? 
 
6. Why are rhinos important in [ place]? 
 
7. How should rhinos be treated by society? 
 
8. Are there other things that are equivalent to rhinos? If so, what? 
 
9. Who is responsible for rhinos? 
 
10. Where do rhinos live? Who does that land belong to? 
 
11. Who should make decisions about rhinos? 
 
12. What groups are involved with rhinos? 
 
13. What is happening to rhinos? Why do you think that is happening? 
 
 
Institutions Regarding Rhinos 
 
14. What are rules associated with rhinos in your country? 
 
15. Is there a boundary around rhinos? 
 
16. Who guards rhinos? 
 
17. Is hunting a rhino legal? Is it ok? 
 
18. Can you legally own a rhino? Should you? 
 
19. What do you think about poaching? 
 
20. What is the penalty for poaching a rhino? What do you think the penalty should be? 
 
 
 
Historical Experiences with Poaching 
 
21. When have rhinos been poached in your country? What happened? 
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22. Was there a response to the poaching? What do you think should have happened? 
 
23. What do you think prevents poaching? 
 
24. What do you think should be done about rhinos in your country? 
 
 
Assessment of Rhino Conservation 
 
25. What is your view of the role that conservation actors have played in supporting rhino 
conservation in [insert location]? When did your organization start working in this region? Has it 
received support from the state or international donors? 
 
26. What is the approach of the rhino conservation policy as it relates to controlling poaching?  
How does the conservation program aim to achieve its stated goals? 
 
27. What were the principal challenges in terms of the design, organization, or implementation of 
the rhino conservation in [insert location]?  What constraints does your organization face in 
implementing its projects and programs (e.g., economic, political, temporal, normative)?   
 
28. In your view, how important has your organization’s programming been for helping to 
improve conservation and this community?  
 
29. In what ways has conservation programming protected rhinos?  What are various metrics of 
success (e.g., decreased poaching rates, more arrests, less attempts etc.)?   
 
30. What are your reflections on the scale and scope of the efforts in terms of its overall 
contribution to rhino conservation?  
 
31. What are the principal lessons learned for rhino conservation (e.g., what works or does not 
work)?  In your view, what could conservation organizations do differently to have a greater 
positive impact on preventing rhino poaching in this community?  
 
32. Is there anything else that I haven’t covered here that you would like to share? 
 
 
